



Australian Government



NATIONAL
ARCHIVES
OF AUSTRALIA

Your story, our history

These copies are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) you should familiarise yourself with any copyright obligations.

NAA: A1838, 175/11/20/15 PART 2

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 175/11/20/15 PART 2

Barcode: 424209

Number of pages: 204

Australian policy in relation to the Israeli attack on Egypt, United Kingdom-French intervention and related developments

File No.

SECRET.

FORMER PAPERS *Part 1*

LATER PAPERS *PART 3*

ARCHIVAL ACTION

R p

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared
<div style="position: relative; height: 100px;"> <div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; right: 10px; font-size: 2em; color: blue; font-weight: bold;">CLOSED</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 40px; left: 30%; font-size: 3em; color: blue; font-weight: bold;">BASEMENT</div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 60px; right: 10%; border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> <div style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">WARNING</div> <div style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">ARCHIVAL FILE</div> <div style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">Return to Registrar</div> <div style="color: red; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.5em;">RP</div> <div style="color: red; font-size: 0.8em;">Archival Action.....</div> </div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 80px; left: 30%; border: 2px solid blue; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> <div style="color: blue; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">CAUTION</div> <div style="color: blue; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.1em;">This file contains Cabinet Documents</div> </div> </div>														
<div style="position: relative; height: 100px;"> <div style="position: absolute; bottom: 10px; right: 10px; font-size: 2em; color: blue; font-weight: bold;">CLOSED</div> </div>														

CLOSED

File No. 73-1471

175/11/20/15

PT. NO. 2

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON 29th November 1956

THIS PART CLOSED ON 21st November 1956

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE PART 3

SECRET

SECRET

175/11/20.

27th November, 1956.

ISRAEL PLAN FOR SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

: THE SECRETARY

In the attached telegram Mr. Ballard refers, in the context of a possible package deal, to an Israeli eight-point plan for settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. The plan first appeared in the Tel Aviv press on 20th December, 1955, as a report from Washington that the State Department had received from Israeli sources proposals for a "plan for peace" with the Arab States.

2. Later press reports stated that the proposal was not embodied in any formal approach, but was a collection of previous Israeli proposals. Mr. Ballard commented at the time that the proposals were "consonant with official thinking" and that they no doubt represented a maximum for the Arabs and a minimum for Israel.

3. The eight points of the plan are :-

- a) Direct talks between Israel and representatives of the Arab states, especially Egypt.
- b) Adjustment of frontier lines but no unilateral cession of territory by Israel.
- c) The re-creation of Israel as the hub of the Middle East communication wheel. Israel would be willing to permit the Arabs to establish land and air communications on the north-south artery between Egypt and the Lebanon, and between Egypt and Jordan from east and west.
- d) Israel in return would expect the Arab states to grant her similar land and air communications facilities in Arab territories.
- e) Jordan would be given free port facilities at Haifa.
- f) Israel would agree to pay compensation to Arab refugees. The return of the refugees to their former homes in Israel was ruled out, but the Israel Government was prepared to accept the United States offer of a loan to provide compensation.
- g) Co-operation with the Arabs in plans for sharing waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.
- h) The maintenance of the status quo in the divided city of Jerusalem.

Middle East Section.
IEN:EH.

(J.C.G. Kevin)
Assistant Secretary,
Division 4.

SECRET

195

F

N.B. under instructions
from the Secretary I
rang Miss Hauser
last night and told
her to place a copy
before Mr Philip McBride
before it was circulated
to ministers. ~~that~~ the
understood the position

wrote 26/11

~~Mr. Landish~~

26/11

Mr. Bullington

For the file

wrote 28/11

SECRET

For the Secretary
This will be teleprinted to the Minister's office
in Melbourne tonight. PM's staff in Melbourne
will attend and circulate it to Ministers tomorrow 28/11
was 27/11

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Secretary saw this - He took out

FOR CABINET: last sentence of paragraph 5 SECRET

He was not convinced

Submission No.

For information.

That conclusion Ben had
been rejected was 28/11

THE MIDDLE EAST

Some progress has now been made in the United Nations
with the five basic problems concerning the United Nations Emergency
Force (U.N.E.F.).

(1) Clearing the Canal:

2. The Secretary-General has proposed that, on behalf of
the General Assembly, he should be responsible for clearing the Canal,
using Dutch and Danish firms. He has now been authorised by the
General Assembly to go ahead and negotiate agreements so that clearance
can be speedily and effectively undertaken. To assist him in this work,
Mr. Hammarskjöld has selected General C.A. Wheeler of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. J.J. McCloy, Chairman of the
Chase-Manhattan Bank and Mr. Katzin, a deputy Under-Secretary of the
United Nations Secretariat.

3. The area held by Anglo-French forces has now been cleared.
Egypt holds that clearing operations should not begin in the Egyptian-
held area until the Anglo-French forces have been evacuated. However, Mr.
Hammarskjöld hopes to get survey and reconnaissance work under way,
almost immediately, before evacuation is complete; he claims that Egypt
is just as anxious as the United Kingdom to get the Canal cleared.

4. The General Assembly has yet to make financial provisions
to meet the cost of the clearing of the Canal by the United Nations.
There are no definite indications as to who is to pay for clearance;
however, as the work is to be done by the United Nations, there may be
an implication that the cost will be shared by the Members of the United
Nations, possibly upon the same basis as that previously recommended by
the Secretary-General for meeting the expenses of the U.N.E.F. Force
(allocation of costs in accordance with the proportionate contributions
of Members to the Budget of the United Nations).

SECRET

Teleprinted
to Minister's Office
Melbourne by
message No. 1337
of 27/11

193

SECRET

2.

5. There is also no clear indication as to what the cost of clearing the Canal will be. One figure mentioned is in excess of \$10 million. If this estimate is correct and if the basis for meeting the cost of clearance is that mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Australia's contribution would be something in excess of \$165,000 (£A73,661), that is, 1.65% of \$10 million. ~~As in the case of Australia's contribution to the budget of the United Nations, it appears that all of this sum would be payable in dollars.~~

6. The question of the estimated cost to Australia of the clearing of the Canal by the United Nations is complicated by the fact that the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary has apparently suggested to the United Kingdom Government that the United Kingdom might get around any difficulty over the provision by the United Nations of funds for clearance by offering the salvage facilities which it has upon the spot in Egypt free of charge.

(2) Composition of U.N.E.F.:

7. The Egyptians take the view that they have the right at least to be consulted about the component contingents of U.N.E.F.. The Secretary-General has taken a somewhat equivocal position: he claims that he is the determining authority (although he may consult the Egyptians) but, on the other hand, he has stated that he intends to negotiate with Egypt concerning any additions to the list of countries which may contribute contingents. The Canadian contingent, apart from administrative personnel and air transport, and a New Zealand contingent have been rejected by Mr. Hammarskjöld as being "unacceptable" to Egypt.

(3) Area of Operation of U.N.E.F.:

8. The General Assembly has approved the Secretary-General's interpretation of the United Nations resolutions that the area of operation shall extend roughly from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line, i.e. the Sinai area, which is still occupied by Israeli forces. 192

9. There are, however, conflicting views about the Port Said-Canal area. Nasser has stipulated that U.N.E.F. shall have no function in Port Said and the Canal area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces. The Secretary-General considers that although the

SECRET

SECRET

3.

ostensible area of operations should be on the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line, there must be a base on the Canal as it is the only feasible place logistically; moreover, the Israelis have not withdrawn from Sinai. He has agreed with the United Kingdom that U.N.E.F. must be in Port Said when the Anglo-French forces leave and that it will have to remain in the Canal area "for some time".

(4) Duration of U.N.E.F.:

10. The Secretary-General takes the view that the duration of the force is related to its functions (regarding the precise extent to which there still is no general agreement) and that it should not be withdrawn until the General Assembly has decided that it has carried out those functions. Canada agrees with this view. The United Kingdom, although they regard Hammarskjöld's view as unsatisfactory (it leaves the question to the mercy of the General Assembly) feel that they have no alternative but to accept it.

11. Nasser has stipulated that U.N.E.F. can only remain and operate in Egypt with Egypt's continuing consent. However, in his talks with Mr. Hammarskjöld in Cairo, Nasser stated at one point that U.N.E.F. might have to remain four years as long as its functions did not include enforcing a settlement of the Canal problem.

(5) U.N.E.F. - Cost:

12. On 22nd November, the Secretary-General recommended that the cost of the United Nations Emergency Force should be allocated among Members of the United Nations on the basis of the scale of assessments to be adopted for contributions to the United Nations budget for 1957. The Secretary-General also recommended that an initial sum of \$10 million should be voted for the cost of the Force.

13. Before these recommendations were considered by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General withdrew the recommendation regarding the allocation of the expenses of the Force among Members in favour of a recommendation that the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the Assembly should consider and report upon the question. It is not known yet whether this recommendation has been adopted by the Assembly. 191

/14. No information....

SECRET

SECRET

4.

14. No information has been received as to what the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly may decide to do if this question of the allocation of cost of the Force is referred to it. If the recommendation of the Secretary-General which was withdrawn is taken up by the Committee, Australia's contribution towards the expenses of the Force would amount to \$165,000 (£A73,661). This estimate is based upon the percentage of the United Nations budget which Australia will probably have to pay in 1957, that is, 1.65%. The percentage which Australia is at present paying is higher than this figure (1.80%) but the Committee on Contributions has recommended that this figure be reduced 1.65% in 1957. If this recommendation were rejected, however, Australia's share of the cost of the Force would amount to \$180,000 (£A80,357). As is the case with Australia's contribution to the budget of the United Nations, it appears that all of this sum would be payable in dollars.

15. These estimates of Australia's probable contribution towards the cost of the Force are based upon the Secretary-General's assessment of the cost at this time, that is, \$10 million. In the event, this assessment may of course prove to be lower (or higher) than the actual cost.

(6) Situation in Syria:

16. There is evidence that the Soviet Union is building up its strength in Syria. The Syrian President has frankly stated to President Chamoun of Lebanon that he has received from the Soviet, virtually free of charge, considerably more arms and equipment than he had hoped for.

17. The Russians may have a number of objectives in mind -

- (a) consistently with their past policy, they may be seeking to maintain tension in the Middle East at a high pitch to the detriment of Western interests and the improvement of their own position;
- (b) they may be seeking to establish in the Middle East a centre additional to Egypt;

SECRET/(c) if they can....

190

SECRET

5.

- (c) if they can consolidate their position in Syria, they are in a position to weaken the Baghdad Pact and the eastern flank of N.A.T.O. from the rear.

(7) United Kingdom Assessment of Soviet Intentions:

18. The latest British estimate, made on 16th November by Sir William Hayter in Moscow, is as follows -

- (a) Russia's first objective is the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from Egypt. The Soviet has reluctantly accepted the United Nations Force as a means to that end.
- (b) As soon as the Anglo-French forces go the heat will be turned on to the United Nations Force whose withdrawal will be the immediate next objective.
- (c) When all forces are out Arab resentment will be exploited and organised to the full to the detriment of Western positions in the Middle East.
- (d) The "volunteers" idea will probably not be taken now, but will be produced again if further fighting should break out in the area.
- (e) Soviet policy completely writes off Israel and Israel will be subjected to maximum pressure; extreme Arab demands against her can expect Soviet support.

(8) Baghdad Pact:

19. The four Muslim members of the Pact (Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran) are showing considerable concern at the build-up of Soviet strength in Syria which they regard as now little more than a satellite of Moscow. They are supported in this by the fact that Lebanon which has hitherto held aloof from the Baghdad Pact alignment, has now felt compelled to appeal to Pact members (Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom) for help in the face of what they regard as an imminent Syrian-Soviet threat. The United Kingdom has already responded to this request by supplying immediately on loan a quantity of small arms. The United Kingdom is also ascertaining Lebanon's requirements of tanks, guns and aircraft.

189

SECRET

/20. Due to these....

20. Due to these fears the four Powers have now formally and urgently requested the United States to become a member of the Pact immediately and have appealed to the United Kingdom and the United States for additional arms and other aid.

21. United States Ambassadors in the Middle East have recommended that the United States become a member of the Pact but present indications are that the United States wishes to avoid any implication that it is linking its policy in the Middle East with that of the United Kingdom and that for the time being at least, it prefers to seek a solution of Middle East problems through the United Nations.

(9) United States Policy:

22. In broad terms, the United States policy in the Middle East has, in the past, aimed at -

- (a) keeping the Communists out;
- (b) keeping the peace and preserving the highest possible measure of unity among Middle East States; and,
- (c) keeping the Suez Canal in working order so that Middle East oil can continue to flow to Western European industry and so strengthen N.A.T.O. countries.

In their general approach they have endeavoured to avoid any criticism of being an imperial power, preferring to appear as a fellow "ex-colonial".

23. In the present crisis, the United States, as already mentioned, appears to be committed to a policy of seeking solutions to both the Suez Canal dispute and the over-all Arab-Israel dispute only through the United Nations where they are acting independently of the United Kingdom. The British Ambassador in Washington recently saw the Acting Secretary of State on the need for consultations but the United States view was that before there could be useful, frank discussions between the two Governments, there would have to be some indication that the United Kingdom was prepared to abide by the United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for the cease-fire, the setting up of the United Nations Force and the withdrawal of forces. After this interview the Ambassador said it seemed "hopeless to expect to wean the State Department from its present compound of emotionalism and legalism until

188

/United Kingdom

SECRET

United Kingdom troops are out of Egypt".

24. In view of this development and the anxiety of the Muslim Members of the Baghdad Pact, it has been suggested to Mr. Casey that while he is in the United States he might have an opportunity of canvassing with the Americans the following ideas -

- (a) the need for the United States to work actively to ensure that U.N.E.F. will be effective in securing a solution of the Canal and the Arab-Israeli disputes (at the moment they appear to be concentrating solely on securing the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces);
- (b) that the United States should move quickly to save the Baghdad Pact from disintegration;
- (c) that they should cease to regard Nasser as a suitable agent through whom to secure settlement of the Middle East problems;
- (d) that the United States and the United Kingdom should energetically revive and accelerate plans for the solution of component problems of the Palestine problem, e.g. refugee resettlement and rehabilitation, Israel's frontiers, the Arab economic and political blockade of Israel;
- (e) the overall need for the United States to fill the present vacuum which, as matters stand, represents an open invitation to the Soviet Union, further encouragement to regional turmoil and a developing threat to Western defence.

187

(P.A. McBride)
Acting Minister for External Affairs.

Melbourne.

28th November, 1956.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 16267/8/9/71.

AMENDED COPY

ABK:OA.

Sent: 27th November, 1956.
1720

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. 542. (Pass Washington and Ottawa)

Repeated -

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON. 1039.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. 2822.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA SAV.133.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON. SAV.128.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Egypt - Israel.

We note that the six-Power resolution on clearing the Canal adopted on 24th November does not on the face of it give the Secretary-General authority to enter into financial commitments. Has authority to do so been granted?

2. We would also like to know the thinking of the Secretariat and friendly delegations upon the bearing of the cost of clearance. Is it intended that this also should be apportioned in accordance with the scale of contributions to the budget?

3. Your 973. The rules and procedures mentioned in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution should be subject to the approval of the Assembly after examination by the Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions.

4. Your 1004. We would be interested to know the background to the Secretary-General's revision of his Draft Resolution. Is there any opposition among delegations to the proposal that the expenses of U.N.E.F. should be shared in accordance with the scale of contributions to the budget?

Cost : £39.19.4.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
F.M.S.

28th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN@ ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HMCC:AS

0.16248

GUARD. Sent: 27th November, 1956.
1610

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Repeated to:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. (For External).

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

(Saving all other posts except Consulates).

AP.11. SECRET. PRIORITY.

New York pass to Washington.

For Casey from McBride.

You will have received Cawthorn's telegrams about developments in the Baghdad Pact countries. We are increasingly conscious of the perplexity its four Muslim members must feel in the face of:-

- (a) Russian penetration in the Middle East and more particularly in Syria;
- (b) Nasser's increasingly successful position;
- (c) the present uncertainties of United States policy;
- (d) diminished United Kingdom prestige.

2. Unless there is some response to their anxiety - and this can only come from the United States under present circumstances - there is a distinct danger that the Pact structure will disintegrate. Concurrently governments of the countries concerned, whose present attitudes are helpful, may fall under pressure of internal dissension or they may be forced to come to terms with the Soviet and Nasser.

3. It is difficult to discern the present pattern of United States objectives. Our latest reports suggest that they are:-

- (a) unduly attached to the idea that they can build up goodwill with Nasser, meanwhile keeping Saud on side;
- (b) adopting the attitude that a Middle East settle-

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2- 0.16248

ment can only be sought through United Nations channels;

- (c) withholding themselves increasingly from the Baghdad Pact countries who, if shelved and isolated in this way, must be expected to react in the way suggested above.

4. We recognise that it is arguable whether now is the most opportune moment for the United States to accede formally to the Pact, but its Muslim members would be encouraged if at least the United States:-

- (a) shows some open interest in them;
- (b) gives them assurances, private or public, that it will support them in any emergency involving Russian penetration;
- (c) grants immediate economic and military aid on a substantial scale.

5. In the present atmosphere in Washington we doubt whether direct representations by Australia to the United States will have much impact, but we feel that strong pressure needs to be brought to bear on the United States Administration:-

- (a) to abandon its present shadowy policies of acting only in the United Nations in favour of the substantial objective of maintaining our friends in the Middle East;
- (b) to take positive steps to salvage the Pact. Unless this is done an essential part of the Western defence structure will collapse with inevitable consequences for N.A.T.O. already weakened by United States attitudes including the United States attitude on oil for Western Europe.

6. Before you leave the United States you may feel that it would be useful to encourage someone (Pearson may be a possibility) to urge upon the United States their essential role in the Middle East, and the need for them to fill the present vacuum which, as matters stand, represents an open invitation to the Soviet Union, a further encouragement to regional turmoil, and a developing threat to Western defence.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

27th November, 1956
(Cost £115/14/6)

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E:AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT
G

SECRET

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.

ADDRESS

AUSTCOM KARACHI

SECRET

Serial No. Classification SECRET

Please pass following message from Prime Minister to
President Iskander:

You and your Prime Minister have been good enough to convey
~~several~~ ^{certain} messages to me through our High Commissioner in Karachi.

We have given ^{close} ~~intense~~ consideration to the views which you and your
Government have expressed, and as far as possible, we have endeavoured
to keep Cawthorn apprised of our thinking in order that he may

in turn acquaint you ^{with it}. No doubt you will have found that ^{generally}
our respective views are running along parallel lines, which I must
say is greatly heartening to us here. We share your apprehensions
about the manner in which the Middle East situation is developing,
and, like you, we are anxious that the adverse trends should be
arrested. We are especially conscious of the need to maintain and

develop the strength of the Baghdad Pact which we see as not only
one of the major bulwarks against Soviet penetration, but also as ^{an}
a factor ^{making for} ~~making for~~ ^{an} ~~contributing~~ ^{immensely to permanent} peace and stability in the Middle East. The
degree to which we here are able to influence events is, of course,

limited, but you may rest assured that to the fullest extent to
which we are able, we shall endeavour to bring home to the United
States, ~~as the power with the most resources,~~ the necessity to
sustain the Baghdad Pact and to support its members, all of whom

association of
countries whose joint
governments
have

AUTHORIZED BY

/ are

E.A. FILE NO. DATE 27th November, 1956

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION.

Sec.	Sent by
A.S.(U.N.)	
A.S.(G.R.)	
AS.(A.&G.)	
Cr.(L. & T.)	Time Sent
U.N.	
E.T.A.	
E. Rel.	
Pac.	
West	Typed by
Central	
P.I.	
Con. & Pro.	
Ant.	No. of Copies
Admin.	
Finance	
Ext. Comms.	

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

are proven friends. It may be that at the present juncture the United States ^{is} ~~may be~~ hesitant to announce its formal accession but, ~~pending this,~~ there appears to be no valid reason why it should not give full moral and material backing short of this. Our own view is that early American ^{support} ~~membership~~ is most important and our efforts will be directed towards this end.

These are difficult times, but we have drawn much encouragement from your country's response to them. ~~In saying this, I would also like to say, if you will permit me to do so, how greatly we have admired your handling of this most complex situation which is disturbing the tranquility of the Middle East.~~ I take advantage of this opportunity to send you ~~my~~ and your Prime Minister my warmest regards.

Wk

192

SECRET

File was 27/11
Rough draft of points which 175/11/10
the Acting Minister will ~~give~~ ^{bring} to PM
for a speech -

We are progressively getting into a situation where the composition, function, location and tenure of the United Nations Force rests firstly on interpretations by the Secretary-General of the various resolutions passed by the General Assembly, and secondly, on interpretations of its rights and responsibilities which Egypt has been endeavouring to impose upon him.

2. The United Nations Force is now going in to Egypt, but there is considerable uncertainty as to:

- (a) whether it will remain until there is general settlement of the Suez Canal and Middle Eastern problems;
- (b) what area it will cover. If the Egyptians have their way it will be moved from the Canal on to the Israeli-Egyptian border.
- (c) how it will ultimately be composed. The Egyptians have been resistant to inclusion of certain national units including units from at least three Commonwealth countries.
- (d) what will be its precise functions.

3. We cannot claim to be satisfied about this development since there is now no assurance that when the United Kingdom and French forces withdraw (and they are prepared to do so when an effective United Nations Force is in position) and when the Israelis withdraw (and they are prepared to do so when satisfactory arrangements are made):

- (a) Egypt will not assert the claim, the making of which she has already foreshadowed, that the United Nations Force should itself be withdrawn.
- (b) Any progress will be made towards the question of how the Suez Canal problem is to be settled or towards a general Middle East settlement.

4. The extraordinary position has, in fact, been reached whereby Egypt seems likely to emerge from the crisis, which she herself stimulated:

- (a) with her expropriation of the Suez Canal obscured by several General Assembly resolutions;
- (b) with a quite unmerited moral position arising from her having been the victim of Anglo-French ^{multi} intervention;
- (c) with her material position, in the sense of warlike supplies from the Soviet bloc, unimpaired;
- (d) with her position in relation to the United States supported by the present tendency in United States policy to cultivate Nasser's goodwill.

5. The last mentioned development is not the least disconcerting feature in the present situation. While it is difficult at this moment to discern clear lines in American policy, it does seem possible to say:

- (a) that the United States have by no means written Nasser off and, in fact, are conducting something perilously close to a flirtation with him;
- (b) that the Americans are adopting the attitude that a Middle East settlement can only be sought through United Nations channels;
- (c) that the United States administration is overcome somewhat belatedly by the notion of its own moral position which seems to be blinding it to the realities not only of the situation in the Middle East, but of the whole Western position.

One may also suspect that its policy is being influenced by the oil lobby whose only concern is to safeguard American oil interests in Saudi Arabia. (An estimate given by Sawyer over the A.B.C. on Sunday is that while American production is far in advance of any other production, American oil reserves will be exhausted in thirty years, while the Middle East reserves are likely to be contained for over two hundred years.)

6. The most deplorable feature of the present situation is the rift in the Anglo-American alliance which:

- (a) threatens the Western defensive position in Europe including N.A.T.O.;
- (b) creates the circumstance which might induce errors of judgment on the part of the Soviet Union, the danger of whose present mood needs no emphasis;
- (c) discourages the Baghdad Pact countries, and
- (d) may weaken the faith in the democracies of uncommitted countries in South and South East Asia.

7. The great task now is to rebuild the alliance. Russia cannot be resisted, whatever form its policies take, except by American strength. If American strength is to be fully effective the United States requires the support of its friends. Nothing is gained by weakening their position except the position of total advantage for the Soviet Union.

TEN/ROH

Dear Mr. Beasley,

On 8th November, 1956, in the House of Representatives you asked me questions concerning Saudi Arabia's relations with the United Kingdom and France which I undertook to investigate.

In regard to your first question, it can be confirmed that Saudi Arabia has severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and France. We do not yet know the precise explanation that Saudi Arabia gave to each country, if explanation was given at all.

As regards your third question, the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Sidon in the Lebanon is still intact. There has been, however, a report that Saudi Arabia has cut off oil supplies to British and French tankers; the accuracy of this report has still to be finally established.

Yours sincerely,

(P.A. McBRIDE)
Acting Minister for External Affairs

Mr. K.E. Beasley, M.P.,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Offices,
PERTH. W.A.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
UNCLASSIFIED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

HD:SH

I. 16367

Dated: 26th November, 1956
1853

FROM:

Rec'd: 27th November, 1956
0830

Australian Legation,
R O M E.

346. UNCLASSIFIED

Rex Thomas Reid, Australian evacuee from Cairo, has applied for repatriation at Government expense. Details are, born Adelaide 23.12.1917, single, next of kin Mrs. James Boyle, 42 Pleasant Avenue, Glendor, Adelaide, passport E109103 issued 20th February, 1956.

2. Left Australia January 1951 for England as Choreographer. Since worked Paris and Cairo compelled to leave all property at Cairo. No funds here or Australia. Promised position £30 weekly David Martin, Tivoli, Melbourne. Letter of offer shown to us, must begin mid December thus air travel would be necessary. Tourist fare £(stg.) 226 Reid undertakes to repay. Contact Martin also Mrs. McClaney, Flat five, Wolsley Road, Wolsley Gardens, Point Piper.

3. Reid, Director, Australian National Ballet 1949/50 seems reliable. Please advise urgently. In the meantime we are paying sustenance.

4. Other evacuees from Cairo arrived Rome 25th November, Mr. D. Price, Barclays Bank Ltd., Mr. and Mrs. L.A. Williams, Miss J.E. Taffs, Miss E.W. Young, Mr. F. Quick, all of Egypt General mission. Miss R.E. Nunn of Church Missionary Society. Reverend Tyler, Anglican clergyman. We are assisting to London where funds available.

McGuire.

E.A.
IMMIGRATION
P.M.'s

27th November, 1956

177

SEC A/SS EAF&ME E AF&ME C&P@ ADMIN PERS TRAV



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION.
KARACHI.

In reply quote No.....508/6/1/2.
208/4.

28 NOV 1956

175/11/20 A

Memo No.....1111/56.

21st November, 1956.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Copy to Mr. Menzies

Australian View point on the Suez Canal
Crisis.

1. Immediately on receipt of the text of the various statements made by Mr. Menzies and the Acting Minister on the Suez Canal crisis and the Hungarian situation, we have reproduced and distributed them. The distribution has included:

- (a) Copies under personal letter from me to the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.
- (b) Copies under personal compliments slip to Heads of Mission.
- (c) Copies to the Pakistan Press Information Department, to the Press and to various influential organisations and persons.
- (d) Copies to the British Information Service and to the United States Information Service.

*Mr. Menzies (14)
Mr. Llewellyn (14)
Mr. Gorton (3)
Zink (14)*

2. The British Information Service have reproduced most of the statements in their own Information Bulletins and also in special supplements to these now being issued as a result of the Suez crisis. Attached is a copy of the supplement carrying Mr. Menzies' statement of 8th November and Sir Phillip McBride's statement on Hungary.

76

3. Both members of the staff and myself have been told by many people here, including Heads of Foreign Missions, the United Kingdom High Commissioner and members of his staff, Pakistan officials and prominent members of the British business community that they consider these statements to be the clearest and most convincing they have seen. The United Kingdom High Commissioner quoted from them most effectively at a meeting he held of the British Community shortly after his return. I know from personal discussions that they have had considerable influence on the President and Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, while of course they have been of the utmost value to all in the High Commission in our discussions with others of the situation.

4. I might add that we took similar action to distribute Mr. Menzies' speech quoted in full in the London Times of 13th November, to the Liberal Party. The pungency of the remarks re the Egyptians' turn of speed was certainly well taken here in many quarters!

Ransom
High Commissioner.

CR



Saturday, November 17, 1956

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

BRITAIN SUPPORTS UN DISCUSSION

WE ARE NOT AFRAID TO DEBATE OUR ACTION, SAYS SELWYN LLOYD

Soviet Votes Against Inclusion Of Hungary

The Steering Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has decided unanimously to place the Middle East crisis on the Assembly's agenda.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has supported the inclusion of this item on the agenda because, he said, "we are not afraid to debate our action in that matter and our willingness to comply with the General Assembly in that affair".

The Committee approved the inclusion of the Hungarian problem on the agenda by 11 votes to two (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) and one abstention (Egypt).

Repressions In Hungary

In response to the determined Soviet opposition, Mr. Cabot Lodge, the United States delegate, reported that the Hungarian situation had become all the more urgent since the Budapest authorities had now rejected all the Assembly's resolutions.

"Merciless repressions" were continuing in Hungary and the situation was as heartbreaking as ever," he said. "As Hungarian women and children face the Soviet terror they look to this organisation for assistance," he declared.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd contended that in comparison to Britain's willingness to support the inclusion of the Middle East item, the Soviet Union was afraid of the "clear light of debate being thrown on their behaviour in Hungary".

Lord Privy Seal's Speech

The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. R. A. Butler, speaking of Suez in the House of Commons this week, said: "I believe that with the Commonwealth, United States and Atlantic alliance we can build up a situation which will be as satisfactory as we can possibly make it. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon have all given indications that they are prepared to contribute towards an international force in Egypt. That is very important news".

Quoting General Gruenther's words that "the enemy had got round our flanks by subversive action in the Middle East", Mr. Butler said: "That is why the Government decided that this action was necessary. A large part of the civilised world and a great part of this country has now realised the moves which inspired the Prime Minister (Sir An-

thony Eden) who had devoted a great part of his life to the constructive work of making international agencies work.

"We had to take immediate action to deal with the crisis. It is my opinion that had we not done so there would have been a boil-up in the Middle East, but we took the action in time".

Referring to the allegations that the action in Egypt had in some way affected the position in Hungary, he said, "I entirely repudiate it".

Premeditated Action In Hungary

There was no doubt, he went on that the Russians had premeditated the action in Hungary. M. Shepilov himself, he said, 24 hours before the British Note was sent to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments, had stated that the Russian troops would withdraw from Budapest only when the rebels in the city had surrendered.

"I am sorry to say that the Hungarian Government have decided not to permit the entry of observers", he added.

INDEPENDENCE OR SERVITUDE

British And Soviet Policies

A striking comparison between British colonial policy and Soviet imperialism was made in the House of Commons this week by Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a general review of the situation in the British colonies.

It is the Government's intention," he said, "that independence should take effect in the Gold Coast on March 5 next year. The Gold Coast will be the first of British dependent territories in tropical Africa to attain full self-government as a sovereign and independent nation.

"We are taking this historic step at a moment when our nation is being charged afresh with following what is called 19th century colonialism.

"What we have been engaged in doing is in vivid contrast to the increased suppression of liberty and economic servitude imposed by Soviet imperialism on its subject peoples."

Referring to the Suez crisis, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the work in which his Government was engaged in the

SOVIET POLITICAL AIMS Iranian Paper's Comment


An "Ettela'at" article (November 11), says: "It is clear that fighting aggression is not the aim of the Soviet Government and that the heart of that government is not bleeding for Egypt or the other small countries. If it were, the U.S.S.R. would not have let loose massacres in Hungary and bloodshed in Budapest and other Hungarian towns.

"It is evident that Soviet propaganda serves only political aims. Russia is seeking to exacerbate the Egyptian crisis in order to turn the attention of the United Nations and the great powers to Egypt so that the risk of a third world war may relegate the tragic events in Hungary to the background."

PEACE WHERE THE WORLD NEEDS PEACE

Menzies' Forthright Statement

In a review of the Middle East situation to the Australian Parliament, the Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, declared what he believed to be the results of the action taken by the Anglo-French forces. He said there were three aspects of the present Middle East crisis which deserved the urgent and earnest consideration of all men:



"First, the freedom and integrity and peace of the Suez Canal area are of just as much importance to the villager of Pakistan and India as to the ordinary citizen of Australia or wage-earner of Great Britain or France. The freedom of the Canal, therefore, has a universal quality, the significance of which is not altered by the pigment of skin or the geographical locality of the Canal users. If we are to settle these problems by linking ourselves up in favour of a European bloc or an Asian bloc, if the actions taken by Egypt are to be regarded in the Arab communities as good simply because Egypt is an Arab community, then the world will be committing itself to a dispute to which there can be no end except in bitterness and destruction. In dealing with such a matter we must try to look objectively at the merits and at the common good of all; we will initiate the suicide of mankind if we substitute bigotry for judgement or seek to revive racial hatred under the guise of instituting the brotherhood of man.

"Secondly, the significance which we attach to great world events depends essentially upon our sense of

—Continued on Page 2, Col. 5

LATE NEWS

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking in an American television programme in New York commented on President Eisenhower's statement of November 14 that the United States would support any United Nations action in the event of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that the people in the Soviet Union did not just volunteer. They did what

—Continued on Back Page, Col. 5

FRIENDLY & CONSTRUCTIVE ADVICE OF BAGHDAD POWERS

Britain Expresses Appreciation

A spokesman of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, commenting on the communique issued by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey after their Teheran meeting, said:-

"Her Majesty's Government fully understand the concern of their Baghdad Pact allies regarding the very grave situation which has arisen in the Middle East. It is H.M.G.'s firm conviction that the action which has been taken to separate the Egyptian and Israeli forces was the only way to prevent a general conflagration in the area.

"H.M.G. are also most appreciative of the initiative of the Governments of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The

views offered both individually and collectively by these Governments have weighed heavily in the decision to bring an end to the military action in Egypt.

"They have listened with close attention to the friendly and constructive advice offered by the four Governments on the form of an early settlement, and are happy to state that the proposals formulated by the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact are consonant with H.M.G.'s own views.

As regards the settlement of the Palestine problem H.M.G.'s views are well known and were stated by the Prime Minister in his speech at Guildhall on November 19.

"H.M.G. believe that the opportunity is now ripe for a general settlement of the Middle Eastern problems which have defied solution for so long and in the settlement of which all members of the Baghdad Pact together will be able to play a valuable and constructive role.

"They believe further that through co-operation in this task the Baghdad Pact alliance will be greatly fortified."

Sound Economy For Middle East

Although the Middle East has great prospects for development, they have not been fully realised and cannot be realised in the sort of political conditions which have existed in the last 10 years.

This was stated by Mr. Reginald Maudling, Britain's Minister of Supply, in the House of Commons this week.

"It is our aim," he said, to get a really long-term Middle East political settlement, and on the basis of that it should be possible for the countries of that area, with help from outside, to develop a really sound economic programme.

"I think that two outstanding examples of international organisation which have worked since the war have been the O.E.E.C. and the Colombo Plan. Is there not a case for saying—I am merely making a suggestion—that in the Middle East voluntary co-operation between the countries of the area, in settled political conditions, could lay the first stages of a substantial and rapid advance in the standard of the people of the area? I am putting that forward as a suggestion on which we shall have to ponder."

BRITAIN AGREES TO WITHDRAW TROOPS

CO-OPERATION WITH U. N.

'We Did What U.N. Without A Police Force Could Not Do'

—Sir Anthony Eden

The Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Anthony Eden, announced in the Commons last week that the United Kingdom and France agreed to the United Nations request for entry into Port Said of U.N. military observers, the withdrawal of British and French assault units from Port Said and the return home of many R.A.F. squadrons.

Sir Anthony began by saying that the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations voted on November 7 in favour of the resolution sponsored by Argentina and other countries.

"We welcome this resolution and regard it as essential to constitute a U.N. Force with the utmost urgency", he declared.

That resolution in its operative paragraphs urged a cease-fire and a halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area.

U.N. Force's Work

"The Secretary-General in his report (his second with regard to the plan for an emergency International U. N. Force) envisaged that the force would exercise its authority in the area in the extent roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice line, and stated that he thought its functions would be to maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the terms of the resolution of November 2. He believes that this work would have to take place in two stages."

The Prime Minister went on: "The British Government welcome the statement of the Prime Minister of Israel with regard to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the intention of the Israeli Government to co-operate with the projected U.N. Force."

"As soon as the force is in a position effectively to discharge its task the British Government, as has been repeatedly stated, is willing to hand over to it the responsibilities which they have assumed..."

"So far as the army is concerned we shall replace the assault units of the paratroops and commandos with their equivalent in infantry battalions and the former will be withdrawn from Egypt. We shall also hold an additional infantry reserve in Cyprus."

Opposition Welcome

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of the Opposition, also welcomed the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

Answering questions, Sir Anthony Eden said that, regarding the composition of the U.N. Force, it was not the size of the countries who sent troops that mattered, it was the efficiency of the force that was the criterion.

"This has got to be discussed by the United Nations and worked out by them", he added.

"About the efficiency of the force, certainly I think that this is a matter which we must have an opportunity to discuss with the United Nations."

Given a little goodwill he saw no reason why "we should not be able to work out with the United Nations what was required in the shape of that force and why agreement should not be reached about that."

GUILDHALL SPEECH

The whole Middle East would have been in flames today if the United Kingdom and France had not acted as they did, said the Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall.

"We did", he said, "what the United Nations without a police force could not do in time."

Sir Anthony began his speech with a reference to the tragedy of Hungary. He said: "There is in the minds of free men the world over the shock and horror at the spectacle of what has happened in Hungary. We are seeing the liberty and national existence of a heroic people stamped out by the most ruthless repression. The world has stood powerlessly by unable to help, except with such medical supplies as it might be possible to distribute."

"We must face the fact that so long as such things can happen the United Nations is very far from being a world order which we in the West would wish it to be."

Background of Events

The Prime Minister then recalled the last occasion on which he had the honour to address the Lord Mayor's Banquet in the Guildhall.

"Then, I felt it my duty to speak plainly of the dangers and difficulties in the Middle East. I know you will forgive me if tonight I remind you of some of the words I then used. I said, in speaking of the Middle East, 'beneath the volcanic crust of these smouldering dangers lies a deeper peril still. The hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbours is unreconciled. Time has proved no healer'. I gave warning of a new danger of the influx of arms from behind the Iron Curtain."

"These words were true then. How much deeper meaning have they since acquired. I urged the search for a common ground. I said then that we had only one desire—to find the means which would enable two peoples to dwell side by side."

Sir Anthony went on: "We all know what has happened since last year. Tension in the Middle East has grown. Arab has attacked Jew. Jew Arab. Passion, hatred, murder—we have seen them all. We have seen violent evidence of these smouldering dangers which lie beneath the volcanic crust. And no one can deny that upon the shoulders of Egypt and her ruler rests much of the responsibility."

"The Egyptian Government again and again has proclaimed its intention to crush Israel. By threats and by propaganda it has poured out its hostility to Britain and the West. Armed by weapons from behind the Iron Curtain, Egypt has clearly been preparing for the day when her deeds

would match her words. And then two months ago, she seized the Suez Canal.

"This, briefly, was the background of events which led to the outbreak of hostilities on a major scale between Egypt and Israel."

"It is not for us at this moment to name the aggressor. What on that day seemed virtually certain was that the whole of the Middle East would be set alight and who can say where the fire would have stopped. These are matters which no one can determine with absolute certainty. What is beyond dispute is that these events presented a mortal danger to British and international interests and to the peace of the world."

"In these circumstances the British and French Governments decided on swift and decisive intervention. We alone of all nations had the forces in the area prepared for instant action in such an emergency. It rested upon our two governments to take a decision. We did so together."

"If there had been a general conflict, sooner or later this country would have been involved. That was the prospect before us and the Government's conclusion was reached with a solemn sense of the burden of our responsibility."

"We had two choices—we could have referred the matter to the Security Council and awaited the outcome or we could have intervened as we did. Had we contented ourselves with reference to the Security Council does any one think that any more positive action would have been taken that has been taken in the Middle East before?"

"Had not the Security Council on no less than 200 occasions discussed the Palestine problem? Is not the appalling and heart-rending struggle in Hungary yet another tragic and humiliating example of incapacity to do much more than express horror and indignation which the world is feeling?"

"And while discussions were proceeding war in the Middle East would have continued to flame with consequences no man can foretell."

"We were faced with harsh alternatives. There was grave peril in any decision but to do nothing would have been worst of all. Decision was taken to act swiftly, to send a police force to end the fighting and pave the way for a new settlement of the problems of the area."

"I know that many had heavy hearts when they learned that Britain and France had taken independent action. But we did what the United Nations without a police force could not do in time. If we had not acted the whole Middle East would be in flames today."

"I recall that when the United Nations was set up it was intended that the Security Council should have the forces at its disposal. This was in the days of hopes just after the war and that conception founded because of a deep divide which has left the world in two."

"The Prime Minister of Australia has justly said that the purpose of the United Nations was not to make great powers impotent and small powers truculent, but to reconcile the strength of the great nations with the strength of the international organisation."

"If the great powers are

proportion. Does anybody in Egypt or Syria seriously believe that the active intervention of the Soviet Union in the Middle East would be in the long run to the benefit of the Middle Eastern people? Would Egypt, so proud of having marched from 'colonialism', seriously seek to defend its new freedom by submitting itself to the help and, therefore, in due course, the tyranny of the worst 'colonialism' of modern times? Are people of Southern Asia, who worked so long and successfully for democratic self-government, prepared to lend their countenance to the most obvious attempt by totalitarian Communism to divide the free countries so that being divided they may all become slaves?"

"Thirdly, I would have thought that the purpose of the United Nations was not to divide the great powers impotent and the small powers truculent, but to reconcile the strength of the great nations with the strength of the international organization."

In the course of his speech, Mr. Menzies said: "A good deal of apprehensive talk has occurred about the differences which have been manifested over this Egyptian matter between some of the countries of Europe and some of the countries of Asia. There could be no greater tragedy in the world than for it to become a settled doctrine that the great nations of Asia and the great European and neo-European nations have conflicting interests and that they must, therefore, accept conflict about them as inevitable..."

"Statesmanship requires that we should all strive to bring ourselves to understanding that the world is one and that ordinary human beings all around the world have similar interests and the same dignified and human ambitions."

Mr. Menzies went on to ask if anybody supposed that an enfeebled Great Britain or France or, in some circumstances, an enfeebled United States could give to the world organization the strength which could make that organization effective and save it from futility. These were matters to be thought about and acted upon.

Great Britain and France rightly felt that if the Suez Canal and the vast traffic which passed through it were to be made unavailable and inaccessible, closed by war between two

unwilling or unable to preserve peace, as it formerly fell to them to do, then the United Nations must be able to take their place. It must at least be endowed with strength to protect the peace and to uphold the law. If the result of our action in the Middle East is to bring the world face to face with that reality then we shall not have acted in vain."

"For the present there are certain events of which we can take account."

"The fighting has ceased—that was our first purpose."

"The principle of the United Nations Force has been approved—it is now being translated into reality. If, as seems possible, the outcome is a new and stronger United Nations capable of enforcing as well as resolving the gain to the world will be beyond price."

"The most remarkable feature about our military action has been that an organisation designed for destruction has been used to destroy weapons, not men. It is also almost unique in history to use armed forces in a controlled way employed in this operation. The highest credit is due to General Keightley and to all ranks who served under him."

"The Services have loyally accepted and brilliantly executed orders which were designed to cause the minimum loss of life and the minimum damage to civilian property."

"Let me conclude with this reflection. Today, there is truce over the whole of that area. World statesmanship now has a chance to use this truce to make firm and lasting peace to settle the problems of these lands."

"We must pray that opportunity will not be lost."

MENZIES REVIEWS MID-EAST SITUATION

—Continued from Page 1

minor powers, the time had come when it was necessary that there should be some assertion of the rights of a majority of the people of the world."

By bitter experience they knew that with certain veto in the Security Council the whole pass might be lost unless definite action preceded the debate. They therefore took definite action.

"They have said, and said truly, that they have no desire to remain in perpetuity as a military garrison on the Canal", continued Mr. Menzies. "That has in the part been tried and been abandoned. But they have been immeasurably wise and courageous in taking steps which would not only anticipate but would, in some measure, compel the attention of the United Nations. I have no doubt that they will welcome relief from their task. But the marshall of an International Police Force is not a matter of days and weeks. It requires organization, contribution and discipline."

"I believe that the United Kingdom and France have pursued intervention not for territorial conquest or for any purpose of domination, but to produce peace where the world needs peace; so that when the United Nations produces an international body in this area, it will not have to fight its way in but will be in such a shape and position that it may first keep the belligerents apart and then bring them together for a sensible and honest and permanent solution of their differences."

"Perhaps the most impudent thing that has occurred of late is the self-righteous attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards the Anglo-French action in Egypt."

The Soviet Union, said the Australian Prime Minister, acting in relation to what were called its satellite countries, of whom two who were most vividly in the public mind were Poland and Hungary, had pursued a line of policy designed to destroy self-government and reduce the people from independence to "colonial" subservience.

It, therefore, came as a shock to civilized onlookers to find that at the very moment when the Soviet Union had by brute force and savage rapacity been crushing the flame of independence in Hungary with the loss of many thousands of lives, it should have the effrontery to pose as a defender of Egyptian liberty and to issue the wildest threats against the Western Powers.

Mr. Menzies added: "There has been much propaganda over recent days and weeks. For example, it has been repeatedly said from Cairo that the Anglo-French action in Egypt was a result of pre-arrangement between Great Britain, France and Israel. This story was always fantastic and particularly so to anybody familiar with the efforts made by us to avoid conflict between Jordan and Israel or Israel and Egypt. But propaganda has gone on. There must of course be a few scores of millions of people today, particularly in Asian countries, who have been persuaded to believe that the allegation is true."

It had also been said by some that the action taken in delivering an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel and following it up by armed action encouraged the Soviet Union to make an attack upon the people of Hungary. This statement was monstrously untrue."

Mr. Menzies went on: "On 30th October I made a statement in this House about Hungary in the course of which I pointed out that the explosion there was touched off on October 23 by the action of the police on the peaceful demonstration of university students. From that moment events in Hungary moved rapidly. There was a considerable loss of life and many other casualties."

"The whole matter became so intolerably acute that the Security Council held an emergency meeting on October 28, a meeting at which 10 members of the Security Council voted for discussion and investigation of the matter but were frustrated by the Soviet veto, a veto based upon a clearly invalid argument that what had happened in Hungary was purely a domestic affair."

"It is quite clear that the events in Egypt were subsequent. Indeed, it was suggested in some quarters that the invasion of Egyptian territory by Israel was designed to take advantage of the pre-occupation arising from the tragic events in Hungary. All I need say is that those who are always ready to criticise our friends are also ready to justify our enemies cannot have it both ways."

STARK REALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY IN HUNGARY

Australian Minister's Statement

"What is happening in Hungary reveals starkly the realities of Soviet policy," said Sir Philip McBride, Australia's Acting Minister for External Affairs, in a statement in Australia.

He added: "It is abundantly clear that Hungary represents no threat to the Soviet Union unless we say that the expression by a people of its natural urge towards freedom and democracy represents a threat to the Soviet Union. If that is the position, few countries can rest easy".

"This situation", the Minister continued, "prevails in spite of the declaration of neutrality by the Hungarian Government on 1st November and of action in the General Assembly of the United Nations condemning the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the fundamental rights of the Hungarian people, specifically guaranteed by the Soviet Government in the Hungarian Peace Treaty, and calling on the Soviet Government to withdraw all its forces and cease intervening in Hungary's internal affairs".

Immense Sufferings

Sir Philip then briefly outlined the sequence of recent events in Hungary, particularly as far as the entry of Soviet troops was concerned.

He said: "What is happening in Hungary reveals starkly the realities of Soviet policy. The Hungarian people have met with immense sufferings as a result of aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. It is still not possible to give accurate figures of the casualties, but there are reports that there are between 10,000 and 15,000 people killed, and as many as 50,000 wounded. There are already 15,000 refugees who have crossed the border into Austria in order to avoid certain massacre at the hands of Russian troops".

General Observations

Sir Philip then made one or two general observations:

"Firstly, there is a tendency in some quarters to bring forward the proposition that the Anglo-French action in Egypt is to be discussed on the same plane as the Soviet subjugation of the Hungarian people. This proposition is without validity. There is no need to labour this.

"The purpose of the Anglo-French measures in Egypt has been clear; namely, to separate the combatants and to safeguard the Suez Canal, in which they have essential rights established by Treaty and which is of vital interest to the world's economy. In the application of the measures they have taken, the British and French forces have been at pains to protect the non-combatants. Their targets have been military targets, and there has been no interference whatsoever in Egyptian political life. The United Kingdom and France have agreed to a cease-fire, and they have accepted the view of the United Nations that a United Nations Force should take over from them with all speed.

In Hungary, on the other hand, the Soviet has entered without any legitimate basis whatsoever. Its targets have been mainly civilian targets. It has temporarily destroyed the po-

litical fabric of the Hungarian people. It has ignored the views of the United Nations, and it shows no disposition whatsoever to withdraw and leave the Hungarians to develop their own future.

"Secondly, there is a lesson to be drawn from the Soviet's unwillingness to tolerate independence and freedom in other countries. The doctrinal basis of Soviet policy postulates the eventual supremacy of Communism, but the application of that doctrine has been curbed by the strength of other countries to resist it. Nevertheless, in countries which are within reach of Soviet armed might, the application of Soviet influence has been given full play.

Hungary is the latest example—or should one say Hungary has, for the second time in 10 years, suffered the full impact of Soviet interference. It is ironical that the Soviet should be able to practice a policy of subjugation by armed might while at the same time assuring the countries of Asia that it supports the Five Principles of freedom and non-interference which underlie the social philosophy of these peoples.

"Thirdly, no provocation by the Western democracies lies behind, or can be said to have promoted, the Soviet domination of Hungary. Before the Soviet intervention, the West left no doubt that it welcomed the resurgence of liberal principles in eastern Europe. But it took no steps which the Soviet Union could truthfully interpret as foreign intervention either against itself or against the countries of eastern Europe."

ACTION IN SUEZ

Lord Kilmuir's Statement

"Britain and France intervened in Suez not to make war but to stop war," said the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, speaking at Newcastle-on-Tyne.

"There was an uneasy truce between Israel and the Arab states smouldering for years in raids and threats. Colonel Nasser's action in securing the influx of Russian arms into Egypt had made the situation more dangerous. Could any realist disregard that background when Israeli forces crossed the Egyptian boundary and pushed the detachments toward the Suez Canal?"

The Lord Chancellor went on: "The British Government had to face not only the prospect of a war spreading throughout the Middle East but of one of the main battlegrounds being the area of the Suez Canal. Our immediate idea of a shield between the combatants has now been almost universally accepted. If we had not acted the whole Middle East might well have been engulfed in the flames of war and the ground area of the fire would have been the Suez Canal."



AID TO HUNGARY: Britain has made a donation of £25,000 to the International Red Cross, to alleviate the sufferings of the Hungarian people in their struggle for their rights and their freedom, by the provision of medical and other supplies. Boxes of medical supplies, urgently required, are unloaded from an aircraft of the British Royal Air Force in Vienna. When the lorries were filled they were immediately driven to the Hungarian border.

BRITISH AID & ASYLUM FOR REFUGEES

Churchill's Gift

The United Kingdom Government have decided to authorise the entry of 2,500 Hungarian refugees into the United Kingdom and to provide up to £10,000 to meet the expenses connected with organising their reception and care.

This was announced in the Commons by Mr. Dods-Parker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Her Majesty's Government had discussed with the British Council for Aid to Refugees (which represents principal voluntary organisations concerned with refugees entering the U.K.) arrangements for organising the reception and care of the refugees in Britain and placing them in suitable employment wherever possible, he added.

The grant, which was subject to

the approval of Parliament, was to meet approved administrative expenses incurred by the Council connected with this scheme, which was being put into effect forthwith.

Lord Mayor's Appeal

Admiration for the citizens of Hungary was expressed by the Lord Mayor of London, Alderman Sir Cullum Welch, in a B.B.C. broadcast launching his Hungarian Relief Fund.

The British people who lived in peace and freedom, he said, found it difficult to picture the stark horror which had overcome another independent-minded people. They felt great sympathy for the citizens

of Hungary in their hour of need and admired the brave spirit of those who sought to be free men.

"Many individual friends of freedom and of Hungary and a number of organisations throughout this country have felt the need to show early and practical assistance and sympathy with these unhappy people," he said.

Sir Winston Churchill had made available for the appeal £1,000 from his 80th Birthday Fund, the Lord Mayor announced, and the Lord Provost of Glasgow had telegraphed £1,000.

The Order of St. John have had volunteered £500 in addition to larger sums already sent by them direct to the British Red Cross.

TRAGEDY OF HUNGARY

By W.N. EWER

(Diplomatic Correspondent of the "Daily Herald")

This is a generation terribly familiar both with brutality and with heroism. But the tragedy of the last few weeks in Hungary has aroused all over the world, feelings of horror and pity and admiration that no other has done. It has a special poignancy and pathos.

Not only have the Hungarians fought with unequalled bravery and desperation against impossible odds. Not only has the reconquest of Hungary by the Russian troops and tanks been carried out with a ruthlessness that revolts the conscience.

The deepest tragic content of these tragic days has been the swift and terrible change, for a whole nation, from joy in a new-won freedom to the sudden realisation of treachery and the desperate resolve to fight to the death, however hopeless the struggle.

In the first days of the rising the Russian troops in Budapest had, at first, seemed ready to fraternise with the Hungarian workers. Then suddenly their tanks opened fire at point-blank range on the crowd of unarmed demonstrators in the Parliament Square. But then, as the insurgents refused to be cowed or intimidated, the scene seemed to change. Moscow seemed to have decided against a ruthlessness which must horrify the world, and to allow (though without enthusiasm) the Hungarian people to have the national and personal freedom which they were demanding.

The Nagy government, apparently without Soviet rebuke or objection, promised concession after concession, culminating in the proclamation of a national govern-

ment, pledged to hold free elections, and to make Hungary an independent and neutral state.

On October 30 it was announced that the Soviet troops were beginning to leave Budapest, and would all be out of the city within 24 hours.

On the same day came an official statement from Moscow itself that the Soviet Government was willing to discuss the question of withdrawing all Soviet forces from Hungary, Rumania and Poland.

That seemed to the Hungarians guarantee for their new liberty. And it seemed to the world at large an assurance that the Soviet leaders were really turning their backs on one of the worst features of Stalinist imperialism.

Now, looking back, one sees that it was only a manoeuvre designed to gain time while preparations were made for an operation which would (in a phrase of Stalin's about his native Georgia) "burn out nationalism with a hot iron."

Within a few hours of this Soviet promise came disquieting reports. Soviet forces in Hungary were moving. But they were moving westwards, not eastwards.

On November 4 the Russians were ready to strike. And they struck fiercely. An ultimatum ordered the new Nagy government to resign within four

hours. A new—purely Communist—government was set up.

The terrible last act of the tragedy had begun. The Russians showed neither restraint nor remorse. The city has been devastated more ruinously than in the fighting between the German and Russian armies in 1945.

Foreign eyewitnesses testify to the machine-gunning of civilians queuing for food and to the hanging of prisoners. While outside Budapest Soviet columns have been remorselessly "liquidating" groups of patriots wherever found.

That is the terrible story of the Hungarian agony of November 1956, following within a few hours upon the happiness of the last days of October. It is also the story of a duplicity and a brutality unsurpassed even in the dark records of the Stalin regime.

Why have the new Soviet leaders done this thing? For two years they have taken infinite pains to persuade the world that Stalinism is dead, that the era of "peaceful co-existence" has opened, that the Soviet Government is pledged to non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

They have inscribed the principle in treaties. They have avowed their devotion to it in speeches and manifestoes. They had begun to convince people and to build up a new reputation for themselves.

Now the bombs and shells which have blasted Budapest have blown all this elaborate work to pieces. The world is given a bloody demonstration that Khrushchev and Bulganin have inherited the mantle of Stalin; and that there is no real change in the character of Soviet Communism.

RUSSIAN WEAPON OF STARVATION

Dixon On Repression In Hungary

The weapon of starvation is being employed by the Soviet Union against the Hungarians, declared Sir Pierson Dixon, Britain's Representative, in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

He said no food had reached Budapest since the Soviet occupation and anyone venturing from his home in search of food was being shot on sight. Sir Pierson denounced the Soviet action in Hungary saying he had heard of women in bread queues being shot down and also "any Hungarian daring to tread the pavements of his own city."

The Soviet Union, he added, had ignored the U.N.'s repeated requests to withdraw its troops, and, on the contrary, was reinforcing its occupation.

Strident Voices

"This then is the real situation of the tragedy of Hungary, a sovereign country, which, we believed, when we voted for her admission last year, was moving towards the full exercise of her sovereign rights."

Sir Pierson said that the very day the news arrived that the Soviet Union had taken over the Hungarian Government by force, Soviet voices were being stridently heard in the Assembly against "attempts of Britain and France to save peace in the Middle East."

The Hungarian situation could not be viewed in isolation, he added. From both this question and that of the Middle East had emerged one simple and disturbing pattern of Soviet imperialism. "In Hungary, the situation stems from Hungary's incorporation into the Soviet empire after World War II. In the Middle East, the problem stems from Soviet ambitions to extend its interests in that area."

Soviet Methods

Sir Pierson contended that Soviet methods inside and outside the United Nations had only served to increase the already inflammatory situation in the Middle East.

He said: "For the past two days the United Nations has devoted all its efforts to maintain peace and order in the Near East and my government is making all possible efforts to that end in accordance with the plans of the United Nations."

"In agreeing to the appeal for a cease-fire we were in no way influenced by blatant threats of Soviet intervention. Indeed, it is a curious lapse on the part of the Soviet psychological warfare machine to suppose that bullying and intimidation can work on the British people", he declared.

Acute Doubts

The Hungarian situation, he said, had aroused acute doubts as to whether the Soviet Union intended to loosen its grip on its European empire.

"The world must watch with equal vigilance the camouflaged ambitions of the Soviet Union in the Near East", he added.

In the General Assembly the United States delegate, Mr. Cabot Lodge, introduced a new resolution demanding the cessation of Soviet interference with the delivery of



MACMILLAN LISTS ACHIEVEMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST

The British and French intervention in Egypt had achieved three important results, Mr. Harold Macmillan, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, claimed in the House of Commons this week.

These he tabulated as follows:

1. Stopped a small war which might have led to a big one.
2. Created a United Nations Force for the first time.
3. Perhaps stopped a third world war.

Economic Policy

Mr. Macmillan, replying to the Opposition censure motion on the Government's economic policy—which was rejected—declared forcibly that when such decisions were to be made one had either to run away from them or to make a right decision.

"I am sincerely convinced, having seen this happen twice in my lifetime, that the events of this period may prevent a third disaster coming to the world."

"I think we made the right decision and when these moments come, it is a brave man who chooses and a coward who stands aside."

"I believe history will show, whatever may be the economic disadvantages, that we have chosen aright."

food and medicines and proposing concerted action to aid the refugees. He said the Soviet interference was "proof of the horrifying callousness to human suffering".

The Pakistan delegate, speaking after Mr. Lodge, announced the support for the United States resolution which he said came opportunely to help the Hungarian people and he called for full support for an Italian resolution, already under discussion. "Pakistan has always opposed colonialism and imperialism of any kind", he said.

The statement of the Yugoslav delegate was interesting—that the Government and people of Yugoslavia were concerned over the recent tragic events in Hungary and that the involvement of Soviet troops in Hungary was contrary to Yugoslavia's fundamental policy. Yugoslavia wanted the Hungarians to enjoy freedom and independence.

LENNOX-BOYD

—Continued from Page 1, Col. 3

that she could not draw back.

"This technique of intervention", he went on, "first by arms and then by volunteers, is deeply disturbing in the sense that it attempts to clothe with legality the employment of private armies, whose aim is in fact to lay their hold on the state that they are professing to assist. This is what has been going on in Egypt and may be going on now in Syria."

Mr. Lennox-Boyd added: "It is increasingly evident that our action, directed as it was to stop the fighting and successful as it was in stopping the fighting, has disturbed the carefully laid Soviet plans."

There were now unmistakable signs of a growing understanding of the United Kingdom's action in the neutral nations that were not at this moment involved in the dispute.

In his review, Mr. Lennox-Boyd made the following points about Britain's Colonial territories:

Cyprus: Recent events in the Mediterranean had demonstrated the vital importance of Cyprus in the Middle East. H. M. Government's policy must continue to be influenced by this essential strategic need. Once law and order was restored it was their intention to press on with the introduction of a new and liberal constitution, recommendations upon which had been received by the Government and would be published in due course.

Malta: It was hoped shortly to have talks with the Maltese Prime Minister on the draft constitutional scheme.

Caribbean: Orders-in-Council would be brought before Parliament this session to provide for the constitution of a new British Caribbean Federation covering the establishment of a Federal Government, a Legislature, a Supreme Court and other necessary federal authorities.

Kenya: The Governor of Kenya had announced in Nairobi this morning (Nov. 13) the withdrawal of all military forces from active operations "and assumption by the authorities and police in Kenya of full responsibility for law and order throughout Kenya". This was very heartening news. Constitutional changes had been published in Kenya today enabling the Governor to appoint additional African and European Ministers and to provide for a leader of the Arabs to participate fully in the work of the Council of Ministers.

Malaya: It was hoped to receive the Constitutional Commission's report early in the New Year and that it would be possible to work out a new constitution for the Federation during the Spring. He hoped it would be possible to introduce and pass a Bill through Parliament conferring independence by the "target date" of August 1957.

Singapore: Lim Yew Hock would be coming to London shortly for consultations on its constitution.

Nigeria: "I hope we shall soon come to an agreement on the timing of a Nigerian conference which concerns 32 million people. I am in confidential communication with all the governments concerned."

ARMS BUILD-UP IN MIDDLE EAST

British Press Comment

An expert analysis of facts and figures of Soviet arms supplies to Egypt has led to several significant conclusions. The first is that Soviet war material captured by the Anglo-French forces and by the Israelis exceeded both in quantity and by its nature anything that Egypt might have been able to use.

Explaining the significance of this fact a military expert writing in the *Birmingham Post*, remarked that what Russia really wanted was to build up in Egypt material resources needed by a base which the Communist troops could take over when the signal was given.

Sinister Sound

This leads to the explanation of the Soviet talk of sending "volunteer" military forces to Egypt.

Discussing this aspect of the Communist technique, the *Glasgow Herald* noted that the term "volunteers" had "a remarkably sinister sound," particularly if one considered the Korean precedent when Chinese "volunteers" were simply regular army divisions sent in the course of duty.

The paper sees in the Soviet threats an indication that "Russian designs on the Middle East have by no means been given up, and that alleged volunteers are nothing more and nothing less than regular troops earmarked for intervention if a suitable pretext can be found."

Russian Aims

The aim of Soviet moves is further stressed by the *Glasgow Herald* when it recalls Russia's ostentatious abstention from voting whenever there was a constructive resolution before the United Nations Assembly in the interests of peace. "Whatever the ultimate aims may be, what Russia does not want at the moment is a quick peace, and it is considered more than merely unfortunate that Arab leaders are apparently ready to play the Russian game without reflecting what the end of it may well be," concludes the *Herald*.

The *Times* Special Correspondent in Moscow writes that "it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union recognizes the current crisis in Egypt as an opportunity for Russia to capitalize on its long-standing programme trying to spread its influence into the Middle East by professions of friendship for the Arabs."

INTERVENTION AT THE RIGHT TIME

Turkish Paper Praises Anglo-French Action

Ulus, a popular Republican Party paper of Ankara, remarked on November 4 that "Britain and France intervened in the Arab-Israeli dispute at the right time", adding "if they had missed this opportunity Britain and France would have committed an unpardonable mistake before humanity, and would have deserved being removed from the scene as big powers. They intervened at the right time to deprive the Soviets of chances of intrigue in the Middle East."

In another article on November 6, *Ulus* reiterated that the British and French Governments must be congratulated for seeing the danger and having the necessary determination to carry out measures to avert it."

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA

Reasons For Egyptian Attache's Expulsion

Details of the Egyptian Military Attache's activities, which led to the Libyan Government decision to ask for his withdrawal, have been published by "Tarablus al-Gharb" (November 8).

Quoting a "responsible source," the article said the Egyptian Military Attache's activity "did not start with the present emergency, but several months ago."

Inciting Mob

In Cyrenaica, the Attache tried on August 14 and 15 to contact some suspected elements so as to organise demonstrations.

The incident was immediately reported to the Egyptian Consul in Benghazi who was officially requested to ask the Attache to desist from his activities whose consequences could not be foreseen.

Of the Attache's activities in Tripoli, the article said that his suspicious contacts and movements aroused the anxiety of the provincial authorities. The Libyan Prime Minister, therefore, summoned him together with the Charge d'Affaires on three consecutive days and warned him of the consequences of the harm he was doing. On two consecutive days the Prime Minister summoned the Egyptian Ambassador and asked him to stop the Attache's increasing activity.

Despite all this, the Attache went to a place outside Tripoli and brought back to the Embassy 28 boxes full of machine guns. On two occasions the Attache incited the people to throw grenades in Tripoli, particularly at crossroads. One night he pointed a machine gun at a police patrol when his car was stopped during curfew hours.

Finally, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary asked the Egyptian Ambassador to have the Attache recalled. The request was officially conveyed by the Foreign Minister the same day.

LATE NEWS

—Continued from Page 1, Col. 4

they were told.

"If people come described as volunteers it will be, in fact, a deliberate act of policy by the Soviet Union and it will be a breach of the United Nations resolution", he said.

Referring to the International Police Force, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said: "Its presence in the Middle East will pave the way for a Palestine settlement."

"We want to settle the Palestine problem on the basis of justice and we must have a settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees," he added.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Mr. Bellington

File No. 175/4/20

Date 26th November, 1956.

SUBJECT

QUESTION IN THE HOUSE: MIDDLE EAST.

FOR: ACTING MINISTER

In the House of Representatives on 8th November, 1956, Mr. Beazley asked: "Can the Minister acting for the Minister for External Affairs inform the House whether the report that Saudi Arabia has severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France is correct? If it is correct, what grounds were given by Saudi Arabia for this action? Has the Minister any information regarding the present position of oil supplies from Saudi Arabia?"

2. You undertook to ascertain the facts and convey them to Mr. Beazley.

...

3. Attached for your signature, if you approve, is a letter to Mr. Beazley.

*letter signed
& despatched
27 Nov. 56.*

OK 27/11

luu
(J.C.G. Kevin)
Assistant Secretary
Division 4.

Africa and Middle East Section.

175

CR

Record of Conversation with the NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR
(Mr. Winkelman)

on 26th November, 1956

Officers Present: The Secretary

Subjects: (1) POLITICAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA
 (2) UNITED NATIONS
 (3) MIDDLE EAST

1. The Ambassador came in for a general talk. He said Fack had received from the Department an appreciation of the situation in Indonesia by way of comment on the Dutch appreciation. Our talk was therefore general. I said that we were depressed by the lack of progress in Indonesia. Referring to the President's prescription of a one-party system, I said that it was our view that this was not so much the result of ideas picked up by the President during his travels in Communist countries: we believed that Soekarno's ideas about the form of Government in Indonesia sprang essentially from indigenous causes, including his own ambitions.

2. The Ambassador asked me whether Australian interests in Indonesia were being subjected to boycotts or interference. I said that there were some trade union boycotts. The Oil people were still confident that they were likely to be temporary. The Government disavowed any responsibility for them and had said it was working to bring them to an end. We treated this profession with some reserve and were waiting to see. We had not (up to that point) made any official representations.

3. We had a general discussion about the voting in the General Assembly on inscription of the West New Guinea item, and I said that it should not be impossible to muster sufficient votes to block a substantive resolution.

4. The Ambassador asked our views on the present situation in the Middle East. I said that we were progressively getting into a situation where the composition, function, location, and tenure of the United Nations force would rest first on interpretations by the Secretary-General and, secondly, on interpretations by Egypt of its legal rights and responsibilities. Nasser claimed the right to withdraw his consent at any time. The Secretary-General seemed to be intent upon having a force which discharged the real objectives of settling Arab-Israel issues and the future running of the Canal. Winkelman said that it seemed to him probable that Nasser would end by running the Canal again. I told him that we were highly dissatisfied with the United Nations force.

Distribution: Acting Minister; Secretary; A/Sec.(4);
 Actg.A/Sec.(1); EAME Bch.; UN Bch.; Information Bch;
 The Hague; Djakarta.

Report prepared by
 (A. H. Tange)

Mr. Winkelman
Mr. Bellingham
 28/11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

File No.....

Date..... 26th November, 1956

3179/56.

SUBJECT

EGYPT - ISRAEL
(THE POSITION AS AT 26th NOVEMBER, 1956)

FOR THE SECRETARY

With copy for:

MR. KEVIN

Mr. Robinson
was

The following brings up to date my note of 23rd November upon this subject.

Clearing the Canal

1. The Secretary-General has been authorised "to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken". He has appointed Wheeler (I.B.R.D.) McCloy (Chase-Manhattan Bank), Katzin (Secretariat), to assist him in this task.

2. The United States has told the Assembly that the United Nations should begin to clear the Canal as soon as this was physically and technically possible. The withdrawal of foreign forces should not await clearance; on the other hand, clearance should not await the completion of withdrawals.

Conclusion Regarding Clearance

3. The Secretary-General now has authority to go ahead with clearance. However, his capacity to do so will depend upon the attitude which Egypt adopts in the negotiations with the Secretary-General upon this subject, that is, will Egypt continue to hold that clearing operations in the Egyptian-held area of the Canal should not commence until Anglo-French forces have been evacuated? In this connection the United States attitude as expressed in paragraph 2 above should be helpful.

Future of the Canal

4. Lodge's statement to the Assembly (on the 24th November) implies that the United States does not intend to bring up its Draft resolution upon the Canal problem until Anglo-French (and Israeli) forces have been completely withdrawn. This means that discussion of a settlement of the Canal problem will probably be delayed longer than we were led to believe last week (our information last week was that the United States would seek discussion of this Draft Resolution very soon after the Secretary-General's Report upon implementation of the Resolutions of the Assembly had been considered).

Composition of U.N.E.F.

5. There is no new development upon this aspect. The conclusion contained in paragraph 17 of the paper of 23rd November stands.

Area of Operation of U.N.E.F.

SECRET

/(6)

SECRET

6. There is no new development upon this aspect either. The conclusion in paragraph 21 of the paper of 23rd November stands.

Duration of U.N.E.F.

7. The only new development upon this aspect is Canada's statement in the Assembly that U.N.E.F. must stay in the area until the United Nations had decided its task was complete. The absence of any comment from other Members upon this statement may indicate that at least the majority of the Assembly endorses this view.

Withdrawal of Anglo-French Forces

8. The Assembly has reiterated its call upon France, Israel and the United Kingdom for complete and immediate withdrawal of forces from Egypt. (63-5-10). The Secretary-General has been asked to report without delay upon the implementation of this Resolution.

9. The United States told the Assembly that the withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces "must advance without delay". The United States also voted for the Resolution regarding the withdrawal of forces, although saying that it was not necessar (see also paragraph 2 above).

10. The United Kingdom has told the Assembly that it would withdraw its forces as soon as U.N.E.F. was in position and could implement all aspects of the Assembly's Resolution of 2nd and 7th November; the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces must be linked with the progressive introduction of U.N.E.F.

11. United Kingdom Ministers are "not unduly disturbed" at a suggestion apparently emanating from Pearson that the United Kingdom should give assurances that evacuation of its forces would be completed in four weeks, provided that clearing of the Canal was commenced immediately and U.N.E.F. was built up over this period. The Ministers still believe that they should avoid evacuating too soon not only because of internal political considerations in the United Kingdom, but also because the presence of their forces provides some lever for getting clearance going and for stimulating the entry of U.N.E.F. 172

Conclusion Regarding the Withdrawal
of the Anglo-French Forces

12. The latest attitude of United Kingdom Ministers as reported in the paragraph immediately above confirms the conclusion reached in paragraph 30 of the paper of 23rd November. The attitude of the United Kingdom now seems to be not to link up the withdrawal of their forces with a satisfactory settlement of the Canal problem and the Arab-Israeli problem but to use the withdrawal of their forces as a weapon for getting clearance of the Canal started and for building up U.N.E.F. in the area as quickly as possible.

/Settlement of

SECRET

Settlement of the Arab-Israel Problem

13. There is no new development upon this aspect except the indication given in the United States statement to the Assembly that consideration of the Draft resolution upon the Arab-Israel problem must await full compliance with the Assembly's recommendations regarding the withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces (see paragraph 4).

(A. P. Renouf)
United Nations Branch

171

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No.....

Date..... 26th November, 1956

3179/56.

SUBJECT

EGYPT - ISRAEL

FOR..... THE SECRETARY

WITH A COPY FOR:

MR. KEVIN
W

Lloyd told London on the 24th November that the atmosphere in the Assembly the previous day was, on the whole, "not too bad". Dixon has also commented to London upon the improvement in the atmosphere at the Assembly since two weeks ago.

2. This improvement in the atmosphere at the Assembly is illustrated by the voting upon the Belgian amendment to the latest Afro-Asian Resolution. This amendment would have changed the operative part of the Resolution to read that "Considers that the United Kingdom, France and Israel should expedite the application of the Resolutions of 2nd and 7th November in the spirit in which they were adopted particularly with regard to the functions vested in the United Nations' Force". This amendment was rejected by 23-37-18 - only.

3. An improvement in the atmosphere is also indicated by the statement made by Lodge. Lodge said that he did not think the Afro-Asian Resolution was necessary; however, as it expressed sentiments in every respect consistent with the United States policy, the United States would vote for it. Lodge also repeated his explanation of vote on 7th November when he said that the withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces should be phased with the arrival of U.N.E.F.

4. Apart from this question of the improvement of the atmosphere in the Assembly, Lodge's statement is significant in another respect, that concerning the two draft United States Resolutions regarding solutions of the Suez Canal and Arab-Israeli problems. Lodge said that the settlement of these two problems depended upon "the full and quick compliance with the General Assembly's recommendations," that is, presumably the recommendations regarding the withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egypt.

M

170

(A. P. RENOUF)
United Nations Branch

Mr. Kandal

Mr. Buckingham

was 26/11

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

VA:AS

O.16219-21.

Sent: 26th November, 1956
1855

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....380.

Repeated to:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....537.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2812.

SECRET.

For Cawthorn.

We have read your reports with interest and have considerable sympathy for the attitude and apprehension of Iskander and Suhrawardy. Their efforts to preserve the situation in the Middle East and to sustain the Baghdad Pact clearly need encouragement in all quarters.

2. We, ourselves, will take whatever opportunities are available to us, directly or indirectly, to bring home to the United States the importance of the Baghdad Powers' attitude.

3. We do not know what action the Baghdad Powers and Pakistan, in particular, have taken to express their anxieties to the United States in Washington but you might suggest to Iskander that Noon, if still in America, could be used for this purpose. In your conversations with Iskander and Suhrawardy, it would be as well not to give too bleak a description of United States thinking in as much as this might discourage them. In addition, United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington urges that not too much should be made of lack of intimacy in United Kingdom-United States consultations as this will discourage Baghdad Pact members.

4. You will by now have received a copy of our views on the lines which United States policy might follow in the Middle East. We hope that we shall find an opportunity of bringing these under notice in Washington. You will appreciate that we do not want to be embarrassed by the Pakistan Government referring to them anywhere before we have spoken to the United States.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE

27th November, 1956
(Cost £60/10/6)

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&S? S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

I.16258

OA/BH

Sent: 23rd November, 1956.
1917
Rec'd: 24th November, 1956.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3215. RESTRICTED.

From External.

Our 3121.

Representation in Syria.

Following upon agreement of Syrians,
Swiss legation has formally confirmed that Swiss Government
will represent Australian interests in Syria.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C) MR. McCLINTOCK
P.M'S.

24th November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN ER PAC&AM S &SEA EAF&ME E INF
C&P ADMIN

*Mr. Boddy will arrange
telegram to all posts*

M. Boddy 11/11/56

166

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 16211.

VA:OA.

Sent: 26th November, 1956.
1745.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

534. RESTRICTED.

Palestine Observers.

Please advise Secretariat that Captains Lott and Simmonds
have been promoted to temporary rank of Major.

Cost : £3.10.0.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A. (854/10/15/2)
MIN & DEPT. DEF.
MIN & DEPT. ARMY
F.M'S.

27th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN@ PAC&AM EAF&ME AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

168

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

BH:AS

0.16162

Sent: 24th November, 1956
1315

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2806. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For External.

Please telegraph urgently assessment of recent
change of government in Lebanon.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

26th November, 1956
(Cost £1/13/4)

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&MT
INF DL MT
G

167

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

MMc/BH

0.16121

Sent: 23rd November, 1956.
1650

TO:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

204. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 230. Paragraph 1.

Question being considered urgently. Will cable further.

Paragraph 2. Cutler advises that full written instructions on what he considered necessary regarding leases, effects and Australian citizens were left with Mr. Kote. Possibly, however, the Canadians have in mind that with blocking of bank accounts some advances to Australians for relief and/or repatriation may be necessary. If so we should appreciate confirmation and any recommendations on amounts, or on other action which they consider desirable. We would welcome any pressure which they can bring to bear on the Egyptians for the early issue of exit permits to Australians wishing to leave.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION
P.M'S.

(Cost £9.16.8)
26th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P@

165

CONFIDENTIAL

Mandal

CONFIDENTIAL

23rd November, 1956

EGYPT - ISRAEL - THE POSITION AS AT 23rd NOVEMBER

THE SECRETARY

With copy to:

MR. KEVIN

Clearing the Canal

Egypt holds that clearing operations should not begin in the Egyptian-held area until Anglo-French forces have been evacuated.

2. However, the Secretary-General hopes to get survey and reconnaissance under way well before evacuation is complete, in fact, almost immediately. The Secretary-General says that Egypt is just as anxious as the United Kingdom to get the Canal cleared.

3. Lloyd says that there is no hope of getting an agreement now for clearance to start in the Egyptian-held area before the Anglo-French forces have been withdrawn, "but there is a chance that this might happen in practice if all else is going smoothly".

4. The Secretary-General refuses to accept the view advanced by Lloyd that U.N.E.F. has the task of securing compliance with the clearing-and-free-navigation clause of the 2nd November resolution. The Secretary-General takes the view that the Assembly did not intend that U.N.E.F. should have this task but that the questions of clearance and the future of the Canal were questions to be settled through negotiation. The United States agrees with the Secretary-General's view. 164

5. The Secretary-General proposes that he should clear the Canal on behalf of the Assembly using private Dutch and Danish firms and should be given authority to make financial commitments for this purpose.

6. Egypt has requested United Nations' aid in clearing the Canal.

7. The Secretary-General says that his agreement with Egypt may enable the private firms employed upon clearance to call in the services of the British salvage teams.

8. Lloyd believes that the United Kingdom may get around any hesitance on the part of the Assembly in providing funds for clearance by offering its salvage facilities free of charge.

Conclusion Regarding Clearance

9. The future course of events is shaping up as follows:-

/(a)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) the contention that U.N.E.F. is responsible for clearing operations will not prevail;
- (b) the Assembly will approve clearance being the responsibility of the Secretary-General and will have to vote funds for this purpose;
- (c) The Secretary-General will be able to get survey and reconnaissance work under way almost immediately;
- (d) Whether he will be able to ~~get it to go~~ any further depends upon the extent to which the United Kingdom and France are able to convince the Assembly that they intend to evacuate completely as quickly as possible and to the extent to which they carry out this intention.
- (e) Depending upon (d), it should be possible to push clearance operations along rapidly, given that the Secretary-General should be able to supplement the resources of the private firms he employs with the British salvage teams.

Future of the Canal

10. Given what is said in paragraph ⁴ above, the question of the future operation of the Canal is clearly going to be a matter for the Assembly to discuss.

11. The United States intends to bring up its draft resolution (the three-man ^{committee} proposal) shortly. The United Kingdom has told the United States it is in general agreement with the resolution.

Composition of U.N.E.F.

12. Egypt apparently takes the view that she has at least the right to be consulted about the component contingents of U.N.E.F. 163

13. The Secretary-General has told Lloyd that he can take account of Egypt's views but that he is the determining authority. However, he has declared in the documents which he drew up at the conclusion of his Cairo talks with Nasser his intention to negotiate with Egypt concerning any additions to the list of countries agreed upon as representing a balanced Force.

14. Canada believes that the Secretary-General should not even discuss the question of the composition of U.N.E.F. with Egypt.

15. A Canadian contingent of 250 to 300 + nical and administrative personnel has been accepted 's on its way to Egypt. Canada has not given tention of contributing a force of up to

/(16)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

16. Hammarskjöld has said that Egypt does not bar a contingent from Pakistan but that this contingent could not be absorbed at present.

Conclusion Regarding Composition

17. It is difficult to see the Assembly disagreeing with what the Secretary-General has done upon this question. The final composition or size of U.N.E.F. probably depends therefore upon the Secretary-General's future discussions with Nasser. Given Canada's attitude, however, it is possible that the Secretary-General will take a tougher line with Nasser than he previously has.

Area of Operation of U.N.E.F.

18. Egypt has stipulated that:-

- (a) U.N.E.F. would have no function in Port Said and the Canal area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces;
- (b) the area that U.N.E.F. will occupy on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the withdrawal of Israeli forces would be subject to agreement; and
- (c) the question of appropriate staging areas for U.N.E.F. would be subject to agreement.

19. The Secretary-General has agreed with Lloyd that U.N.E.F. must be at Port Said when the Anglo-French forces withdraw and that it will have to remain in the Canal area for some time. 162

20. Lloyd has said that the principal ^{reliance} ~~lines~~ of the United Kingdom as regards this question must be on physical limitations; the Secretary-General seemed to agree that U.N.E.F. could not survive unless it had a firm base upon the Canal.

Conclusion Regarding Area of Operation

21. The attitude of the Secretary-General seems satisfactory and it looks as if he can be relied upon to secure from Egypt agreement to having some part of U.N.E.F. remain in the Canal area.

Duration of U.N.E.F.

22. Egypt has stipulated that as U.N.E.F. has entered Egyptian territory with Egypt's consent, U.N.E.F. cannot stay or operate there unless Egypt continues to consent. In his talks with the Secretary-General, Nasser said at one point that U.N.E.F. might remain four years as long as its functions did not include enforcing a settlement of the Canal problem.

23. The position of the Secretary-General is

CONFIDENTIAL

that U.N.E.F. should not be withdrawn from Egypt until the Assembly has decided that it has fulfilled its functions.

24. The Foreign Office view which has been recommended to Ministers is that the Secretary-General's attitude is unsatisfactory as it left *leaves* the question of the duration of U.N.E.F. at the mercy of the Assembly; however, there seems to be no alternative but to accept this attitude.

Conclusion Regarding Duration of U.N.E.F.

25. It is too early to attempt to predict what the duration of U.N.E.F. will be although Nasser's attitude as expressed to the Secretary-General gives some ground for hope that U.N.E.F. will be able to continue in existence until the problem of Arab-Israel relations is settled.

Withdrawal of Anglo-French Forces

26. The United States considers that the Anglo-French forces should be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment. Presumably this is also the attitude of the Secretary-General (naturally it is Egypt's attitude also).

27. The exact attitude of the United Kingdom is a little difficult to make out. Home's instinct before the meeting of the British Cabinet on Wednesday, seemed, on balance, to be that the United Kingdom and France should hold on and insist on proper conditions before they withdrew their forces. However, Home was worried about the effect of such an attitude upon the United States (U.S. economic aid and particularly oil), about the need to get the Egyptian question off the scene as soon as possible so that world attention *could* be centred upon the U.S.S.R.'s problems with her satellites, *about* the internal political situation in the United Kingdom and the doubt that keeping the Anglo-French forces in Egypt would achieve any better result than withdrawing them.

28. The Foreign Office view which was recommended to Cabinet was that the United Kingdom should be in no hurry to agree to the withdrawal of forces. The United Kingdom might well be forced to withdraw her forces if it proved obviously impossible to get clearance under way as long as the forces remained. However, there was still a chance that a pressure for withdrawal could be held at bay until the position of U.N.E.F. had been clarified and a properly-phased withdrawal could be set in train. The delay of withdrawal for as long as possible was reinforced by reports from Cairo that Nasser's position was less secure than might appear to be the case.

29. Subsequent to the discussions of the British Cabinet on Wednesday, Lloyd has announced the immediate withdrawal of one battalion from Egypt. Lloyd was also instructed to endeavour to keep the question of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces separate from the

/question of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

question of clearance of the Canal.

Conclusion Regarding the Withdrawal of the
Anglo-French Forces.

30. It seems clear that mainly in response to the attitude of the United States (and the effects of that attitude upon the economy of the United Kingdom and Western Europe generally), the United Kingdom is tending to move in the direction of withdrawing its forces without obtaining positive assurances from Egypt about essential objectives, such as the clearing of the Canal, a satisfactory settlement of the future of the Canal and a satisfactory settlement of the Arab-Israel problem (the United Kingdom is, of course, trying to get the best assurances of this kind that it can but it is apparently not prepared now to brazen out the situation by maintaining its forces in Egypt, in defiance of the United States and the Assembly). How quickly this tendency develops will depend upon the pressure brought to bear in the Assembly, upon how firmly the United States adheres to its present attitude and upon internal political considerations within the United Kingdom.

Settlement of the Arab-Israel Problem

31. Egypt has given some indication that she is prepared to link up the duration of U.N.E.F. with a settlement of the Arab-Israel problem.

32. Earlier, the Secretary-General felt that U.N.E.F. should not be wound up until such a settlement had been reached. However, he now seems to feel that the question of winding up U.N.E.F. is a matter for the Assembly to decide. 160

33. Lloyd feels that U.N.E.F. should not be wound up before a settlement of the Arab-Israel problem is in sight.

34. The attitude of the United States is not quite clear. The United States draft resolution (the Five-Man Committee proposal) on the Arab-Israel problem is still upon the books of the Assembly. The United Kingdom has decided (without enthusiasm) to vote for this resolution. There are no indications, however, that the resolution will be brought up for consideration in the near future. It is fairly clear that the United States regards withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from Egypt, clearance of the Canal and a Canal settlement as having priority.

Conclusion Regarding a Settlement
of the Arab-Israel Problem

35. This question is one which the Assembly will be asked to decide. There are grounds for hope that the duration of U.N.E.F. will be linked up with a settlement of it. It appears that when brought up for discussion the United States draft resolution will be adopted.

M
(A. P. RENOUF)
United Nations Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.16104/5/6/7/8

BH

Sent: 23rd November, 1956.
1515

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. 526
Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON..1027
Repeated
Australian High Commission,
KARACHI. 379

SECRETPRIORITY.

New York pass Washington..

For Casey from Tange..

United States Policy in the Middle East..

2. Before receiving telegram 332 from Cawthorn (repeated to New York 28) Acting Minister approved a Departmental paper suggesting policies which the United States might be encouraged to adopt. This has been forwarded to posts as guidance savingram.

3. The following are the suggested policies:

Begin

(a) The United States should work actively to ensure that the United Nations force is so composed, covers such a breadth of area, and maintains its operations for such time as are necessary to get agreement on the basic essentials for the future operation of the Suez Canal and on Arab-Israel relations.

(b) The United States should move promptly to save the Baghdad Pact from disintegrating and to help sustain the Iraqi and Pakistan Governments in ways which will divert present popular hostility to their moderate attitudes. These and the other Pact Governments are alive to both Nasser's ambitions and Soviet intentions. Their continuing help is needed as a counterpoise to Nasser, the Russians and the dangerous instability of Syria and Jordan.

(c) There is a question whether the United States should now enter into full membership of the Baghdad Pact, in spite of the break this would involve with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; membership would encourage the present Muslim members but would not of itself serve its full purpose unless the United States allocated a significantly increased amount of military and economic aid to the Pact members.

(d) We should encourage the Americans not to be influenced, so long as Nasser remains, by any fear of Egyptian chagrin or malevolence.

(e) Whatever action is taken on the American resolution

SECRET

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.16104/5/6/7/8

2.

it seems inevitable that the problem of Arab-Israeli relations will have to be approached piecemeal. The most satisfactory targets in the first phase seem to be the related subjects of:

- (i) refugee resettlement; and
- (ii) irrigation and other projects like the Jordan Valley scheme.

British and United States efforts to secure progress in these fields, and indeed the whole field of economic and technical aid, should be energetically revived and stepped up. A solution of the refugee problem would considerably improve the existing situation in Jordan.

(f) The question of Israel's frontiers is the most unyielding of all Middle East problems, and it is not easy to suggest any constructive move by the United States which would better ensure the discontinuance of border incidents which are a constant threat to peace.

(g) The Arab political and economic blockade of Israel - their refusal to recognise the existence of an Israel - is a fundamental cause of the present situation. Neither threats nor reason seem likely to persuade the Arabs to abandon their present boycott. It is barely possible that they could eventually be persuaded to do so by a bold offer of American aid combined with an American guarantee of frontiers which are negotiated. A solution acceptable to the Arabs may require some concessions by Israel, and an American policy calling for concessions by Israel, in respect of such matters as the absorption of a quota of the Palestine refugees and the principles upon which permanent borders are to be negotiated. (It is to be noted that the United Kingdom proposes to argue that the 1947 partition lines, which would leave Israel with less territory than she at present occupies should be the basis for negotiation.)

(h) The Americans should be encouraged to work methodically to break down the myth of Nasser as the destined leader of the Arab cause (early American reactions to the Anglo-French action suggesting that they would drastically revise their attitude towards French policy in North Africa suggested that, in withholding support from the French, they would find themselves at one with Nasser.

(j) Finally, and more immediately, we should encourage the Americans to press for the implementation of all parts of their November 2nd resolution and not merely that part of it which calls for the withdrawal from Egypt of Anglo-French forces.

The distractions exercised upon the United States by interests in other regions, and the conflict of advice within the United States Administration, make it desirable that the President should be persuaded to overcome his present inhibitions about a high-level meeting with the British and French. The dangers of any impression of "ganging up" are not so great as the dangers of continuing conflict with two Western allies, and paralysis of the only Power which is capable of controlling events in the Middle East. The most effective way to register

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

3.

0.16104/5/6/7/8

in Washington the necessity for a tripartite accord is perhaps to emphasise the great opportunities which the present situation provides for Russian initiatives in the Middle East while the policies of the three great democracies lack moral force because of all too evident disagreements among them.

Ends.

4. You may find an opportunity of canvassing these to United States officials. Copy was given to Spender.

(Cost £26.15.10)
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

23rd November, 1956.

157

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

VA:SH

O. 16064/65/66/67

TO:

Sent: 22nd November, 1956
2120

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK 524

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON 1023

Repeated:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON 2787

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA 203

CONFIDENTIAL - IMMEDIATE

New York ~~passed to~~ Washington and Ottawa.

For Casey from Tange.

Your 937. Egypt-Israel.

1. A.B.C. reports that the Assembly will consider today a report by the Secretary-General. Presumably the report will include the documents referred to in your 943 and the Assembly will be requested to approve the aide memoire of the Secretary-General and Egypt (your 937).
2. Consultation with Ministers is not possible today. Following are some departmental reactions.
3. We suggest you examine closely why Egypt is apparently willing to be guided only by resolution 394 smitting the interpretation of necessary location for force, etc. embraced in 395.
4. Will exploration mentioned in paragraph (3) be limited to the means of implementing further the resolutions of the Assembly; or will it amount to a negotiation in which the terms of reference of U.N.E.F. may be changed by agreement?
5. We presume that the Egyptian aide memoire upon the arrival of U.N.E.F. in Egypt does not mean that Hammarskjöld has accepted the conditions stipulated by Egypt. Conditions (2), (4) are not in our opinion "interpretations" of the resolutions of the Assembly but variations of them (hence, our paragraph 4 above). Condition (5) is unsatisfactory but probably more difficult to contest on legal grounds alone. 151
6. The consent which Egypt was asked to give to the entry of U.N.E.F. is clearly defined in paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) which was approved by the resolution of 7th November.
7. Egypt's reply to the Secretary-General as set out in

CONFIDENTIAL

/2.....

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 16064/65/66/67

the aide memoire amounts to a refusal to give its consent to entry on the terms specified by the Assembly and to a counter-offer because:

- (a) Condition (2) is inconsistent with the final sentence of paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;
- (b) the question of the composition of U.N.E.F. is a matter for the Chief of Command and Secretary-General to decide in consultation with Members who wish to contribute contingents;
- (c) the question of the length of stay of U.N.E.F. is also regulated by its functions as defined in resolutions of the Assembly; it is not a matter for negotiation with Egypt.

8. It seems clear that the objective will be to try to prevent Assembly endorsement of Egypt's interpretations. It may however be necessary to press for specific rejection of them as inconsistent with past Assembly decisions. If this course were followed but defeated, do you consider this would only add strength to Egyptian position? Glad of comments.

(COST £84.14.0)

23rd November, 1956

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

SEC	A/SS	UN	PAC&AM	S&SEA	SA	EEAF&ME	E	AF&ME
INF	DL	C&P	MT					

G

155

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK

(REPEATED TO WASHINGTON, LONDON, OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON)

(NEW YORK TO PASS TO WASHINGTON)

CONFIDENTIAL - IMMEDIATE

YOUR 937 EGYPT - ISRAEL

1. We presume that the Assembly will shortly be asked to consider a report by the Secretary-General upon progress made so far in implementing the resolutions of the Assembly, that this report will include the documents referred in your 943 and that the Assembly will be requested to approve what has been done.

2. We presume that the Aide Memoire upon the arrival of U.N.E.F. in Egypt does not mean that Hammarskjöld has accepted the conditions stipulated by Egypt for in our view the Assembly should not (repeat not) agree to some of them. Conditions (2), (4) and (5) are not "interpretations" of the resolutions of the Assembly but variations of them.

3. The consent which Egypt was asked to give to the entry of U.N.E.F. is clearly defined in paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) which was approved by the resolution of 7th November. This is consent to the entry and operation of a Force composed by the Secretary-General on behalf of the Assembly to carry out

APR/bgg

/certain stated....

22/11/56.

154

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL - IMMEDIATE

certain stated functions in a specified area for such time as may be necessary to build those functions.

4. Egypt's reply to the Secretary-General as set out in the Aide Memoire amounts to a refusal to give its consent to entry on the terms specified by the Assembly and to a counter-offer because:-

- (a) (Condition 2) is inconsistent with the official section of paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;
- (b) the question of position of U.N.E.F. is a matter for the Secretary-General to decide in consultation with Members who wish to contribute contingents;
- (c) the question of the length of stay by U.N.E.F. is also regulated by the resolutions of the Assembly, it is not a matter for negotiation with Egypt.

5. The Assembly should therefore reject the "interpretations" which Egypt is attempting to place upon the /resolutions and

153

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - IMMEDIATE

resolutions and affirm that U.N.E.F. has entered Egypt in strict accordance with them. The Secretary-General should be told that the question of composition of the Force of U.N.E.F. is not a matter for negotiation with Egypt.

152

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: LONDON

(REPEATED TO NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON)

(NEW YORK TO PASS TO WASHINGTON)

SECRET

SECRET - EMERGENCY

(FOR MCCARTHY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER)

YOUR 3196 EGYPT - ISRAEL

1. I strongly agree with Home's instinct that the Anglo-French forces should sit tight (this would not, of course, prevent token withdrawals) until satisfaction is secured from Nasser upon the three major questions. These are that the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces should be phased with the entry of an effective United Nations Force, that the United Nations Force will remain in the region with at least bases upon the Canal until the problem of the Canal is settled and that the Force should remain thereafter in the region for so long as is necessary to ensure a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. Satisfaction on the third point, if not as important as the first two, is still highly desirable.

/2.....

APR/bgg

22/11/56.

51

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET - EMERGENCY

2. If we were not to insist upon the satisfaction of at least the first two points (I note that Nasser does not seem over-concerned about the third point), it will become even more difficult to obtain anything like a satisfactory solution of the problem of the Canal as well as boosting Nasser's standing and conversely further diminishing the standing of the United Kingdom and France.

3. I appreciate that the attitude of the United States presents a real obstacle to this policy. However, it must be remembered that Nasser's intransigence with regard to implementation of the Assembly's resolutions makes our position in the Assembly better than it previously was. If Nasser refuses to give satisfaction on the first two points a reasonable case can be made out in the Assembly that Egypt is obstructing the /implementation of.....

150

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET - EMERGENCY

implementation of one of the objectives of 2nd November, namely, the restoration of secure freedom of navigation of the Canal. It can also be argued with justification that by insisting that his consent to the entry of the United Nations Force can be withdrawn at any time (as I understand he is doing), Nasser has refused to comply with the resolution of 7th November. That resolution asked from Egypt an unqualified consent to the entry of the Force for the purposes stated; this naturally includes the time necessary to carry out those purposes.

4. This can be re-inforced effectively by exploiting Nasser's wide and wilful act of sabotage of the Canal, an act which shows his government to lack the degree of international responsibility essential in a government which is the guardian of a great international water-way and an act the consequences of which the Assembly

/is now being

149

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET - EMERGENCY

is now being asked to repair.

5. Furthermore, it seems to me too early yet to say just how long the United States' Government will persist with its present attitude of sitting back and giving no lead and making no move to assist Western Europe with oil supplies in the belief the Anglo-French forces should be withdrawn unconditionally. I have the feeling that this attitude is an emotional one; it is surely one which is contrary to the long-term interests of the United States. I have hopes that the United States will quickly come to realize this. We should all do what we can to bring pressure to bear upon them to hasten this process of realization.

15148

SECRET

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

O.16033

Sent: 22nd November, 1956.

BH

TO:

ALL POSTS (Excluding consulates)

~~Save~~ No. 22 SECRET. GUIDANCE

American Policy in the Middle East.

The attached paper gives background information on American policy in the Middle East and Departmental views on possible courses of action.

The paper has been conveyed to the Australian Ambassador in Washington.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

22nd November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA
SEA EAF&ME@ E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G.

147

SECRET

SECRET

20th November, 1956.

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Tripartite Declaration:

1. The United States subscribes to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 that should the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States find any Middle East country preparing to violate frontiers or amistice lines, they would immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.

Dulles' Statement of 26th August, 1955:

2. United States policy with regard to the Palestine issue and Arab-Israeli relations was outlined by Mr. Dulles on 26th August, 1955. According to Mr. Dulles three basic problems had been left unsolved by the Armistice Agreements 1949:

- (i) the plight of 900,000 refugees who formerly lived in Israel;
- (ii) the pall of fear hanging over both Israelis and Arabs;
- (iii) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

As part of an overall settlement, Dulles expressed the readiness of the United States to undertake the following:

- (i) Refugees. The United States would be prepared to contribute substantially to an international loan to assist resettlement of Arab refugees.
- (ii) Security guarantee. The United States would be prepared to join in formal treaty negotiations to prevent any attempt by either side to alter, by force, the boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Dulles expressed the hope that the United Nations would sponsor any such security guarantee.
- (iii) Borders. Each side would have to reconcile their border claims.

Eden-Eisenhower Declaration of 1st February, 1956:

3. The United States with the United Kingdom expressed readiness to guarantee agreed frontiers and finance aid for refugees.

Tripartite Talks, Washington, April, 1956:

4. At these talks, the United States expressed the view that in the event of a renewal of the Palestine war any action under the Tripartite Declaration should come through the United Nations. Only if the United Nations sponsored action proved impractical would Tripartite action alone be considered.

146

SECRET

SECRET

Statement by President Eisenhower:

5. On 15th November, 1956, in a public message, Eisenhower repeated American willingness to sign a Middle Eastern security guarantee provided agreement was reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries. He stated that the United States would meanwhile continue to be guided by the policies of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

United States and Middle East Defence:

6. Since the end of World War II the United States has been much interested in the defence of the Middle East. It has expressed that interest in a variety of ways including assistance to Greece and Turkey (1947) and support for the entry of those countries into NATO (1952). Together with France, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the United States during 1951-52 sought the establishment of MEDO; this concept failed to materialise. In 1953 Mr. Dulles concluded that any sound regional defence arrangement would have to rest on the desires of the peoples and the governments of the Middle East. He found that the Northern Tier states, more exposed to external danger, were more likely than the others to find a solution to the problem and also were so situated as to provide the greatest measure of protection to the area. This attitude lies behind American support of the Baghdad Pact. The United States has not yet joined the Baghdad Pact except in the economic field. It maintains a permanent liaison with the Baghdad Pact organisation. It considers that:

- (i) by not formally joining the Pact the United States is in a better manoeuvring position;
- (ii) "backing into the Pact", the United States would be less inclined to antagonise the Arabs;
- (iii) it is better for domestic reasons for, if the United States joined the Pact, pressure for a Security Pact with Israel would be difficult to resist.

Buraimi Oasis:

7. The United States policy towards Saudi Arabia is conditioned by their fear of losing the Aramco Oil concession and to a lesser degree the Dhahran air base. Moreover, they do not share the United Kingdom's suspicion of Saudi designs against the whole United Kingdom position in the Persian Gulf.

Attitude towards Israel:

8. In a television statement on 31st October, President Eisenhower said:

"We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new State of Israel, and at the same time to strengthen our bonds both with Israel and with the Arab countries."

145

United States Economic Programmes:

9. The United States readiness to assist in the economic field was outlined by Hollister, the Director of the International Co-operation Administration, on 30th March, 1956:

"In the Arab States and in Israel we are prepared to

SECRET

support any programmes or projects that hold real promise of constructive progress on these problems including broad support for regional projects that will harness the energy and equitably distribute the waters of the Jordan River and facilitate the resettlement of refugees."

The United States sees three factors in particular as creating a special need for flexible action on the economic front:

- (a) increased Soviet activity in the area;
- (b) the past pattern of frequent and sudden economic crises in particular countries in the region;
- (c) many major problems of the regions are of a kind which concern two or more countries which means that, given their sensitive political relationships, the exact timing and character of the eventual solution of these problems cannot be accurately forecast nor the precise manner in which aid can be contributed.

Johnston Plan:

10. The United States have sponsored the Johnston Plan for unified development of the Jordan Valley and have spared no effort in trying to secure Arab and Israeli acceptance. The United States is prepared to contribute substantially to the cost of the plan now in the vicinity of \$200 m.

11. The basic objective of the Plan is to enable the resettlement of a considerable number of Arab refugees and so reduce Arab-Israeli tension.

SUEZ CANAL

Nationalisation of Suez Canal:

12. The United States, regarding the nationalisation of the Canal as legally admissible but politically intolerable, has from the outset maintained that the objective should be to ensure open, secure and efficient operation of the Canal as an international waterway. It has consistently opposed the use of force.

13. The proposal for international operation of the Canal which was adopted by the 18 Nations was put forward by Mr. Dulles. The essence of the plan was that the Canal should be operated, maintained and developed by international management set up by treaty and under assurances which would pay due regard to the interests both of Egypt and other powers.

14. Mr. Dulles has frequently stressed the value of establishing de facto working arrangements with Egypt which would point up a provisional or even possibly, a final solution. S.C.U.A. was conceived by him.

15. Notwithstanding the United States adherence to the 18 Nations Proposal. their approach has been somewhat flexible and pragmatic. They wanted to strengthen S.C.U.A., to make it as attractive as possible to the Egyptians and to develop instances of day to day co-operation. We have the impression that the United States do not attach as much weight to international operation as do the United Kingdom and France.

SECRET

United States Attitude towards Russian Volunteers:

16. At a press conference on 14th November, President Eisenhower said it would be the duty of the United Nations, which would include the United States, to oppose the intervention of Soviet "volunteers" and in any such action, the United States would again try to support the United Nations. President did not know how the United Nations would act in this event. What "we" would do would depend upon circumstances.

C. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN THE PAST

17. In broad terms the United States policy in the Middle East aims to:

- (a) keep the Communists out of the area;
- (b) keep the peace and preserve the highest possible measure of unity among the States of the Middle East;
- (c) keep the Suez Canal in working order so that Middle East oil can continue to flow to Western European industry.

To this end United States efforts have been designed to:

- (a) maintain the defence effort of those countries which are prepared to resist Soviet influence;
- (b) assist the whole region, including uncommitted countries to strike at those poor living standards which tend to create unrest and instability;
- (c) keep alive among the uncommitted countries their desire for independence, and to help them to develop the internal economic conditions in which free institutions can prosper;
- (d) resist Soviet economic as well as political penetration.

D. COURSES OF ACTION OR POLICIES TO BE URGED ON THE UNITED STATES NOW:

18. It is to be assumed that the United States will be obliged, by their recent stand in the United Nations, to seek solutions to the Suez Canal dispute and the overall Arab-Israel dispute only through that organization. One can deduce from American proposals now before the General Assembly that their aim is to have these subjects handled by small committees in a more constructive atmosphere than the General Assembly. It is also to be assumed that there can be no going back by the United States on their requirement that the United Kingdom and French forces should withdraw from Egypt. Equally, the Americans are pledged to support the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt.

19. The following are suggested as helpful policies which the United States might be encouraged to adopt:

- (a) The United States should work actively to ensure that the United Nations force is so composed, covers such a breadth of area, and maintains its operations for such time as are necessary to get agreement on the basic essentials for the future operation of the Suez Canal and on Arab-Israel relations.

SECRET

- (b) The United States should move promptly to save the Baghdad Pact from disintegrating and to help sustain the Iraqi and Pakistan Governments in ways which will divert present popular hostility to their moderate attitudes. These and the other Pact Governments are alive to both Nasser's ambitions and Soviet intentions. Their continuing help is needed as a counterpoise to Nasser, the Russians and the dangerous instability of Syria and Jordan.
- (c) There is a question whether the United States should now enter into full membership of the Baghdad Pact, in spite of the break this would involve with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; membership would encourage the present Muslim members but would not of itself serve its full purpose unless the United States allocated a significantly increased amount of military and economic aid to the Pact members.
- (d) We should encourage the Americans not to be influenced, so long as Nasser remains, by any fear of Egyptian chagrin or malevolence.
- (e) Whatever action is taken on the American resolution, it seems inevitable that the problem of Arab-Israeli relations will have to be approached piecemeal. The most satisfactory targets in the first phase seem to be the related subjects of:
 - (i) refugee resettlement; and
 - (ii) irrigation and other projects like the Jordan Valley scheme.

British and United States efforts to secure progress in these fields, and indeed the whole field of economic and technical aid, should be energetically revived and stepped up. A solution of the refugee problem would considerably improve the existing situation in Jordan.

- (f) The question of Israel's frontiers is the most unyielding of all Middle East problems, and it is not easy to suggest any constructive move by the United States which would better ensure the discontinuance of border incidents which are a constant threat to peace.
- (g) The Arab political and economic blockade of Israel - their refusal to recognize the existence of an Israel - is a fundamental cause of the present situation. Neither threats nor reason seem likely to persuade the Arabs to abandon their present boycott. It is ~~barely~~ ¹⁴² possible that they could eventually be persuaded to do so by a bold offer of American aid combined with an American guarantee of frontiers which are negotiated. A solution acceptable to the Arabs may require some concessions by Israel, and an American policy calling for concessions by Israel, in respect of such matters as the absorption of a quota of the Palestine refugees and the principles upon which permanent borders are

SECRET

to be negotiated. (It is to be noted that the United Kingdom proposes to argue that the 1947 partition lines, which would leave Israel with less territory than she at present occupies, should be the basis for negotiation.)

- (h) The Americans should be encouraged to work methodically to break down the myth of Nasser as the destined leader of the Arab cause (early American reactions to the Anglo-French action suggesting that they would drastically revise their attitude towards French policy in North Africa suggested that, in withholding support from the French, they would find themselves at one with Nasser.)
- (j) Finally, and more immediately, we should encourage the Americans to press for the implementation of all parts of their November 2nd resolution and not merely that part of it which calls for the withdrawal from Egypt of Anglo-French forces.

20. The distractions exercised upon the United States by interests in other regions, and the conflict of advice within the United States Administration, make it desirable that the President should be persuaded to overcome his present inhibitions about a high-level meeting with the British and French. The dangers of any impression of "ganging up" are not so great as the dangers of continuing conflict with two Western allies, and paralysis of the only Power which is capable of controlling events in the Middle East. The most effective way to register in Washington the necessity for a tripartite accord is perhaps to emphasize the great opportunities which the present situation provides for Russian initiatives in the Middle East while the policies of the three great democracies lack moral force because of all too evident disagreements among them.

141

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/60.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

VA:AS

0.16015-9

Sent: 22nd November, 1956
1415

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....518.

Repeated to:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2779.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....1020.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.132.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV.126.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

New York pass Washington and Ottawa.

Egypt - Israel.

1. We note from Washington's telegram 1271 that the United States may seek the Assembly's consideration of its draft resolution upon the Suez Canal this week.

2. In their telegram 314C to us (which we are passing to you) London has stated that the United Kingdom agrees generally with the resolution and hopes to vote for it, subject to assurances regarding the composition of the Committee and provisions whereby the United Kingdom will be able to influence both the interim plan and the eventual permanent settlement. Willcox's remarks in Washington indicate that the United States is prepared to give such assurances.

3. Provided that the Committee is so composed as to give adequate representation to important users of the Canal and provided that the United Kingdom supports it, you should also support the resolution.

4. Our previous instructions regarding the United States draft resolution on Arab - Israel relations (our 429) stand. We understand that the United Kingdom, although not enthusiastic about this resolution (because it will entrust the working out of the problem to a majority of small powers), does not intend to incur further unpopularity by failing to support it. The United Kingdom will, however, propose the insertion of a provision requiring the Committee to bear in mind the Assembly's resolution of 29th November 1947 regarding Palestine. You should support such an amendment.

CONFIDENTIAL

140

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2- 0.16015-9

You should also work to secure the best possible composition of the Committee.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

22nd November, 1956
(Cost £53/5/4)

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E. AF&ME	E	AF
AF&ME	INF	DL	MT	C&P					
G									

139

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

OA:HM&C

I.16102

Dated: 21st November, 1956.
0236

Rec'd: 22nd November, 1956.
0830

FROM:-

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

942. RESTRICTED.

Our 889.

Secretariat still has no definite news
of Major Carter but believes he is in Jerusalem. Major
Connell is reported to be in Cyprus as U.N.E.F. Liaison
Officer while Captain Simmonds is doing U.N.E.F. Liaison
in Jerusalem.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S.

22nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL M.T. C&P

G

138

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MMc:HMCC

1.16133

Dated: 21st November, 1956.
1747
Rec'd: 22nd November, 1956.
1330

FROM:-

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

946. RESTRICTED.

Our 942.

Carter is in Port Said as Military Observer of
U.N.E.F.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

22nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL M.T. C&P

G

137

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

DB:HP

0.15922
Sent: 21st November, 1956.
1445

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

131. SECRET.

For Ballard from Tange.

The following is the text of telegram 911 from
Casey in New York. This is for your own information.

(Begins)

(Here insert text of 911 from New York I.15954)

(Ends)

External Affairs

Cost - £7.11.8.

21st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN E.AF&ME AF&ME

136

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

I.15954

OA/BH

Sent 19th November, 1956.
2234
Rec'd: 20th November, 1956.
1800

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

911.

SECRET.

Acting Minister and Secretary from Casey.

M.54.

I talked with Mrs. Meir Israeli Foreign Minister at her request today. She said specifically in answer to my query, that Israel had no intention whatsoever to attack Syria or Jordan. However, Israel must have the two small Islands near Akaba to which she said there was no clear title by either Israel or Egypt. They were essential to enable shipping approach to be made to Akaba. She was less specific about the Gaza strip as it contained considerable Arab population and no Jews, as well, as (she said), 300,000 Arab refugees. After considerable discussion she asked what I had to recommend. I said she ought to see Herbert Hoover in the State Department and put the Israel proposals in the form of a package deal, involving all she had told me above as well as their desire for a demilitarised zone (carved out of Sinai) on the Egyptian border and the withdrawal of Israeli forces at the proper time within their own borders. I said that I knew that Americans would be relieved by what she had said about Syria and Jordan.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

19th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA FAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
G.

135

SECRET

Mr. Nicholson
175/11/20
SECRET

Copy of teleprinter message from Department of
External Affairs to Department of Civil
Aviation - 20th November, 1956.

You asked for our comment on the feasibility of Qantas using the following routes if its present diversion through Basra, Iran and Turkey were, for any reason, to go sour. I understand that the routes listed are in order of operational convenience:

- (a) Australia-Karachi-Aden-Khartoum-Rome-London.
- (b) Australia-Bombay-Aden-Khartoum-Rome-London.
- (c) Australia-Singapore-Colombo-Aden-Kano (Nigeria) -Rome-London.
- (d) Australia-Singapore-Cocos-Mauritius-Entebbe (Uganda) - Kano-Rome-London.
- (e) Perth-Cocos-Mauritius-Entebbe-Rome-London.

2. The present diversion is holding. Turkey is the strong-point. The weak point is Basra. Iran lies between the two, the attitude by Iran is probably closer to that of Turkey than to that of Iraq. Where the danger lies is popular sentiment in favour of Nasser despite the Governments moderate attitude.

3. The present diversion could go sour for one of two reasons. There might firstly be an increase of military activity in the Middle East, e.g. by a flare-up of hostilities between Israel and neighbouring Arab States. If this were accompanied by wide-spread air activity or by the passage of supplies or equipment or even personnel, by air between the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern countries it might be unwise for Qantas to maintain its present diversion. In the event described, consideration might need to be given to the two diversionary routes involving Khartoum. However, as neither Libya nor the Sudan are parties to the international air transit agreement Australia would have to get their concurrence before Qantas could exercise rights of over-flight and technical stop. We are not sure that those countries would wish to make a concession in favour of Australia at this time but will ask London to sound-out the Foreign Office on the point.

4. The second circumstance under which the present diversion might become unuseable would be if developments in the Middle East were to lead to a stiffening of attitudes towards the United Kingdom, France and Australia with the result that Iraq and Iran (though as previously indicated Iran is less likely than Iraq) were to cease to allow Qantas to exercise rights of over-flight and technical stop. If stiffer official attitudes against us were adopted by Iraq and Iran it is highly unlikely that the Sudan and Libya would give Qantas those rights. (Alternatively trade union attitudes might become antagonistic.)

5. On the whole, therefore, we are inclined to think that Qantas would be better advised to explore the possibilities of routes 3, 4 and 5 above. But if they think it worth while looking further into the first two routes we would not dissuade them. We hope that Qantas will not make soundings of Governments without our knowledge. As you know, the recent soundings in Turkey were made without the prior knowledge of the Australian Government.

Mr. Laidlaw: Japheth. 11/11

File

SECRET

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

O. 15837.

...:OA.

Sent: 20th November, 1956.
1130

TO:

TO ALL POSTS (Except Consulates).GUIDANCE SAVINGRAM.G.21. SECRET.Egypt - Israel.

The following is the position as at 19th November regarding the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

United Nations Force:

The cease-fire is now in effect. The United Kingdom and France have undertaken to hand over the Egyptian territory they control when and as an effective United Nations Force is organised and arrives in Egypt. Israel has promised to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula upon the arrival of the United Nations Force in the Canal area (whether or not Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip or the island of Tirana in the Gulf of Aqaba is uncertain).

2. The resolution establishing the United Nations Force says that the United Nations General Assembly cannot station or operate the Force on the territory of any country without that country's consent. The Secretary-General (Mr. Hammarskjöld) has encountered difficulty in obtaining the consent of Egypt to the entry of the Force into Egyptian territory upon the terms stipulated by the General Assembly.

3. Nasser is reported by the press as stipulating:-

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until "all foreign troops" have left Egypt;
- (b) that the Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) that after the Anglo-French withdrawal the United Nations Force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier;
- (d) that Egypt has full control over what troops enter her territory.

4. There is yet no official confirmation of these stipulations. Egypt's attitude has been such, however, that over the last weekend the Secretary-General was forced to go to Cairo to negotiate upon the entry of the Force. As yet, there are no official reports available as to the results of the Hammarskjöld-Nasser talks.

Basic Questions:

5. It is obvious, that there are four basic questions regarding the United Nations Force the answers to which have still to be determined. These questions are:-

SECRET

/ (i) the clearing

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- 2 -

O. 15837.

- (i) the clearing of the canal;
- (ii) the composition of the Force;
- (iii) the area of operation of the Force;
- (iv) the life of the Force.

6. The present attitudes of the principal parties to these basic issues are as follows.

Clearing the Canal:United Kingdom.

7. The United Kingdom is anxious to get the Canal cleared as soon as possible. The Anglo-French forces are clearing such area of the Canal as is under their control, but more than half of the work to be done is outside this area. The latest United Kingdom estimate is that clearance will take three months if work on the blockages in Egyptian-controlled territory can be commenced promptly. The United States estimate is two to four months.

8. The United Kingdom hopes that the United Nations can find a formula under which Anglo-French facilities can be used in the clearance operations in the area under Egyptian control; the United Kingdom has offered to put her technicians and equipment under United Nations' auspices for this purpose.

9. The United Kingdom, in conversations with the Secretary-General, has been trying to bring clearance of the Canal under the authority of the United Nations Force (their justification for this can be found in the resolutions of the Assembly, but the resolutions may be open to varying interpretations). Mr. Hammarskjöld has replied that he thought Egypt would not agree to clearing operations until the Anglo-French forces withdrew. United Kingdom officials believe that this condition may have to be accepted.

10. United Kingdom officials believe that clearance will not be made by or under the direction of the United Nations Force but by another organ of the United Nations (presumably yet to be established).

United States.

11. The United States believes that under the resolutions already adopted it is the United Nations, rather than the United Nations Force, which should be responsible for clearing the Canal.

12. The United States regards the draft resolution that it presented to the General Assembly (establishing a committee to draw up, in consultation with Egypt, France and the United Kingdom, a plan for clearing the Canal and operating it until the Committee can prepare and recommend a permanent and just solution) as one of urgency. Dependent on the outcome of the Hammarskjöld-Nasser talks, the United States hopes to bring this resolution up for discussion in the General Assembly this week. (The United Kingdom has now told the United States it is in general agreement with the resolution).

/ Secretary-General.

SECRET

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- 3 -

O. 15837.

Secretary-General.

13. The Secretary-General was to take up with Nasser the Anglo-French offer to place their technical facilities for clearing the Canal under the United Nations. However, the Secretary-General appears to favour clearance by private concerns under United Nations' auspices (Hammarskjöld has already designated an official of his staff to plan clearing operations),

Composition of United Nations Force:

14. The text of Mr. Menzies' statement concerning an Australian contribution has been forwarded to the Secretary-General but no request for an Australian contribution has been received and no further Australian initiative is contemplated. New Zealand, although not yet invited to do so, is recruiting a volunteer body of some 300 men.

15. Egypt originally refused to accept contingents from any Commonwealth country or any Scandinavian country (because of the N.A.T.O. connections of Scandinavia). These stipulations have now apparently been in some degree relaxed.

16. The composition of the force is still fluid. As at 14th November, the State Department understood that the following countries and numbers of men had been accepted by Egypt:

Canada	-	975
Colombia	-	550
Sweden	-	360
Norway	-	200
Denmark	-	325
India	-	765
Finland	-	175
Yugoslavia)	-	no numbers known
Indonesia)		

17. Canada: On 17th November the Canadian contribution was reduced, as the result of Egyptian pressure, to 300 men plus air transport. Canada, which had hoped that a whole battalion might be accepted, is considering its position.

18. Pakistan: Pakistan would be prepared to supply more than a battalion and possibly a brigade group. They understand, however, (with annoyance) that Egypt is not willing to accept Pakistani troops.

(The Foreign Office view is that an effective force should consist of about 6,000 men. The United Kingdom and France strongly support Canadian, and favour Pakistani, participation. The United States strongly supports Canadian participation and see advantages in, but would not press for, Pakistan participation.

SECRET

/ The Secretary-General

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- 5 -

O. 15837.

- (b) the United Kingdom (and France) will be able to influence both the interim and final settlement through their right of consultation with the committee which is granted in the draft; and
- (c) the draft recognises the rights of the users and endorses the six basic principles of the Security Council for operation of the Canal.

29. The draft resolution upon the problem of Arab-Israel relations proposes the establishment of a committee to recommend a solution of this problem. Although not enthusiastic about this resolution, the United Kingdom will support it. With one amendment which, if accepted, would refuse the committee to take account of Israel's partition boundaries established by the United Nations in 1947 which are narrower than those which Israel subsequently acquired as a result of the Palestine war and which were set up by her armistice agreements with the Arab States. The United Kingdom hopes, in this way, to regain some of the goodwill it has lost with the Arab States.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEF.

20th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5)
E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

UN@ ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME

130

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **RESTRICTED**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

BH:HP

O.15895
Sent: 20th November, 1956.
1755

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

504. RESTRICTED.

U.N.T.S.O.

According to the New Zealand High Commissioner, Canberra, a message from Jerusalem to the Foreign Office says that Jordan has informed Burns that in future no Australia, French or New Zealand observers will be allowed on the Jordan side of the demarcation lines.

2. Please ascertain from the Secretariat whether this is correct.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

21st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL MT

RESTRICTED

129

175/11/20

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 27

C A B I N E T M I N U T E

Canberra, 20th November, 1956

Decision No. 576

Submission No. 470 - Egypt-Israel

Cabinet noted the contents of this submission.

Certified true copy.

E. J. Bunting

Acting Secretary to Cabinet

Rec'd 28/X1

W. Bunting
W.B.

Mr. Bunting
was 24/11

F 178

175/11/20.
S E C R E T

COPY NO. 26

C A B I N E T M I N U T E

Canberra, 20th November, 1956.

Decision No. 566

Without memorandum - United Nations Middle East Force

Cabinet decided that no further action should be taken at this stage concerning the offer of Australian forces to the United Nations Middle East Force.

Certified true copy.

S. J. Bunting

Acting Secretary to Cabinet

→ Mr. Keenan *Wh.*
 Reverf *W*
→ AS de Emeke

Rec'd 22/X1

127

Fd

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SECRET

Submission No....

Copy No.... of

.... copies.

For information

FOR CABINET:

EGYPT - ISRAEL

UNITED NATIONS FORCE

The cease-fire is now in effect. The United Kingdom and France have undertaken to hand over the Egyptian territory they control when and as an effective United Nations Force is organized and arrives in Egypt. Israel has promised to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula upon the arrival of the United Nations Force in the Canal area (whether or not Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip or the island of Tiran in the Gulf of Agaba is uncertain).

2. The resolution establishing the United Nations Force says that the United Nations General Assembly cannot station or operate the Force on the territory of any country without that country's consent. The Secretary-General (Mr. Hammarskjöld) has encountered difficulty in obtaining the consent of Egypt to the entry of the Force into Egyptian territory upon the terms stipulated by the General Assembly.

3. Nasser is reported by the press as stipulating:-

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until "all foreign troops" have left Egypt;
- (b) that the Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) that after the Anglo-French withdrawal the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier;
- (d) that Egypt has full control over what troops enter her territory.

SECRET

SECRET

2.

4. There is yet no official confirmation of these stipulations. Egypt's attitude has been such, however, that over the last week-end the Secretary-General was forced to go to Cairo to negotiate upon the entry of the Force. As yet, there are no official reports available as to the results of the Hammarskjöld-Nasser talks.

BASIC QUESTIONS

5. It is obvious, that there are four basic questions regarding the United Nations Force the answers to which have still to be determined. These questions are:-

- (i) the clearing of the canal;
- (ii) the composition of the Force;
- (iii) the area of operation of the Force;
- (iv) the life of the Force.

6. The present attitudes of the principal parties to these basic issues are as follows.

Clearing the Canal

United Kingdom

7. The United Kingdom is anxious to get the Canal cleared as soon as possible. The Anglo-French forces are clearing such area of the Canal as is under their control, but more than half of the work to be done is outside this area. The latest United Kingdom estimate is that clearance will take three months if work on the blockages in Egyptian-controlled territory can be commenced promptly. The United States estimate is two to four months.

128

SECRET

SECRET

3.

8. The United Kingdom hopes that the United Nations can find a formula under which Anglo-French facilities can be used in the clearance operations in the area under Egyptian control; the United Kingdom has offered to put her technicians and equipment under United Nations' auspices for this purpose.

9. The United Kingdom, in conversations with the Secretary-General, has been trying to bring clearance of the Canal under the authority of the United Nations Force (their justification for this can be found in the resolutions of the Assembly, but the resolutions may be open to varying interpretations). Mr. Hammarskjöld has replied that he thought Egypt would not agree to clearing operations until the Anglo-French forces withdrew. United Kingdom officials believe that this condition may have to be accepted.

10. United Kingdom officials believe that clearance will not be made by or under the direction of the United Nations Force but by another organ of the United Nations (presumably yet to be established).

United States

11. The United States believes that under the resolutions already adopted it is the United Nations, rather than the United Nations Force, which should be responsible for clearing the Canal.

12. The United States regards the draft resolution that it presented to the General Assembly (establishing a committee to draw up, in consultation with Egypt, France

int

SECRET

SECRET

4.

and the United Kingdom, a plan for clearing the Canal and operating it until the Committee can prepare and recommend a permanent and just solution) as one of urgency. Dependent on the outcome of the Hammarskjöld-Nasser talks, the United States hopes to bring this resolution up for discussion in the General Assembly this week. (The United Kingdom has now told the United States it is in general agreement with the resolution).

Secretary-General

13. The Secretary-General was to take up with Nasser the Anglo-French offer to place their technical facilities for clearing the Canal under the United Nations. However, the Secretary-General appears to favour clearance by private concerns under United Nations' auspices (Hammarskjöld has already designated an official of his staff to plan clearing operations).

Composition of United Nations Force

14. The text of Mr. Menzies' statement concerning an Australian contribution has been forwarded to the Secretary-General but no request for an Australian contribution has been received and no further Australian initiative is contemplated. New Zealand, although not yet invited to do so, is recruiting a volunteer body of some 300 men.

15. Egypt originally refused to accept contingents from any Commonwealth country or any Scandinavian country (because of the N.A.T.O. connections of Scandinavia). These stipulations have now apparently been in some degree relaxed. M3

16. The composition of the force is still fluid. As at 14th November, the State Department understood that the following countries and numbers of men had been accepted by Egypt:

SECRET

SECRET

5.

Canada	-	975
Colombia	-	550
Sweden	-	360
Norway	-	200
Denmark	-	325
India	-	765
Finland	-	175
Yugoslavia)	-	no numbers known
Indonesia)		

17. Canada: On 17th November the Canadian contribution was reduced, as the result of Egyptian pressure, to 300 men plus air transport. Canada, which has hoped that a whole battalion might be accepted, is considering its position.

18. Pakistan: Pakistan would be prepared to supply more than a battalion and possibly a brigade group. They understand, however, (with annoyance) that Egypt is not willing to accept Pakistani troops.

(The Foreign Office view is that an effective force should consist of about 6,000 men. The United Kingdom and France strongly support Canadian, and favour Pakistani, participation. The United States strongly supports Canadian participation and see advantages in, but would not press for, Pakistan participation. The Secretary-General wants a balanced Force. He favours Canadian participation in the Force.)

122

SECRET

SECRET

6.

Area of Operation

19. United Kingdom, United States and France: These three countries consider that the United Nations Force should be stationed at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez and, while retaining those bases, operate northwards through Sinai to the Egypt-Israel armistice line.
20. Israel: Israel appears to agree with the view of the United Kingdom, the United States and France.
21. Secretary-General: Mr. Hammarskjöld considers that the Force must be based on the Canal. He foresees some difficulty with Nasser over this but hopes to get around the difficulty by describing the Canal Zone bases as "staging areas".
22. Egypt: See paragraph 3 above.

Tenure of United Nations Force

23. United Kingdom and France: In their view, the United Nations must remain until permanent settlements of the problems of Arab-Israel relations and the Canal are reached.
24. United States: The United States considers that:-
- (a) the United Nations Force "should not vacate the Canal until a more satisfactory situation is achieved";
 - (b) the presence of the Force should not be subject to Egypt's continuing consent.
25. Secretary-General: The United Kingdom understands that Mr. Hammarskjöld is firm on the need to maintain the Force in the area until there are settlements of the Arab-Israel and Canal problems.

SECRET

SECRET

7.

LONG TERM SOLUTIONS

26. Two draft resolutions, designed to set up United Nations machinery to work out long-term solutions of the problems of Arab-Israel relations and the Suez Canal, were presented on 3rd November by the United States to the General Assembly.

27. These draft resolutions were not discussed at the Emergency Session, priority being given to the resolutions establishing the United Nations Force. The drafts are before the current regular session of the Assembly, however, as part of the documentation of the Emergency Session. The United States intends to bring the resolution dealing with the Suez Canal up for discussion in the immediate future. It will be recalled from paragraph 12 above that this resolution covers the broad problem of the Canal's future in addition to the clearing of it.

28. The United Kingdom has decided to vote for this resolution, provided that the committee to implement it is satisfactorily composed, because -

- (a) the draft would be adopted in any event;
- (b) the United Kingdom (and France) will be able to influence both the interim and final settlement through their right of consultation with the committee which is granted in the draft; and
- (c) the draft recognizes the rights of the users and endorses the six basic principles of the Security Council for operation of the Canal.

SECRET

SECRET

8.

29. The draft resolution upon the problem of Arab-Israel relations proposes the establishment of a committee to recommend a solution of this problem. Although not enthusiastic about this resolution, the United Kingdom will support it. With one amendment which, if accepted, would ~~REFUSE~~ ^{REQUIRE} the committee to take account of Israel's partition boundaries established by the United Nations in 1947 which are narrower than those which Israel subsequently acquired as a result of the Palestine war and which were set up by her armistice agreements with the Arab States. The United Kingdom hopes, in this way, to regain some of the goodwill it has lost with the Arab States.

(P.A. McBRIDE)
Acting/MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

20.11.56

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

119

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.Record of Conversation with Mr. R.E. Hoey, First Secretary, United States Embassyon 21st November, 1956Officers Present J.C.G. KevinSECRETMAIN SUBJECT(S):EGYPT-ISRAEL

Mr. Hoey called today at his request. He showed me a circular telegram to American posts, signed by Mr. Hoover, dealing with the stage reached in setting up the United Nations Force. The end of the telegram contained critical general references to Nasser. I said that I was interested to see these since we had noticed, in the past few days, press statements:

- (a) quoting "United States officials" as saying that no action would be taken to send emergency oil shipments to Western Europe;
- (b) claiming that the State Department had information that there was joint British-French-Israeli military planning before the Israeli invasion of Egypt. Mr. Hoey said that he had seen these reports but could throw no light on them.

2. I said to Mr. Hoey that I thought he should know that the Prime Minister had sent a personal message to President Eisenhower but that since we still had no information as to whether it had reached the President, I was unable to give him the tenor of it. Mr. Casey was hoping to see the President, but so far had been unable to do so.

3. Mr. Hoey's stated purpose in calling was to enquire about the Australian contribution to the United Nations Force. He showed not much interest in this when he came, but I explained our position.

WLS
27/11

Mr. Landale *Mr. Cunningham* *29/11*

118

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>Acting</u> Minister. *	A/S G.R.	Central Br.	D.L. & P.I. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.	Admin. Branch.
Secretary. *	A/S Admin.	Pacific Br.	U.N. Branch.	C. & P. Br.	Antarctic Div.
A/S U.N.	L. & T. Div.	Western Br.	E.R. Branch.	C'wealth. Rels.	Melbourne Office.
Mr. Quinn	Mr. Renouf	Mr. Landale	Mr. Arnott		Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):ACTION:Report prepared by *WLS*

(J.C.G. KEVIN)

FMA

Mr. Buckingham

Nov 22/11

McL...
CONFIDENTIAL

19th November, 1956

SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE
FUTURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL
AND ARAB - ISRAEL RELATIONS.

THE ACTING
MINISTER

At the Emergency Session of the General Assembly the United States tabled two draft resolutions which would establish machinery to settle the problem of Arab-Israel relations and the problem of the clearing of the Suez Canal and its operation in the future.

2. The resolutions were not discussed at the Emergency Session as the later Canadian resolution which led to the establishment of the United Force was given priority. However, the resolutions were referred to the Regular Session of the Assembly as forming part of the documentation of the Emergency Session. The United States intends that the resolutions should be discussed at the Ordinary Session of the Assembly and that depending on the progress made at the Hammerskjold-Nasser talks, the resolution dealing with the Canal should be discussed this week.

The Draft Resolution on the Canal

3. The draft resolution upon the Canal would establish a committee of individuals (number unspecified):-

- (a) to take measures to re-open the Canal immediately as a secure international waterway;
- (b) to prepare a plan in consultation with Egypt, France and the United Kingdom, for the operation and maintenance of the Canal and freedom of passage in accordance with the Convention of 1888 and with the six principles approved by the Security Council; and
- (c) to put the plan into effect.

The Committee would report to the Assembly and to the Security Council as appropriate and make such recommendations as it deems useful to promote a just and permanent settlement of the problem of the Canal.

4. The State Department has explained to us that any settlement recommended by the Committee or executive action proposed would be subject to the agreement of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom. The State Department has mentioned Mr. Pearson of Canada as one possible member of the Committee.* I has also said that one Afro-Asian vote would probably have to be accepted but that the United States would not accept a Committee that included

CONFIDENTIAL

/both an

*The State Department mentioned as other possibilities representatives from Italy and Norway.

CONFIDENTIAL

both an Afro-Asian and a Soviet bloc representative.

5. The United Kingdom has told us that:-

- (a) they consider the draft resolution "not unsatisfactory; as it is likely to be voted anyway, there is considerable advantage in voting for it;
- (b) the United Kingdom delegation in New York has been instructed to convey to the United States the United Kingdom's general agreement with the resolution and request more information upon how it is to be put into practice;
- (c) in this approach the United States should be told that the United Kingdom regards the composition of the Committee as of considerable importance and feels that the important users other than the United Kingdom and France should be represented;
- (d) the United Kingdom delegation has also been instructed to confirm with the United States that the plan referred to in paragraph 3 above, while designed in the first instance to ensure the immediate availability of the Canal after its clearance, will also form the basis of any permanent settlement recommended by the Committee (on this assumption the provision in the resolution regarding consultation with the United Kingdom and France on the interim plan meant that they would be able to influence the permanent settlement).

6. These instructions given to the United Kingdom delegation in New York indicate that the United Kingdom has given up its earlier ideas of having the settlement of the Canal problem negotiated through the Security Council or through a special conference convened by the Assembly.

7. During the Emergency Session of the Assembly Dr. Walker was instructed that we could accept the broad principles of the draft resolution but only if the membership of the Committee were right; we would prefer a committee of five rather than three (three was the number originally mentioned by the United States behind the scenes in New York).

8. Recognizing as it does the rights of the users of the Canal and the principles endorsed by the Security Council, the draft resolution appears acceptable to us, provided that:-

- (a) the Committee is satisfactorily composed; and
- (b) the United Kingdom (and France) is in a position to control both the interim and permanent settlement.

As regards both of these points the attitude of the

/State Department

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

State Department (paragraph 4 above) is reassuring and should meet the points which the United Kingdom delegation has been instructed to raise with the United States.

9. It is recommended therefore that the delegation to the Assembly should be instructed to support the draft resolution if the United Kingdom does so and and if the Committee is composed satisfactorily.

The Draft Resolution on Arab - Israel Relations

10. The draft resolution upon Arab - Israel relations would establish a Committee of governments or individuals (we do not know yet which is intended or what number of governments or individuals are to be appointed):-

- (a) to prepare recommendations after consultations with the parties to the Armistice Agreements of 1949 regarding the settlement of major problems between the Arab States and Israel; and
- (b) to submit its recommendations to the countries concerned and to the Assembly or to the Security Council as appropriate.

11. We understand that the United Kingdom, although not enthusiastic about this resolution (because it will presumably entrust the working out of the problem to a majority of small powers), does not intend to incur further unpopularity by failing to support it. However, the United Kingdom wants to insert a reference to the basic resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1947 regarding Palestine (the Arab States have consistently insisted that any negotiations with Israel should take this resolution as their starting point). The United Kingdom believes that by proposing such an amendment, it might retrieve some of the goodwill which it has recently lost in the Arab world.

12. During the Emergency Session of the Assembly Dr. Walker was instructed that he should support this draft resolution and strongly press the United Kingdom to vote for it.

13. It is recommended that the delegation to the Assembly should be given the same instructions again and also to support the amendment which the United Kingdom intends to propose while working to obtain the best possible composition of the Committee.

14. A draft telegram to the delegation to the Assembly embodying the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 above is attached for your consideration.

(A. H. TANGE)
Secretary

United Nations Branch
A.P. Renouf

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO:

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK
(REPEATED TO LONDON) AND SAVINGRAM OTTAWA,
WELLINGTON. NEW YORK PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL - PRIORITY

EGYPT - ISRAEL

1. We note from Washington's telegram 1271 that the United States may seek the Assembly's consideration of its draft resolution upon the Suez Canal this week.
2. In their telegram 3140 to us (which we are passing to you) London has stated that the United Kingdom agrees generally with the resolution and hopes to vote for it subject to assurances regarding the composition of the Committee and provisions whereby the United Kingdom will be able to influence both the interim plan and the eventual permanent settlement. Willcox's remarks in Washington indicate that the United States is prepared to give such assurances.
3. Provided that the Committee is so composed as to give adequate representation to important users of the Canal and provided that the United Kingdom supports it, you should also support the resolution.

4. Our previous instructions regarding the United
/States

APR/bgg

19/11/56.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

States draft resolution on Arab - Israel relations (our 429) stand. We understand that the United Kingdom although not enthusiastic about this resolution (because it will entrust the working out of the problem to a majority of small powers) does not intend to incur further unpopularity by failing to support it. The United Kingdom will, however, support this resolution but will propose the insertion of a provision requiring the Committee to bear in mind the Assembly's resolution of 29th November, 1947 regarding Palestine. You should support such an amendment. You should also work to secure the best possible composition of the Committee.

113

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT.

TO: LONDON

SECRET

(REPEATED TO NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON)

(NEW YORK TO PASS TO WASHINGTON)

SECRET - EMERGENCY

(FOR MCCARTHY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER)

YOUR 3196 EGYPT - ISRAEL

1. I strongly agree with the United Kingdom Government's instinct that the Anglo-French forces should sit tight until satisfaction is secured from Nasser upon the three essential questions. These are that the withdrawal of the Anglo-French Forces should be phased with the entry of an effective United Nations Force, that the United Nations Force will remain in the region with at least bases upon the Canal until the problem of the Canal is settled and that the Force should remain thereafter for so long as is necessary to ensure a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel problem.

2. If we were not to insist upon the satisfaction of these three conditions, it will become even more difficult to obtain anything like a satisfactory solution of the problem of the Canal as well as boosting Nasser's

APR:bgg

22/11/56. /standing.....

117

SECRET

SECRET

standing and conversely diminishing the standing of the United Kingdom and France even more.

3. I appreciate that the attitude of the United States presents a real obstacle to this policy. However, it must be remembered that Nasser's insurgence with regard to implementation of the Assembly's resolutions makes our position in the Assembly stronger than it previously was. If Nasser refuses to give satisfaction upon the three conditions I have mentioned, an attractive case can be made out in the Assembly that Egypt has flouted the will of the United Nations. This case can be re-inforced effectively by exploiting Nasser's wide and wilful act of sabotage of the Canal, an act which shows his government to lack the degree of international responsibility essential to a country which is the guardian of a great international water-way.

/4.....

SECRET

SECRET

4. Furthermore, it seems to me too early yet to say just how long the United States will persist with its present attitude of sitting back and giving no lead and making no move to assist Western Europe with oil supplies in the belief the Anglo-French forces should be withdrawn unconditionally. I have the feeling that this attitude is an emotional one and one which is contrary to the best interests of the United States. I have hopes that the United States will realize this. We should all do what we can to bring pressure to bear upon them to hasten this process of realization.

110

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

HMCC

AMENDED COPY

I.15840

Dated: 16th November, 1956.
2020

Rec'd: 18th November, 1956.
0900

FROM:-

Australian Embassy,
W A S H I N G T O N.

1277. SECRET.

M.45.

McBride and Tange from Casey.

I discussed Australian Embassy 1273 with Pearson of Canada who had discussed similar matters with General Burns (Canadian and United Nations Armistice Supervisor J.P.A. Commission from Cairo) today. Burns agrees with (a) probably agrees with (c) and disagrees with (b). Pearson agrees with me that (f) is a dreadful attitude and is inconceivable.

2. Reference Prime Minister's 992. Paragraph 3 Pearson agrees with me that Canal sabotage was an act of international spite wholly unconnected with defensive or other military operations and will cause vast economic loss to world trading nations. However Pearson suggests waiting Hammarskjöld's views on return shortly as to how best to capitalise publicly on this.

Paragraph 5. In addition to Loomes' contact with Committee of seven, Pearson will keep me fully informed.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(X Amendment)
19th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
C&P

G

109

SECRET

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MMc.MMc

INWARD CABLEGRAM L.15846

Dated: 16th November 1956
2156
Rec'd: 18th November 1956
0900

FROM:

AUstralian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

889. RESTRICTED.

Your 478..

Burns on arrival could not recall the whereabouts of Major Carter, the Secretariat are cabling to ascertain where all Australia and New Zealand U.N.T.S.O. officers are at present.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s.

18th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UNC	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.AF&ME
E	AF&ME	INF	DL	ANT			

G

RESTRICTED

108

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SAVINGRAM

AUSTLEG, TEL AVIV

SECRET
GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

The following is the text of Ottawa's telegram 226 sent
on 17th November:

(Take in text of I.15850)

2. This is for your own information and you should NOT
disclose any knowledge of this conversation to the Israeli authorities
or to any of your colleagues (including Commonwealth and United States)

*authorized by Mr. [unclear]
[unclear] 20/11*

SECRET
GUARD

20th November, 1956

107

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:HP

I.15789

FROM:

Dated: 16th November, 1956.
1838

Rec'd: 17th November, 1956.
4.15 p.m.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

223. CONFIDENTIAL.

Following further message received from Cairo dated
15th November.

(Begins)

"Before they will arrange for exit visas for Australian Nationals wishing to leave, the Foreign Office requires written confirmation from us that Egyptian Nationals in Australia are free to leave the country or to stay and also enjoy personal freedom of movement. Could such confirmation be obtained from Canberra as quickly as possible please?

Saw D.L. Price today. He said he was never arrested and has had no trouble. He will be one of the first to go after Egyptian Government gives us the green light".

(Ends).

*Copy on
16/11/56.*

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

17th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) PAC&AM AM&SP E.AF&ME AF&ME C&P ADMIN
PERS PROP UN

106

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:HP

I.15786

FROM:

Dated: 16th November, 1956.
1841

Rec'd: 17th November, 1956.
1500

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

221. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Following 2 messages dated 13th November and 14th November received today from Canadian Embassy, Cairo.

(Begins)

"Since the break-off of relations on 6th November Australians have to register like United Kingdom and French Nationals. On 5th November, when I sent you my telegram 184, the Registration Law did not apply to them.

Roquet returned last night from expedition to the Libyan border across which he safely saw Cutler and his staff on the afternoon of 11th November. Arrangements were for party to fly to London same day from Tobruk in British planes. Train facilities from Cairo rather inadequate but most, including the Australians, agreed that the Egyptians had probably done all they could.

Slow contact with the Australian Nationals as most live outside of Cairo with many in the Canal Zone. Spoke tonight with Miss O'Donohue after receipt of your telegram. She lives in the Greek Embassy, is well and safe, and proposes to stay on indefinitely. News received today indicates that D.L. Price of Barclays Bank Ismailia, reported arrested a week ago, is now apparently free and most anxious to leave. We are trying to arrange early evacuation for him, as well as for Rex Reid of 278 Frankjoy Street, Adelaide. F. Quicq Missionary. About the latter please ask Canberra for early reply to telegram 265 of 31st October from Australia Legation requesting Quicq's guide Miss Georgiou be admitted as immigrant.

Proceeding as promptly as conditions permit with arrangements for protection of Australian Government property in accordance with plans worked out with the Australian Minister. Residence under the care of trusted Legation employees designated by Cutler. Hope decreasing pressure of work will soon permit one of us to take up residence there. Meanwhile we make frequent visits daily.

Could Canberra tell us if Ismail Karid, to whom Australian visa 4552 was granted herefor one year for F.A.O. fellowship, will be permitted to enter. Surprisingly enough, Farid got his Egyptian exit visa for Australia yesterday." 105

(Ends).

(Begins)

According to I.C.A.O. here, Molloy was evacuated about 1st November together with other United Nations personnel and proceeded to Italy.

Because of requisition of schools and hospitals, Cairo

SECRET

/missionary.....

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2-

I.15786

missionary work discontinued and following Australian Nationals now anxious to leave: Mr. and Mrs. L. Williams, Miss J.E. Taffs, Miss E.W. Young, Miss R.E. Nunn. Trying to arrange evacuation with Egyptian authorities but delay likely as in the case of British and French subjects. No contact yet with Rev. W.R. Tyler in Port Said. A. Sarkissian and D.L. Price calling Embassy tomorrow".

(Ends)

3. I understand the Canadian Ambassador, who had been marooned at Beirut, has now been able to return to Cairo. His presence there I am told will help to relieve the burden a little on the other three male officers. Active consideration is being given here to additions to the staff.

....Pyman..

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

17th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UN PAC&AM AM&SP E.AF&ME AF&ME@ C&P
ADMIN PERS PROP

104

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

MMc

O.15657

Sent: 16th November 1956
0930

TO:

ALL POSTS.SAV. AP9. UNCLASSIFIED.

Egypt.

The Egyptian Aide Memoire handed to Mr. Cutler on 6th November informing him of the severance of diplomatic relations was in the following form:

"Taking into consideration the position adopted by the Commonwealth of Australia, more particularly in the General Assembly in the United Nations in its session of the 2nd November, 1956, and following in the Security Council in its session of the 6th November on a question which touches in the highest the honour, the dignity and the independence of Egypt, the Government of the Republic has decided to break Diplomatic Relations with the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. This severance takes effect from this day dated Cairo 6th November, 1956."

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

16th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP
S&SEA SA SEA E.A.FCIE E AF&IE INFO DL C&P
MT

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

OA:AS

O.15594-98

Sent: 16th November, 1956
1156

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....Sav.57.

Repeated to:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAV.178.Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....SAV.205.Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.125.Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV.117.SECRET. GUARD.Egypt-Israel.

1. We have received the following preliminary assessment of the effect on the United Kingdom's Middle East policies of developments in the United Nations since 28th October, from the United Kingdom High Commissioner:-

"The following is the position:-

- (a) The General Assembly has come into the centre of the picture and it would be difficult to restore control to the Security Council if we wanted to.
- (b) The General Assembly has now established a United Nations Command in the area and has authorized General Burns, in consultation with the Secretary-General regarding the size and composition, to proceed with the full organization of the Emergency International Force.
- (c) The Secretary-General is pushing ahead with the utmost energy.
- (d) An Advisory Committee, consisting of Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Norway, India, Ceylon and Pakistan has been established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary-General. At present this Committee seems to be working on a military basis but, as political problems connected with the use of the Force begin to emerge, it will no doubt take on an increasingly political complexion. The Committee is already authorized to convene and report to a meeting of the General Assembly when it sees fit.

SECRET

102 ✓

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

-2- 0.15594-98

"Our immediate concern is to see that the Force gets into position and takes over from us as soon as possible the task of acting as a shield between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, we hope that its presence in the area will facilitate a generally acceptable settlement of the Palestine and Suez Canal problems.

"The exceptional situation summarized in the first paragraph above is full of dangers. In future we shall have little influence with the Advisory Committee or with the Command. If the present set-up is perpetuated, we should reach the extraordinary position that the peace of the world would be the primary responsibility of a group of smaller powers and the General Assembly with the Secretary-General as a powerful supranational figure. This would be a complete inversion of the San Francisco conception of the Security Council's exercising the primary responsibility for maintaining peace through the four major Powers acting in unison.

"We must clearly work by all means in our power to recover some degree of control over events. We must aim at full consultation by the Secretary-General with us both on military questions and on political problems of the Middle East. We must also mend our fences with the United States. The United Kingdom Ambassador has found an improved atmosphere in Washington. When the United States authorities recover from their indignation and shock, they too may feel unhappy at the prospect of surrendering control in the Middle East to the United Nations and, in particular, to the General Assembly.

"If the United States do come round to our view, we will then be able to see with them what can be done in order to move forward on the Palestine and Suez Canal problems under better conditions than are feasible in the General Assembly. One possible line would be to get the General Assembly, since we can hardly now exclude it altogether, to establish suitably composed conferences to deal with each of these problems."

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

16th November, 1956

SEC	A/Ss	UN@	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	SEA
E.AF&ME	E	AF&ME	INF	DL C&P	MT		

101

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

C. 15539

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

Sent: 16th November, 1956.

....:OA.

TO:

ALL POSTS (EXCEPT CONSULATES)

SAVINGRAM.

GUIDANCE NO.20.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Egypt - Israel : Australian Voting.

The following is for your guidance in answering questions in regard to Australia's voting position in the Security Council and the General Assembly.

A. Security Council:

United States Resolution 30th October (vetoed). The Australian delegate abstained. He was without instructions on the specific issue. His previous instructions were that the Security Council should establish the facts before condemning Israel.

Soviet Resolution. 30th October (vetoed). Australia voted in favour since it called for a cease fire between Egypt and Israel, without precluding Anglo-French action.

Yugoslav Resolution of 31st October (adopted) calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. Australia abstained. The Australian delegate had no time to obtain instructions.

Soviet Proposal 5th November (inscription defeated) for United States and Soviet intervention. Australia voted against inclusion of the item on the agenda, and described the proposal as effrontery in view of Soviet action in Hungary, and as an attempt to inject Soviet power into the Middle East.

B. General Assembly (Texts of all resolutions have been sent under circular memorandum No.57).

United States Resolution adopted 2nd November, Australia voted against since the resolution recommended against the action proposed by the United Kingdom and France, and did not provide adequate measures for the protection of the Suez Canal.

Canadian Resolution adopted 4th November. Australia abstained. Australia approved the principle of an international force, but as the resolution impliedly endorsed the United States Resolution of 2nd November, against which we had voted we could not vote in favour.

Afro-Asian Resolution adopted 7th November. Australia abstained, rather than vote against, because, although the resolution was substantially a repetition of the Afro-Asian resolution of 4th November, Canada, the United States and three of the sponsors (Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran) made statements to the effect that in regard to the Anglo-French forces, "immediate withdrawal" should be interpreted as meaning as soon as practical in regard to the

CONFIDENTIAL

/ introduction

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- 2 -

O. 15539.

introduction of the international force.

Seven-Country Resolution adopted 7th November. Australia voted in favour of this resolution, and in fact had it amended to inject urgency into the request to the United Nations Chief of Command to proceed with the organisation of the force. The Resolution proposed practical measures, acceptable to the United Kingdom and France, although we had, and still have, doubts about the effectiveness of some of the arrangements as proposed (see Guidance Telegram of 9th November, and Prime Minister's statement of 8th November.)

Cost :

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.

16th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN@ ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

99

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:HMCC

0.15687

Sent: 16th November, 1956.
1638

TO:-

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2735. SECRET.

For External.

Suez.

Please draw to attention of United Kingdom paragraph 5 of New York's 153 to you, which supports Secretariat is sceptical of proposition that Egypt has blocked Canal. Has United Kingdom considered point in our 2690 paragraph 3 repeated in our 2728?

/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £4.18.4)
19th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL M.T.

98

SECRET

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

OA:AS

O.15594-98

Sent: 16th November, 1956
1156

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....Sav.57.

Repeated to:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAV.178.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....SAV.205.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.125.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV.117.

Imagined work. 19/11
In London should be
cover this in Cabinet
Submission.
all 19/11

SECRET. GUARD.

Egypt-Israel.

1. We have received the following preliminary assessment of the effect on the United Kingdom's Middle East policies of developments in the United Nations since 28th October, from the United Kingdom High Commissioner:-

"The following is the position:-

- (a) The General Assembly has come into the centre of the picture and it would be difficult to restore control to the Security Council if we wanted to.
- (b) The General Assembly has now established a United Nations Command in the area and has authorized General Burns, in consultation with the Secretary-General regarding the size and composition, to proceed with the full organization of the Emergency International Force.
- (c) The Secretary-General is pushing ahead with the utmost energy.
- (d) An Advisory Committee, consisting of Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Norway, India, Ceylon and Pakistan has been established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary-General. At present this Committee seems to be working on a military basis but, as political problems connected with the use of the Force begin to emerge, it will no doubt take on an increasingly political complexion. The Committee is already authorized to convene and report to a meeting of the General Assembly when it sees fit.

97

SECRET

F.H.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

-2- 0.15594-98

"Our immediate concern is to see that the Force gets into position and takes over from us as soon as possible the task of acting as a shield between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, we hope that its presence in the area will facilitate a generally acceptable settlement of the Palestine and Suez Canal problems.

"The exceptional situation summarized in the first paragraph above is full of dangers. In future we shall have little influence with the Advisory Committee or with the Command. If the present set-up is perpetuated, we should reach the extraordinary position that the peace of the world would be the primary responsibility of a group of smaller powers and the General Assembly with the Secretary-General as a powerful supranational figure. This would be a complete inversion of the San Francisco conception of the Security Council's exercising the primary responsibility for maintaining peace through the four major Powers acting in unison.

"We must clearly work by all means in our power to recover some degree of control over events. We must aim at full consultation by the Secretary-General with us both on military questions and on political problems of the Middle East. We must also mend our fences with the United States. The United Kingdom Ambassador has found an improved atmosphere in Washington. When the United States authorities recover from their indignation and shock, they too may feel unhappy at the prospect of surrendering control in the Middle East to the United Nations and, in particular, to the General Assembly.

"If the United States do come round to our view, we will then be able to see with them what can be done in order to move forward on the Palestine and Suez Canal problems under better conditions than are feasible in the General Assembly. One possible line would be to get the General Assembly, since we can hardly now exclude it altogether, to establish suitably composed conferences to deal with each of these problems."

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

16th November, 1956

SEC A/Ss
E. AF&ME E

UN@
AF&ME

PAC&AM
INF

AM&SP
DL C&P

S&SEA
MT

SA

SEA

SECRET

96

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20

GJW/BH

0.15686

Sent: 16th November, 1956.
1640

TO:

Australian Consulate-General,
SAN FRANCISCO.

117. CONFIDENTIAL.

Crawford from Raggatt.

It is reported here that Mr. McEwen stated in New York that the blockage of the Suez Canal will probably result in Australia being pinched for oil supplies. Would you please let Minister know our oil supply position is satisfactory and current advice is that it will stay that way. Our dependence on Middle East oil has been substantially reduced as a result of increased supply coming from East Indies. In public statements we are emphasising that

- (1) Australia is much better placed to meet crisis than is Western Europe.
- (2) Our stock position is comfortable
- (3) Supplies from overseas are being maintained at satisfactory level and
- (4) on present indications rationing of petrol will not be necessary.

MIN. & DEPT. N.D.
/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(Cost £10.0.0)

19th November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN ER PAC&AM S&SEA AM&SP SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL

95

CONFIDENTIAL

Wm. L. ... (Chap. 1)
CONFIDENTIAL

16/Nov
MIDDLE EAST: QUESTION OF A ROLE FOR THE U.S. *Wing 175/11/20*

1. There is convincing evidence of the desire of the American Administration to let bygones remain so; to preserve their alliances; and to come together with the U.K. in the Middle East.
2. They are to some extent imprisoned by their position on the Anglo-French intervention. There can be no going back on the U.S. requirement that the U.K. and French withdraw. High level meetings are to be delayed for reasons which the Americans have given privately.
3. The President, in his statement of November 14th, stuck to the concept of working through the United Nations - for example, when he spoke of the necessity for the Americans to support the United Nations in opposing the intervention of Soviet volunteers.
4. It looks as though the general U.S. conception is to keep the United Nations organization seized of the short and long-term Middle East problems; but to try to get them dealt with by small committees or specially selected conferences in a more constructive atmosphere than the General Assembly. U.K. and France seem to accept United Nations treatment but prefer the Security Council, inspite of Soviet participation.
5. The Americans are precluded from having direct military influence in Egypt by the exclusion of Great Power contingents. Indirectly, however, they made some prompt and overt military moves when Bulganin issued his threats against the United Kingdom and France last week.
6. What we are seeking is a positive United States policy. In the short run, the dangers reside in:

24
KIA
CONFIDENTIAL

Nasser.

The Leftist Syrian Government.

The disintegration in Jordan.

The possibilities of conflict on Israel's eastern borders stimulated by the Soviet Union.

Continued Soviet propaganda gains from overt support of the Arab cause, peace, and obstruction of the Anglo-French "imperialists".

7. American influence on Nasser, Syria or Jordan is likely to be limited (but see below). It is questionable whether their stand against Israel-U.K.-France will have had any striking appeal with Arab popular opinion against the background of hostility to American intervention and American support for Israel.

8. There are, nevertheless, some American assets which she could exploit to our common benefit:

- a. As the author of the November withdrawal resolution, she can exercise influence among U.N. members in getting effective implementation of the clause about restoration of freedom of navigation; and in getting an effective international force into position.
- b. She could throw her weight behind the Baghdad Pact countries.
- c. She may be able to do something with Saudi Arabia, whose help is important to Nasser.
- d. She might bring the Jordanians and Syrians round to a more responsible freedom of action and greater readiness to make a settlement with Israel if the United States were to announce some principles for a permanent settlement and in those principles provide a solution for the Palestine refugee question which provided

93

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

a good deal of American money and some obligations upon Israel greater than Israel has hitherto been prepared to accept.

16/11/56

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:HMCC

0.15694/5/6/7/8

Sent: 16th November, 1956.
1630

TO:-

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.....490

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....993

Australian High
Commission,
LONDON....2733

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.126

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV.118

(New York pass to Washington and Ottawa.)

CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Paragraph 7 of your 875 - Suez.

1. We will be interested to learn of Hammarskjöld's opinion on his return.
2. Meanwhile, you should point out to Malania that our interpretation is based on the actual texts of the resolutions of the Assembly; notably:-
 - (a) operative paragraph (4) of the resolution of 2nd November;
 - (b) operative paragraph (1) of the 3-Power resolution of 5th November ("to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the resolution of 2nd November"); and
 - (c) operative paragraph (2) of the 7-Power resolution of 7th November which approves, inter alia, paragraph 12 of A/3302("...and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2nd November").
3. We do not entirely understand why Secretariat should have any position for or against dissemination of facts of Egyptian sabotage. This could only be done by United Kingdom and France who have so far kept facts classified.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £42.7.0)
19th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL M.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. *175/11/20.*

Date. 16th November, 1956

SUBJECT

EGYPT - ISRAEL - THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE
TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

FOR.....MR. KEVIN

Mr. Bingham
was 15/11

I think the main point of any message from the Prime Minister to President Eisenhower at this time regarding the Middle East situation should be the necessity for a very early return to United Kingdom - United States solidarity in their approaches to major problems in the region. The need for such solidarity is sharply pointed up by the obvious increase in Soviet interest in the Middle East, evidenced first by the arms deal with Egypt (and later Syria) and at the present time by threats to send volunteers to Egypt. This increase in Soviet interest has probably led to, and undoubtedly has been encouraged, by an increase in Soviet prestige in Egypt and Syria and possibly in the minds of the Arab peoples generally (as distinct in some cases from their governments). The immediate task which calls for joint United Kingdom - United States planning is what is to be done to prevent Egypt and Syria moving more and more into the Soviet camp. Another immediate task for joint United Kingdom - United States planning is the strengthening of the Baghdad Pact, the members of which have so far come through the present crisis surprisingly well (should not the United States join the Pact?)

2. I think that the message should also emphasize the need to take advantage of the unique opportunity which now exists in the Middle East (with a United Nations Force going in) to achieve long-term settlements of the Arab - Israel problem and the Suez Canal problem; it would be tragic if this opportunity were missed. We therefore think that the operations of the Force must be such as to ensure the circumstances for the settlement of these two problems, including the necessary amount of time and the holding aside for this period of time of Egyptian control over the Canal. We cannot contemplate a situation of the type which Nasser apparently wishes to obtain - namely, a situation where United Kingdom and French forces would withdraw, the United Nations Force would be pushed up to the Armistice demarcation lines and Egypt would be left in sole control of the Canal. It must be clear from Nasser's deliberate and wide-spread ~~the~~ act of sabotage of the Canal, an act which went beyond any military objective, that the present Egyptian government does not have the ~~sense of responsibility~~ *necessary control* to control and run the Canal in the future. Nasser's act of sabotage has given conclusive proof of the rightness of the case for international control of the Canal.

3. I think that the message should also deal with the question of the immediate clearing of the Canal. This is a matter of great concern to very many countries of different political creeds; it is therefore a task that the United Nations should

CONFIDENTIAL

/put under

90

FM

CONFIDENTIAL

put under way at the earliest possible moment, either by authorising the United Kingdom and French technicians to do so or by setting up some instrument to carry out the task using such technicians or others. Nasser is clearly regarding the blocked Canal as one of his political weapons and unless firm action is taken by the United Nations, we can only look forward to this weapon being involved in long-term bargaining with Nasser.

MR

(A. P. RENOUF)
United Nations Branch

89

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy on 18/6/11.

....
I asked my Department to give some consideration to the broad policies which we might encourage the Americans to follow in order to further a long term settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

I agree with the recommendations in the attached paper and would propose to pass a copy to Sir Percy Spender unless you should see objection to any of the points made.

(P.A. McBride)

The Rt.Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA

A.C.T.

per Billington

*Miss Brown has promised
us a copy of the final text*

SECRET *was 21/11*

Am Landis

88

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 175/11/20.

Date. 16th November, 1956

SUBJECT

UNITED NATIONS FORCES : AREA OF OPERATION

FOR MR. KENNEDY

The area of operation of the United Nations Force (Secretary-General's report of 6th November) is limited to "roughly from the Suez Canal to the Armistice demarcation lines, established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel." This admittedly is the main danger spot at the moment but the situation along the Syrian-Israeli-Jordanian frontiers is also very tense and serious trouble may occur there almost at any time.

2. There have been persistent but as yet unconfirmed reports that the Russians are building up a modern jet air force in Syria and it is quite conceivable that if the United Nations Force establishes itself in the Canal area and the Anglo-French forces withdraw, the Russians may send volunteers to Syria (instead of Egypt) to support a combined Syrian/Jordanian attack on Israel.

3. In present circumstances the situation could get out of hand in a matter of hours. If, however, General Burns was authorized by the Assembly (and the countries concerned agreed) to station the United Nations Force along the Syrian-Israeli/Jordanian frontiers, when a threat of hostilities seemed imminent, it is possible that their presence might prevent an actual act of aggression. (The United Nations Truce Supervisors did not deter the Israelis from their invasion on Egypt.) An extension of the area of operation of the United Nations Force to include these frontiers would require the adoption by the Assembly of a further resolution, and it is difficult to judge whether the requisite number of votes would be obtained. However, I feel that once the United Nations Force has begun to function in the Canal area we should sound out other governments, particularly the United States, on this proposal.

McKenney
Comment?
16th '56

W.G.A. LANDALE)
E.A. & M.E.

work 16/11

87

Mr Billington

was 21/11

For Mr Kennedy

I agree with this idea. The time to bring it up will be when the U.S. draft resolution on M.E. problems comes up for discussion (U.N. T.S.O. & future comes into this resolution)

CONFIDENTIAL

→ Mr Landale: As basis for the - E.S.
16th 20/11

M 20/11

FA

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Buckingham

was 15/11

16th November, 1956

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE SECRETARY

A. ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Tripartite Declaration:

1. The United States subscribes to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 that should the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States find any Middle East country preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, they would immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.

Dulles' Statement of 26th August, 1955:

2. United States policy with regard to the Palestine issue and Arab-Israeli relations was outlined by Mr. Dulles on 26th August, 1955. According to Mr. Dulles three basic problems had been left unsolved by the Armistice Agreements 1949:-

- (i) the plight of 900,000 refugees who formerly lived in Israel;
- (ii) the pall of fear hanging over both Israelis and Arabs;
- (iii) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

As part of an overall settlement, Dulles expressed the readiness of the United States to undertake the following:-

- (i) Refugees. The United States would be prepared to contribute substantially to an international loan to assist resettlement of Arab refugees.
- (ii) Security guarantee. The United States would be prepared to join in formal treaty negotiations to prevent any attempt by either side to alter by force, the boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Dulles expressed the hope that the United Nations would sponsor any such security guarantee. 82
- (iii) Borders. Each side would have to reconcile their border claims.

Eden-Eisenhower Declaration of 1st February, 1956:

3. The United States with the United Kingdom expressed readiness to guarantee agreed frontiers and finance aid for refugees.

/ Tripartite

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

Tripartite Talks, Washington, April, 1956:

4. At these talks, the United States expressed the view that in the event of a renewal of the Palestine war any action under the Tripartite Declaration should come through the United Nations. Only if the United Nations sponsored action proved impractical would Tripartite action alone be considered.

Statement by President Eisenhower:

5. On 15th November, 1956, in a public message, Eisenhower repeated American willingness to sign a Middle Eastern security guarantee provided agreement was reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries. He stated that the United States would meanwhile continue to be guided by the policies of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

United States and Middle East Defence:

6. Since the end of World War II the United States has been much interested in the defence of the Middle East. It has expressed that interest in a variety of ways including assistance to Greece and Turkey (1947) and support for the entry of those countries into NATO (1952). Together with France, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the United States during 1951-52 sought the establishment of MEDO; this concept failed to materialise. In 1953 Mr. Dulles concluded that any sound regional defence arrangement would have to rest on the desires of the peoples and the governments of the Middle East. He found that the Northern Tier states, more exposed to external danger, were more likely than the others to find a solution to the problem and also were so situated as to provide the greatest measure of protection to the area. This attitude lies behind American support of the Baghdad Pact. The United States has not yet joined the Baghdad Pact except in the economic field. It maintains a permanent liaison with the Baghdad Pact organisation. It considers that -

- (i) by not formally joining the Pact the United States is in a better manoeuvring position;
- (ii) backing into the Pact the United States would be less inclined to antagonise the Arabs;
- (iii) it is better for domestic reasons for if the United States joined the Pact pressure for a Security Pact with Israel would be difficult to resist.

Buraiimi Oasis:

7. The United States policy towards Saudi Arabia is conditioned by their fear of losing the Aramco Oil concession and to a lesser degree the Dhahran air base. Moreover, they do not share the United Kingdom's suspicion of Saudi designs against the whole United Kingdom position in the Persian Gulf.

/ Attitude
SECRET

Attitude towards Israel:

8. In a television statement on 31st October, President Eisenhower said:

"We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new State of Israel, and at the same time to strengthen our bonds both with Israel and with the Arab countries."

United States Economic Programmes:

9. The United States readiness to assist in the economic field was outlined by Hollister, the Director of the International Co-operation Administration, on 30th March, 1956:

"In the Arab States and in Israel we are prepared to support any programmes or projects that hold real promise of constructive progress on these problems including broad support for regional projects that will harness the energy and equitably distribute the waters of the Jordan River and facilitate the resettlement of refugees."

The United States sees three factors in particular as creating a special need for flexible action on the economic front:

- (a) increased Soviet activity in the area;
- (b) the past pattern of frequent and sudden economic crises in particular countries in the region;
- (c) many major problems of the regions are of a kind which concern two or more countries which means that, given their sensitive political relationships, the exact timing and character of the eventual solution of these problems cannot be accurately forecast nor the precise manner in which aid can be contributed.

Johnston Plan:

10. The United States have sponsored the Johnston Plan for unified development of the Jordan Valley and have spared no effort in trying to secure Arab and Israeli acceptance. The United States is prepared to contribute substantially to the cost of the plan now in the vicinity of \$200 m. 84

11. The basic objective of the Plan is to enable the resettlement of a considerable number of Arab refugees and so reduce Arab-Israeli tension.

B. SUEZ CANALNationalisation of Suez Canal:

12. The United States, regarding the nationalisation of the Canal as legally admissible but politically intolerable, has from the outset maintained that the

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET

objective should be to ensure open, secure and efficient operation of the Canal as an international waterway. It has consistently opposed the use of force.

13. The proposal for international operation of the Canal which was adopted by the 18 Nations was put forward by Mr. Dulles. The essence of the plan was that the Canal should be operated, maintained and developed by international management set up by treaty and under assurances which would pay due regard to the interests both of Egypt and other powers.

14. Mr. Dulles has frequently stressed the value of establishing de facto working arrangements with Egypt which would point up a provisional or even possibly, a final solution. S.C.U.A. was conceived by him.

15. Notwithstanding the United States adherence to the 18 Nations Proposals, their approach has been somewhat flexible and pragmatic. They wanted to strengthen S.C.U.A., to make it as attractive as possible to the Egyptians and to develop instances of day to day co-operation. We have the impression that the United States do not attach as much weight to international operation as do the United Kingdom and France.

United States Attitude towards Russian Volunteers:

16. At a press conference on 14th November, President Eisenhower said it would be the duty of the United Nations, which would include the United States, to oppose the intervention of Soviet "volunteers" and in any such action, the United States would again try to support the United Nations. President did not know how the United Nations would act in this event. What "we" would do would depend upon circumstances.

C. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

17. In broad terms the United States policy in the Middle East aims to:

- (a) keep the Communists out of the area;
- (b) keep the peace and preserve the highest possible measure of unity among the States of the Middle East;
- (c) keep the Suez Canal in working order so that Middle East oil can continue to flow to Western European industry.

To this end United States efforts have been designed to:

- (a) maintain the defence effort of those countries which are prepared to resist Soviet influence;
- (b) assist the whole region, including uncommitted countries to strike at those poor living standards which tend to create unrest and instability;

/ (c) keep

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

SECRET

- (c) keep alive among the uncommitted countries their desire for independence, and to help them to develop the internal economic conditions in which free institutions can prosper;
- (d) resist Soviet economic as well as political penetration.

D. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM:

18. (a) We should aim to secure that the United Nations Force is so composed, covers such a breadth of area and maintains its operations for such time as will contribute towards the settlement of the two broad problems.
- (b) We should also take full advantage of the not unhelpful attitude of the Baghdad Pact countries; these are alive both to Nasser's ambitions and Soviet intentions, and it should be possible to enlist their interest in finding solutions. In some cases they might be used to spearhead efforts to solve particular problems.
- (c) We should ask ourselves whether the United States should not now enter in full membership of the Baghdad Pact, not only to encourage its present Muslim members but as one method of retrieving the Western position in the region.
- (d) Certainly for so long as Nasser remains we should not be influenced in the application of policies, by any prospect of Egyptian chagrin and malevolence.
- (e) Whatever action is taken on the American resolution, it seems inevitable that the problem of Arab-Israeli relations will have to be approached piecemeal. The most satisfactory targets in the first phase seem to be the related subjects of:
- (i) refugee resettlement, and
 - (ii) irrigation and other projects like the Jordan Valley scheme.

British and United States efforts to secure progress in these fields, and indeed the whole field of economic and technical aid, should be energetically revived and stepped up. A solution of the refugee problem would considerably improve the existing situation in Jordan.

- (f) The question of Israel's frontiers is the most unyielding of all Middle East problems, but there is no reason why border incidents should not be encompassed by building up the strength of the Truce Organisation. The Arab economic blockade of Israel is a matter in which it should be possible to secure solution, since it calls for no positive action by the Arabs beyond

SECRET

/ desisting....

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

desisting from this irritant. Unless the problem is solved, Israel will never become viable economically.

- (g) The undebated United Nations resolution on the Suez Canal setting up a committee of three paves the way for further treatment of that question. The United Kingdom now seems ready to accept this approach. It is unlikely that the original British formula for control can be sustained, but Nasser's sabotage has weakened his own case and some solution which puts tight reins on him is now more capable of being realised.
- (h) We should endeavour to break down the myth of Nasser as the destined leader of the Arab cause and to detach other Arab States from Egypt.
- (i) In all this we must not forget that Russia, following its classical policy is making sustained efforts to penetrate the Middle East with a view to gaining a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, and we should support all measures taken by the Western Powers to contain Russian influences in this area.

E. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO EISENHOWER

....

19. President Eisenhower's latest statement on the Middle East was made at a press conference yesterday. A summary of his remarks is attached. They might be referred to in any message that Mr. Menzies sends. In his message Mr. Menzies, besides outlining what he feels we should all be aiming for, might preface this by mentioning:

- (i) The rapid increase in Soviet influence and prestige in the Middle East and the vital need for consistent vigilance by the West and for a united front;
- (ii) the importance of an early return to United Kingdom-United States solidarity in their approaches to major problems; 81
- (iii) the need to turn the present position in the Middle East to advantage by seeking long term settlements of both the Arab-Israeli problem and the Suez Canal problem

....

Mr. Renouf develops this in the attached minute.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

Memo No. *TTV* ✓

16th November, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH : 12th NOVEMBER, 1956

.... Your telegram 357 was slightly corrupt. We assume that Associated Press story refers to a speech which the Prime Minister made to the Federal Council of the Liberal Party on 12th November. The text of this speech is attached.

2. Our guidance telegram of 13th November gives the Government's attitude on an Australian contribution to the United Nations Force. We have not as yet been asked for a contribution.

WGA
(W.G.A. LANDALE)
for Secretary

80
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED.

DBB:HMCC

0.15599

Sent: 15th November, 1956.
1510

TO:-

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

478. UNCLASSIFIED.

Egypt - Israel.

Press reports Australian Observer Major Carter
of U.N.T.S.O. has arrived Port Said with Burns. Please
confirm.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

(COST £1.14.0)
15th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL M.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

561/2/1 Pt. III

15th November, 1956.

: FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE - MEETING 8th NOVEMBER.

the Acting Minister

Secretary

→ Mr. Kevin *W*

Mr. Renouf

Mr. Booker

Senator Wordsworth reported to the Committee his approach to the Acting Minister with regard to their request for access to the Department's files on A.E.C. Commentators on public affairs. He said that the Acting Minister had said that the files were not available to the Committee, but in any case the Department had no file that was worthwhile other than on Radio Australia commentators.

2. It was mentioned by Senator Wordsworth that Mr. Peter Russo was not used by Radio Australia as a commentator.

3. Brief discussion ensued which indicated that the majority of the Committee appreciated that issues of freedom of speech were involved and that it would not be appropriate to endeavour to prevent Mr. Russo expressing his views.

4. The Acting Minister's letter to the Committee of 7th November, in relation to the appeal of the Supreme Soviet on Disarmament, was read to the Committee. There was general agreement that the reasons set forth in the letter were sound and that the Committee should take no further action.

5. Comment by Messrs. Wheelen and Gergat ^{W-gh} regarding delays occurring in the receipt of information by the Department on the Middle East crisis, notably the text of one of Sir Anthony Eden's speeches, was discussed but no conclusion reached.

6. Mr. Kevin and Mr. Renouf furnished the Committee with information on the latest developments in Middle East.:

7. The Committee discussed inconclusively:

- (a) Australian contribution to United Nations forces,
- (b) the role of the United Nations force, 79
- (c) Australian public opinion regarding Anglo-French intervention which was thought to have swung, in recent days, heavily in favour of the Australian Government support of United Kingdom.

8. The Committee resolved to raise in Party Meeting a proposal that the Parliamentary

Mr. Lindsay
Mr. Kensington
Mr. Davis is anxious to put a paper on the present committee before the Committee

Possibly we could commence our next instalment for the P.I.B. and sent them that

CONFIDENTIAL

F. J. G.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

debate on the Middle East crisis should be restricted
to one or two speeches on either side of the House.



(O.L. DAVIS)
Head - Information Branch.

77

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 15599.

AMENDED COPY

Sent: 14th November, 1956.
1720

MCD:OA.

Recd: 15th November, 1956.
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

357 CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram 229.

Middle East.

Do you wish to initiate any discussion?

2. Press today carries Associated Press story, dated 12th November from Canberra, under the headline "Menzies Attacks United Nations Policy". Prime Minister is described as saying it was "astonishing" British and French were not allowed to participate in the United Nations Force.

3. The background on this, and on possible Australian contribution, would be helpful.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

15th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
G

76

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM, 1956.
2200.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....488 (For Walker).

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....992 (For Casey).

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....2728 (For McCarthy).

Australian Embassy,
PARIS....274 (For Stirling).

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

From Prime Minister.

Egyptian Situation.

1. Since McBride's telegram of November 13th (465 to New York), we have received some assurance that Hammarskjöld has recognized, in discussion with United Kingdom Representatives, that Canada must participate in the Force; that it must be based on the Suez Canal; and that it must remain in the area until the Arab-Israel question and the Suez Canal question are settled.

2. It remains to be seen whether Hammarskjöld will succeed in overcoming Egyptian attempts to frustrate these objectives and whether he will have adequate support if Nasser contests him.

3. McBride and I therefore return to two practical suggestions about which we have had no response from Paris, London, Washington, or the representatives of these Governments in New York. These were:

(a) a formal communication to all Governments, publicly disseminated, of the details of Egyptian sabotage to the Canal, and of the economic consequences;

(b) representations in the capitals of the member nations of the Committee of 7 to give backing to a comprehensive interpretation of the purposes of the United Nations Force; and to insist upon the organization of an effective force. Unless this effort is made and succeeds, we fear that we may find ourselves falling back again on the full General Assembly where we should have another emotional and confused discussion from which we could expect nothing but concentrated efforts to get the French and British forces out irrespective of the consequences.

4. A third course in which we see advantage is for the most active encouragement to be given to the Baghdad Pact countries to dilute the support Nasser is receiving from other Arab and Asian countries. In particular, we would have thought that there was the greatest advantage in pressing for the inclusion of a substantial Pakistan contingent. Apart from the evident military value of a Pakistan force, Nasser would find it politically difficult to contest or eject a Muslim force in position in the Canal area ready to stay for such time as is necessary to bring about permanent settlements. The Pakistan Government has offered a force, The United Kingdom

SECRET

75
8

FMA

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

2. 0.15649/50/1/2.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

It apparently ~~not~~ Pakistan herself, has been told that the Secretary-General will accept a force, but Egypt has objected. For your own private information, the President of Pakistan is encouraging his Government to press the offer of a force as large as a brigade group and the President is firmly of the view that the United Nations force should be an effective one and that unfettered control of the Canal by Nasser must be frustrated.

5. Please canvass these views with the respective Governments (we do not however at this stage wish the French informed by us of the Pakistan Government's desire to contribute a force). We should like a senior officer designated in New York to keep in continuous contact with the various delegations, with the Committee of Seven, and, so far as is possible, with the Secretary-General, so that we may be kept fully informed of progress in dealing with Nasser.

PRIME MINISTER & DEPT.
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £172/14/4)

16th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss /^{UN} CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P
MT.

74

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20

MMC:AS

O.15606-8

Sent: 15th November, 1956
1640

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....990.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. (For Minister)....479.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. (For External).....2721. ✓

SECRET.

Washington pass to New York.

Suez Canal.

We should be glad to know the reaction of the State Department/Foreign Office to the views set out and matters raised in our telegrams 975 to Washington (London 2690), 978 to Washington (London 2696) and 471 to New York (London 2699) of 13th November.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

16th November, 1956
(Cost £15/4/4)

73

SECRET

F. O. W.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

VA: [redacted]

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. 4-5

175/11/20

163/4/7/3/3.

Sent: 15th November, 1956.
1700

TO:-

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....991

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....482

Repeated:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2722

RESTRICTED.

PRIORITY.

Washington pass New York.

Egypt - Israel.

1. Please advise us of State Department's present intentions regarding the two draft resolutions which they presented to the Emergency Assembly (New York's 785 and 786). Do they intend to bring these resolutions up again at the Assembly and if so, in what form?

2. We have difficulty in reconciling Barco's remarks made to the Mission (New York's 849 to us) about Assembly Committee exploring practical facilities and the terms of the draft resolution giving executive functions to the Canal Committee.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £24.7.8)
16th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P M.T.

72

RESTRICTED

ai
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 15594.

AS:OA.

Sent: 14th November, 1956.
0028

FROM:

Recd: 15th November, 1956.
0838

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

864. CONFIDENTIAL.

McBride from Casey.

M.37.

Harold Rabling came to see me today. He was Managing Director of Vacuum Oil, Australia, and Director of the parent Company in New York but now retired on generous pension. He stressed the major dislocation of oil distribution from Middle East and immediately prospective shortage and high charter rates of oil tankers. Saudi Arabia has banned any Arabian oil to United Kingdom which makes United Kingdom dependent on Iraq and Kuwait supplies. He says the United States has set up a Middle East Supply Committee composed of all major American Oil Companies and that a similar Committee has been set up in United Kingdom. He says that although Australia is on the right side of the Suez Canal he anticipates tanker difficulties for us. He offers his services here to keep us informed of ^{the} oil situation in the United States without salary but with expenses if he is obliged to travel from New York. Says all he would want is official backing of the Australian Government to enable him to seek information from the Oil Industry here with which he is well acquainted. I have suggested he contact McEwen now passing through New York. Telegraph me if you want this matter pursued.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.

15th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME DL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 15636.

VA:OA.

Sent: 14th November, 1956.
1702.

FROM:

Recd: 15th November, 1956.
1050Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.220. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Following message dated 10th November was received this morning in Ottawa from the Canadian Embassy Cairo.

Begins -

"The Australian Minister and Staff accompanied by Roquet left Cairo by train early this morning for the Libyan Border where they are due on Sunday morning. From Libya the Australians will use transportation facilities presumably by air laid on by the United Kingdom Government for their own people who left Cairo on same train. If Rome is on the itinerary the Australians will get off there and they would like their Embassy informed of their possible arrival. Please advise Canberra also that no Nationals other than Government Officials of the three countries were allowed to leave on today's special train".

Ends.

2. Roquet is a member of the Canadian Diplomatic Staff in Cairo.

3. Have cabled Rome regarding the last sentence in paragraph 1.


4. You will have heard that the matter of protection of Australian interests was discussed informally in New York yesterday by Mr. Casey and Mr. Pearson and reference was made to the practical difficulties confronting the small Canadian Staff in Cairo. Officials here however appear to regard the whole matter as settled for the time being subject to possible review in a week or two in the light of the ability of the Canadian Staff to cope with the responsibilities.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

15th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P ADMIN PERS.

CONFIDENTIAL



In reply quote No.



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

221/5/34/1
Memorandum No. 1607

14th November, 1956

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

Reactions to Military Action in Egypt

Attached are a letter received by the High
Commissioner from an Australian citizen living in India and
a copy of his reply.

(Signed) A. M. MORRIS

(D. J. Munro)
Counsellor

AMM:ASW

69


7th November, 1956

Dear Miss Pulsford,,

I thank you for your letter of 3rd November in which you protest against the statement made by the Prime Minister Mr. Menzies supporting recent action by the United Kingdom and French Governments in Egypt .

Your comments on the matter are noted and will be forwarded to Australia.

Yours faithfully,


(P.R. Heydon)
High Commissioner

Miss F.N. Pulsford,
Leadbeater Chambers,
The Theosophical Society,
Adyar,
MADRAS - 20

Leadbeater Chambers,
The Theosophical Society,
Adyar, Madras 20,
India.

3rd November, 1956.

The High Commissioner for Australia,
Connaught Place,
NEW DELHI.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

NEW DELHI


Dear Sir:

As an Australian citizen at present resident in India, I feel that I must strongly protest against the statement of the Australian Prime Minister supporting Anglo-French military action against Egypt. It causes me the most profound sorrow thus to feel impelled to dissociate myself from the official viewpoint of my country, of which I have always been a loyal and devoted citizen. My only consolation is the conviction that the Prime Minister's statement cannot reflect the feeling of the Australian people generally, who are noted for their sense of fair play. Deep and close as are Australia's ties with England, they surely do not involve supporting an action which is against every principle of honour and humanity.

My feeling of distress is the deeper for the fact that I have always been a most ardent admirer and supporter of Mr. Menzies himself, and prior to my leaving Australia I was for a time an active committee member of the Clovelly (Sydney) branch of the political party of which he is the leader. I have worked hard for the Liberal candidate at many elections, and have never before felt my confidence in its leader shaken.

I realise that this letter can achieve little, if anything, and understand that in your official position you must support the Australian Government. I do not wish to embarrass you in any way, but feel that I must express my views on the matter, and record my emphatic protest against something that must greatly lower Australia's prestige in the eyes of the world.

Yours faithfully,



(Miss) F. N. Pulsford.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

²
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.15468/9/70/1/3.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £86/0/10)

14th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL C&P MT.
G.

66

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

HMCC

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. 541/60/1/2/3/4

Sent: 14th November, 1956.
1840

TO :

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....474 (Pass to
Washington...985, Ottawa...195)

Repeated:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON2718 (Pass to
Paris...272)and

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....357

RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Our 465 - Egypt - Israel.

Please delete Iran in paragraph 4 and substitute
Ceylon.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

(COST £14.15.10)
15th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EAf&ME	E
AF&ME	INF	C&P						

Recon 7
*Please make alteration
to cable 465 as
above*
16/11/56

65

RESTRICTED

189/11/1

14th November, 1956.

AUSTRALIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH.

THE ACTING MINISTER:

THE SECRETARY:
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DIVISION IV: ✓
MR. QUINN:

On re-reading a series of telegrams from our High Commissioners at the Asian posts of the Commonwealth sent during the Suez crisis, it has struck me that it is upon Pakistan only that Australia and the closer portions of the Commonwealth can rely in such troublous times as those through which we are passing. Our High Commissioner there holds an unique position of influencing policy; so did I during the regime of Liaquat Ali Khan, who was Number One force in Pakistan. The then United Kingdom High Commissioner had not been in the United Kingdom for many years and it was to me rather than to Sir L. Craffety-Smith, that Mr. Liaquat turned to discuss Commonwealth and Pakistan problems. To a very much greater extent indeed, the present pre-eminent force in Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, turns to General Cawthorn.

2. May I refer to paragraph 10 of General Cawthorn's telegram No. 294 from Karachi of 2nd November, reading as follows:-

"During these interviews both the Prime Minister and Baig deplored their lack of real news of what was happening and and I was struck by tendency of both to swallow Egyptian accounts. I ventured to suggest to my United Kingdom colleague the desirability of giving both all possible information as to actual developments and of keeping the Prime Minister primed with copies of important statements to counteract garbled Press accounts. I feel this very important and you may be able to help in this respect."

3. Might I add that I followed the same course from middle 1949 till the beginning of 1952 - suggesting to the United Kingdom High Commissioners "the desirability of giving both all possible information as to actual developments and of keeping the Prime Minister primed with copies of important statements to counteract garbled Press accounts. I feel this very important and you may be able to help in this respect."

4. The result was fruitless, and I submit that this task should be performed by Australia through the establishment of a Press Attache at Karachi and providing him with a good flow of news. It is noted that there are Press Attaches at New Delhi, Bangkok, Singapore, The Hague and Washington, and Bureaux at London and New York.

J. Oldham
(J. Oldham)

Adviser on Commonwealth Relations.

JEO:HMS.

14th November, 1956

EGYPT - ISRAEL

THE SECRETARY
(copy for Mr. Kevin)

1. I think I should draw your attention to the fact the Advisory Committee, established by the General Assembly on 7th November, to continue in co-operation with the Secretary-General and on behalf of the Assembly, planning regarding the International Force has both executive and advisory functions. The name "Advisory Committee" is therefore misleading.

2. The Committee has two sets of functions as follows:-

(a) "to undertake development of those aspects of planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of direct responsibility of the Chief of Command"; and

(b) "following the fulfilment of these responsibilities, to continue to assist the Secretary-General in responsibilities falling to him under the relevant resolutions regarding the Force"

3. The Committee also has the authority to request that the Assembly should be convened and to report to it whenever matters arise which in its opinion are of such urgency and importance as to require their consideration by the Assembly itself.

4. You will see from this that the agreement which the Secretary-General is reported to have made with Egypt regarding the entry of the International Force into Egyptian territory is not one which the Secretary General had authority to make. This was a task for the Advisory Committee of which the Secretary-General is the Chairman. (Of course, we do not yet know whether the Secretary-General in concluding the agreement had the approval of the Advisory Committee or not.)

(A. P. Renouf)
United Nations Branch

Mr. Lardale

Mr. R. H. H. H. H.

was 15/11

AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK (Pls. pass to Washington and Ottawa)

Repeated: LONDON, PARIS.

SECRET

For Casey from McBride

SUEZ CANAL

1. We are concerned at reports that Nasser, in negotiation with the Secretary-General about admission of U.N. forces, is stipulating not merely withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces but also:

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until all "foreign soldiers" have left Egypt;
- (b) the Suez Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) after the Anglo-French withdrawal, the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier.

At same time press reports Burns as saying that the International Force will not (repeat not) be responsible for clearing the Canal.

2. If, in fact, Nasser is allowed to maintain these or similar stipulations, the Suez Canal will be blocked indefinitely. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the regime which illegally nationalized the Canal should remain unchallenged after wantonly and methodically destroying it.

3. It appears to us that, as a first step, there should be communicated to all Governments and disseminated publicly the details of the damage done by the Egyptians which they could in no way justify as necessary on military grounds to support their resistance to Israeli, British or French forces.

4. In particular, we would think that urgent representations should be made in the capitals of the seven States advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, including the American resolution of November 2. These States are:-

Canada, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Norway, Iran & Brazil.

*we are to take up in
Kharak. Has etc
after we get reactions
from the above
9/10/57*

62

*→ McKinnon & TD to be submitted by
McKinnon & TD to be submitted by
1/11/57*

the operative part of that resolution urged that "upon the cease fire being effective steps shall be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and return secure freedom of navigation".

5. Please advise whether the Secretary-General and the Force Commander interpret the resolution as giving the U.N. Force authority either to perform or alternatively to provide protection for and facilitate the physical operations necessary to re-open the Canal and to occupy the Canal area and to remain in it for such time as is necessary to "secure" freedom of navigation. As to the location of the U.N. force ((c) above), please confirm that Secretary General intends to insist upon Egypt's acceptance of the Assembly's interpretations that the Force is to cover the area "from the Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel".

6. If this is not the intention, the question at once arises whether there will be concerted action by the Powers entitled to enjoy freedom of navigation under the 1888 Convention to restore their rights.

13/11/56.

SECRET

AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK (Pls. pass to Washington and Ottawa)

Repeated: LONDON, PARIS, KARACHI, RIO

SECRET

For Casey from McBride

Suez Canal

1. We are concerned at reports that Nasser, in negotiation with the Secretary-General about admission of U.N. forces, is stipulating not merely withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces but also:

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until all "foreign soldiers" have left Egypt;
- (b) the Suez Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) after the Anglo-French withdrawal, the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier.

Referring to reports that Nasser is planning to block the Canal
2. If, in fact, Nasser is allowed to maintain these or similar stipulations, the Suez Canal will be blocked indefinitely. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the regime which illegally nationalized the Canal should remain unchallenged after ~~its~~ *wanton and methodical destruction of it.*

3. It appears to us that, as a first step, there should be communicated to all Governments ~~the details of the damage done~~ *and disseminated publicly* by the Egyptians which ~~was~~ *they could* ~~in no sense justified on military grounds~~ *was partly or necessarily* ~~to~~ *in support of* their resistance to Israeli, British or French forces.

13/11/56

SECRET

SECRET

2.

4. In particular, we would think that urgent representations should be made in the capitals of the seven States advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, including the American resolution of November 2nd. ^{These states are} One operative part of that resolution urged that "upon the cease fire being effective steps shall be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and return secure freedom of navigation".

5. Please advise whether the Secretary-General and the Force Commander interpret the resolution as giving the U.N. Force authority to perform ^{either as an alternative to provide protection for and facilitate} the physical operations necessary to re-open the Canal and to occupy the Canal area and to remain in it for such time as is necessary to "secure" freedom of navigation.

6. If this is not the intention, the question at once arises whether there will be concerted action by the Powers entitled to enjoy freedom of navigation under the 1888 Convention to restore their rights.

~~4-6-60~~

59

As to the location of the UN force (C) above please confirm that Secretary General intends to insist upon the Assembly's ~~assumption~~ Egypt's acceptance of the Assembly's interpretation that the Force is to cover the area "from the Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel."

Copy
exactly
into

SECRET

SECRET**CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.****ADDRESS** AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK (Pls. pass to Washington and Ottawa)Repeated: LONDON, PARIS, KARACHI, RIO**Serial No.** **Classification** SECRETFor Casey from McBrideSuez Canal

1. We are concerned at reports that Nasser, in negotiation with the Secreatry-General about admission of U.N. forces, is stipulating not merely withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces but also:

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until all "foreign soldiers" have left Egypt;
- (b) the Suez Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) after the Anglo-French withdrawal, the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier.

2. If, in fact, Nasser is allowed to maintain these or similar stipulations, the Suez Canal will be blocked indefinitely. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the regime which illegally nationalized the Canal should remain unchallenged after its wanton act of methodical destruction of it.

3. It appears to us that, as a first step, there should be communicated to all Governments the details of the damage done by the Egyptians which was in no sense justified on military grounds in support of their resistance to Israeli, British or French forces.

AUTHORIZED BY

E.A. FILE NO. DATE 13/11/56**PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION.**

SECRET

Sec.	Sent by
A.S.(U.N.)	
A.S.(G.R.)	
AS.(A.&G.)	
Cr.(L. & T.)	Time Sent
U.N.	
E.T.A.	
E. Rel.	
Pac.	
West	Typed by
Central	
P.I.	
Con. & Pro.	
Ant.	No. of Copies
Admin.	
Finance.	
Ex. Comms.	

SECRET

2.

4. In particular, we would think that urgent representations should be made in the capitals of the seven States advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, including the American resolution of November 2nd. One operative part of that resolution urged that "upon the cease fire being effective steps shall be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and return secure freedom of navigation".

5. Please advise whether the Secretary-General and the Force Commander interpret the resolution as giving the U.N. Force authority to perform the physical operations necessary to re-open the Canal and to occupy the Canal area and to remain in it for such time as is necessary to "secure" freedom of navigation.

6. If this is not the intention, the question at once arises whether there will be concerted action by the Powers entitled to enjoy freedom of navigation under the 1888 Convention to restore their rights.

57

SECRET

Sentry

Wm 13/11

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.

ADDRESS

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK

SECRET

Serial No. Classification SECRET

IMMEDIATE

For Walker.

Newsagency reports today say that Nasser, in negotiations with Hammarskjöld, is insisting on five preconditions to the entry of the United Nations Forces:

- (a) the "quick and effective withdrawal" of Anglo-French troops;
- (b) the withdrawal of Israeli forces to behind the Armistice lines of 1948;
- (c) the operation of the Canal by Egypt;
- (d) no Canal clearance and repair "until the last foreign soldier has left Egyptian soil;"
- (e) movement of United Nations Forces from the Canal to Israeli-Egyptian frontier after the United Nations Force secures the complete withdrawal of Anglo-French troops.

2. If this report is correct, it seems to contemplate that Anglo-French forces would not withdraw until shortly after the arrival of the United Nations Force, but that compliance with the other four conditions should precede the entry of the United Nations Force.

3. With regard to (b) above, the formal position, as we interpret the resolution, seems to be that foreign withdrawals

AUTHORIZED BY

/ should

E.A. FILE NO. DATE

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION.

Sec.	Sent by
A.S.(U.N.)	
A.S.(G.R.)	
AS.(A.&G.)	
Cr.(L. & T.)	Time Sent
U.N.	
E.T.A.	
E. Rel.	
Pac.	
West	Typed by
Central	
P.I.	
Con. & Pro.	
Ant.	No. of Copies
Admin.	
Finance	
Ex. Comms.	

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

should be phased to coincide with United Nations Force arrivals but not that withdrawals should precede the entry of the United Nations forces. As regards conditions (c), ~~(d)~~ and ~~(e)~~, Nasser seems to be out of court regarding Canal operation since this question was raised in the Assembly by United States resolution which has not yet been considered. As regards clearance of the Canal, Egypt is acting contrary to the resolution of 2nd November which urges that when a cease fire becomes effective, the Canal should be cleared and freedom of navigation secured. As regards (e) Egypt is disregarding the functions of the United Nations Force, as approved by the General Assembly, which are to cover the area from the Canal to the Armistice Demarcation lines between Egypt and Israel.

4. We should be glad to know if Egypt has, in fact, stipulated the above conditions, and should appreciate your views on our comments. in the light of consultation with other delegations.

55

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20
SECRET

OA.MMc

0.15430/31/32/33/34/74

Sent: 13th November 1956
1630

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....465.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....975.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....191.

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2690.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.....268.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....352.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

London pass to Paris. New York pass to Washington
and Ottawa.

For Casey from McBride.

SUEZ CANAL.

1. We are concerned at reports that Nasser, in negotiation with the Secretary-General about admission of United Nations forces, is stipulating not merely withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces but also:

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until all "foreign soldiers" have left Egypt;
- (b) the Suez Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) after the Anglo-French withdrawal, the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier.

At same time press reports Burns as saying that the International Force will not be responsible for clearing the Canal.

2. If, in fact, Nasser is allowed to maintain these or similar stipulations, the Suez Canal will be blocked indefinitely. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the regime which illegally nationalized the Canal should remain unchallenged after wantonly and methodically destroying it.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
^{2.}
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

0.15430/31/32/33/34/74

3. It appears to us that, as a first step, there should be communicated to all Governments and disseminated publicly the details of the damage done by the Egyptians which they could in no way justify as necessary on military grounds to support their resistance to Israeli, British or French forces.

4. In particular, we would think that urgent representations should be made in the capitals of the seven States advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, including the American resolution of November 2. These States are:-

Canada, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Norway, ~~Iran~~ ^{CEYLON} and Brazil.

One operative part of that resolution urged that "upon the cease fire being effective steps shall be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation".

5. Please advise whether the Secretary-General and the Force Commander interpret the resolution as giving the United Nations Force authority either to perform or alternatively to provide protection for and facilitate the physical operations necessary to re-open the Canal and to occupy the Canal area and to remain in it for such time as is necessary to "secure" freedom of navigation. As to the location of the United Nations force ((c) above), please confirm that Secretary-General intends to insist upon Egypt's acceptance of the Assembly's interpretations that the Force is to cover the area "from the Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel".

6. If this is not the intention, the question at once arises whether there will be concerted action by the Powers entitled to enjoy freedom of navigation under the 1888 Convention to restore their rights.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

(COST £87.9.0)

14th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME
INF C&P

G

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O.15484

BH/BH

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
2130

Australian Delegation to U.N.C.U.R.K., SEOUL. (Savingram)	
Australian Embassy, DUBLIN (Savingram)	Australian High Commission, PRETORIA. (Savingram)
Australian High Commission, LONDON. (Savingram)	Australian Consulate-General, GENEVA. (Savingram)
Australian High Commission, KARACHI.	Australian Embassy, THE HAGUE.
Australian Embassy, TOKYO.	Australian Embassy, MANILA.
Australian Embassy, WASHINGTON (Pass Ottawa & pass Australian Commission Austnat New York)	Australian High Commission, NEW DELHI.
Australian Embassy, SINGAPORE	Australian Embassy, RANGOON
Australian Embassy, BANGKOK.	Australian Legation, RIO de JANEIRO
Australian Embassy, BONN	Australian Legation, ROME
Australian High Commission, COLOMBO	Australian Legation, SAIGON.
Australian Embassy, DJAKARTA	Australian Legation, TEL AVIV
	Australian Trade Commission, HONG KONG.
	Australian Legation, PHNOM PENH.

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Middle East.

The following guidance points should be used
supplementary to other material provided:

- (1) Australia does not deny an Israeli act of aggression but insists that the situation must be looked at as a whole including the provocations, the threats by Egypt, and the build-up against Israel.
- (2) We have supported Israeli withdrawal from the time of our vote in first meeting of the Security Council. Israel has stated her intention to withdraw. 5✓
- (3) We would consider it most imprudent for Anglo-French forces to withdraw until a properly-constituted United Nations force is in position; otherwise, a resumption of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities would be inevitable. United States, Canada and Baghdad Pact countries support a phased withdrawal to which United Kingdom and France have agreed.
- (4) We consider United Nations force should get into position with greatest urgency. The duration of its stay will depend on its role as determined by the Assembly and Egypt's willingness to conform to objectives stated in Assembly resolutions.
- (5) We have said we are not unwilling if invited to make a contribution to a United Nations military establishment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

2.

O.15484

which will facilitate a permanent settlement- though we recognised that it is not yet clear that an Australian contribution would be required.

(6) We consider the physical blockage of the Canal by the deliberate action of Egypt to be contrary to the 1888 Convention.

(7) Egypt's wanton acts of destruction in the Canal will injure ordinary people throughout the world, and they could not be justified as military necessity in order to resist United Kingdom French or Israeli forces.

(8) We support immediate efforts to restore the Canal in the interests of all, including use of Anglo-French technical facilities already available, and we condemn Egypt's obstructive attitude to restoration.

(9) We consider Soviet motives and interference in the area, which began with the introduction of Communist arms, to be wholly mischievous.

(10) Collective efforts should be begun at once to settle the eight-year conflict between the Arabs and Israel which brought this crisis; and to settle the Suez Canal problem.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(Cost £557.7.8)
13th November, 1956.

SEC	A/SS	L&T(Div5)	UN	ER	CR	PAC&AM	EA	AM&SP	S&SEA
SA	EEF&ME	E	AF&ME	INF	DL	C&P			
G.									

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DW:RMC **OUTWARD CABLEGRAM** 0.45464

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
1815

TO:-

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S.

269. CONFIDENTIAL.

Please confirm reports that Iraq and Saudi Arabia have broken off diplomatic relations with France.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £1.2.2)
14th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	S&SLA	SA	EAF&ME	E
AF&ME	INF	C&P					

50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

BC: ABK.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM 10/1/3.

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
1815.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....468. (PLEASE PASS TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....978.)

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....2696.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....193.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON....354.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

EGYPT-ISRAEL.

Further to our 465.

We are concerned over the implications of further radio reports that the Secretary-General has concluded an agreement with Egypt whereby Egypt permits the entry of the International Force on condition that:-

- (a) Egypt has full control over what troops enter her territory;
- (b) Egypt retains full control over where the Force is to be stationed;
- (c) Egypt can at any time order the forces to withdraw from her territory.

2. If such an agreement has been concluded by the Secretary-General, it would seem that there is nothing to prevent Egypt, once having secured the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces, from demanding that the International Force be withdrawn before the Canal is re-opened and freedom of navigation secured.

3. We appreciate that the functioning of the Force as approved by the Assembly (paragraph 9 of Document A/3302) says that the Force cannot be stationed or operate on Egyptian territory without the consent of Egypt. However, it was clearly the intention of the Assembly in accepting this legal position that

- (a) Egypt should be asked to consent to the entry of the force into the area stated for the purposes approved by the Assembly;
- (b) Egypt's consent would give authority for the Force to remain in Egypt for the length of time necessary for it to achieve these purposes.

CONFIDENTIAL

...2.

and
Acting Minister for External Affairs.

Parliament House,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

13th November, 1956.

My dear Prime Minister,

I enclose, for your information, a paper
compiled by the Department of External Affairs,
setting out the attitude of the U.S.S.R. in the
Middle East crisis.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) P. A. McBRIDE

(P. A. McBRIDE)

The Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, C.H.,
Q.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.

A. C. T.



SECRET

In reply quote No. 175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CANBERRA.

PERSONAL

13th November, 1956

SECRET

.....

Enclosed is a copy of a report from the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington upon a discussion with President Eisenhower on Anglo-American relations in connection with the Middle East situation.

2. This is sent to you for your personal background as an indication of the President's desire to restore Anglo-French-American relations in the Middle East as quickly as possible. We do not wish you to refer to this communication in your discussions with the Government to which you are accredited or with your colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

Sent to: New Delhi
Karachi
Colombo
Djakarta
Bangkok
Tokyo
Manila
Washington
New York
Ottawa
London

(A.H. Tange)
SECRETARY

SECRET

47

SECRET

Office of the United Kingdom
High Commissioner,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

POL.55/1

SECRET

12th November, 1956

My dear Brown,

You will be interested to receive the following information which has been reported by the United Kingdom Ambassador at Washington. When Sir Harold Caccia recently presented his credentials to the President, they discussed the situation in the Middle East.

2. The President began by saying that he had just had to deal with an announcement made by the French authorities that the United Kingdom and French Prime Ministers were going to Washington on an official visit. This possibility was under discussion, but, in the President's view, it was quite the wrong moment to make any announcement. He had therefore given instructions for a statement to be issued that no firm plan had yet been fixed.

3. The President then went on to elaborate why he thought it premature to fix a date. In his judgment, the first essential was to get the United Nations' plan moving. From the Israel communication agreeing to withdraw their forces from Egypt, it now looked as if the way was clear. However, until the United Nations force began to arrive and actual withdrawals by the Israelis on the one side and the United Kingdom and French on the other had started, he thought the whole position might be prejudiced by an overt getting together of the Heads of Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France. In particular, he feared that this might give the Russians an excuse for claiming that the three principal Western Powers were ganging together to bulldoze something through the United Nations. On the basis of such a claim, they might take independent action to support the Arab States and carry an uncomfortable amount of world opinion with them.

4. The Ambassador said he was sure that the President, as a soldier, would understand our great anxiety that any withdrawal on our side should not leave a vacuum. The President replied that he fully appreciated this. He did not know exactly where the United Kingdom and French troops were on the ground beyond Port Said. What was important was that some United Nations troops should get in as quickly as possible and that this should be accompanied by some significant withdrawal on our side. He did not mean man for man; but the withdrawal should be visible. How the rest of the operation was phased could then, he hoped, be left over and solved as we went along. The Ambassador asked whether the President would think that the time for a visit by Sir Anthony Eden would be right as soon as this process had begun. The President said that he would have thought so. But he repeated that the first priority, in his judgment, was to get the United Nations police going as a means of forestalling any Soviet initiative.

5. At the same time, the President asked the Ambassador to convey to Sir Anthony Eden the warmest message of personal friendship. The fact that the President had sharply differed from Sir Anthony Eden on tactics on a single point did not mean that the President's views about the vital need for the Anglo/United States alliance were changed in any way. Quite the contrary, and he had

SECRET

SECRET

already made this plain in public. He would do so again.

6. What is more, on the point of difference, there was only, in the President's view, a divergence on method. The President shared Sir Anthony Eden's views about Nasser. But he had felt from the beginning of the Suez crisis that this was a difficult ground to choose for bringing Nasser down. Rightly or wrongly, a great deal of world opinion did not share our views about Nasser's seizure of the Canal. This led the President to express views about the difficulties with which we were faced by the differing standards applied to us and to the Russians. A great deal of world opinion, and the Afro-Asians in particular, seemed prepared to swallow any kind of excuse from the Russians for the grossest forms of callous brutality. On the other side, the slightest suspicions that we were acting illegally brought down heaps of abuse upon our heads. The United Kingdom Ambassador said however true this might be, the dangerous aspect of Nasser's seizure of the Canal was the increased power and prestige which he would gain if he appeared to have a success. The President said that he realized this but he must stick to his point that the Canal issue was not the best for bringing him down.

7. The President ended by repeating his determination to get as close as possible to us and the French as quickly as possible. He knew that Sir Anthony Eden wanted to discuss basic policies with him and he accepted the need for this as soon as it could prudently be arranged. In particular, he said the Ambassador could assure Sir Anthony Eden that he had clearly in mind the necessity for reaching a settlement of the Palestine and Suez questions. It would be nonsensical to go back to the position before the Israel attack. What is worse, it would be extremely dangerous and would merely pave the way for another crisis in the near future.

8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Arthur Tange.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G.W.Tory

Sir Allen Brown, C.B.E.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

SECRET

45

SECRET

AUSTUNAT,
NEW YORK (Pls. pass to Washington)

Repeated: LONDON, OTTAWA.

SECRET

For Casey from McBride

Suez Canal

1. In discussions in London on November 7th, Home expressed the hope that the Australian delegation in New York would help persuade the Secretary-General and other delegations towards the commonsense view that all available means, including those already at hand, should be used to clear the Canal as soon as possible. Home referred to the availability of Anglo-French technicians and equipment and said he thought that Hammarskjold had inhibitions about using Anglo-French personnel, even though they are already on the spot.
2. We should be grateful if you would arrange with Walker to concert with Dixon in an approach to the Secretary-General along the above line.
3. We shall be telegraphing separately about the implications of current reports that Burns has said that the United Nations force does not have responsibility for clearing the Canal and that Nasser is making stipulations ^{on this matter} to the Secretary-General.

AHT/SCB

13/11/56

44

SECRET

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

ABK:ABK.

O.15487/88.

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
2130.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK...471.

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
LON DON (FOR EXTERNAL)...2699.SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Minister and Walker.

Reference our telegrams 465 and 468.

1. Following is extract from United Kingdom circular telegram of 12th November given to us by United Kingdom High Commission:

BEGINS..

"The Secretary-General informed Dixon that he had received formal reply from Fawzi confirming Egyptian Government's acceptance of International Force but asking for clarification on three points (one of which is):

- (c) What function would international force have in Canal area once that area was outside fighting zone? Hammarskjöld's comment had been that force would then have no responsibility in Canal area since it would be operating elsewhere, but there would probably have to be agreement with Egyptians to enable force to maintain a base in Canal area for its operations on demarcation line.

ENDS.

2. Hammarskjöld's comment seems to show no recognition of the stated purpose of reopening the Canal and securing freedom of navigation.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £33/3/8)

14th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.A.F& ME E AF&ME INF DL
C&P
G.

43

SECRET

13th November, 1956

EGYPT - ISRAEL

THE SECRETARY

(Copy for Mr. Kevin) The Press reports to-day that Nasser has said that he will permit entry of the International Force upon certain conditions.

2. This appears to be an improper attitude upon the part of Egypt. As I see it, the question before Nasser is whether to permit the entry of the Force with its terms of reference as approved by the Assembly, or not to permit its entry - there can be no question of entry subject to certain conditions.

3. I also feel that if Nasser has only given a permission qualified by conditions, the Secretary-General has no authority to accept on behalf of the United Nations and that the question of Nasser's conditional acceptance is one to be considered by the Assembly.



(A. P. Renouf)
United Nations Branch

Scrub

Following from Goss (Melbourne ABC reception)

(1) Hammarskjöld said Egypt had agreed to stationing of UN Blue Force in Egypt.

(2) He would leave for Cairo on Thursday ^{help} to coordinate operations

(3) First unit, according to Hammarskjöld would be deployed today

(4) Camp would be near Suez

(5) Damoush - Egypt agreement was that UN Force would operate within Egyptian 20 miles; UN force would withdraw after UN-demonstrated troops withdraw; Egypt's agreement necessary for participation of troops of any countries; Egypt's agreement necessary for location of UN Force. (No attribution given to Goss)

13/11

→ Mr. Goss 13/11

Mr. Krum
Bill. — Mr.

Confidential

DL (Max Loveday) do NOT consider it advisable to pass Mr. Krum's reports to Mr. Hartnell. They say:-

(a) these reports relate to Singapore principally &

(b) the reports are concerned with possibilities & Hartnell would have to be briefed on background.

ER (Mr. Brennan) say that Hartnell is only interested in information directly affecting oil supplies to Australia.

St. 12/11

I agree with the above comments

wrote 12/11

M. Landish. ✓ All 13/11

File wrote 13/11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Telephone
 Record of Conversation with Mr. Bernard Hartnell, Assistant Secretary,
 Department of National Development
 on 9th November, 1956
 Officers Present Mr. Keith Brennan

MAIN SUBJECT(S):INDONESIAN OIL FOR AUSTRALIA

Mr. Hartnell rang to say that at 3 a.m. to-day the tanker "William G. Walkeley" owned by AMPOL arrived at the port of Sungai Paking in Sumatra. The AMPOL agent had some difficulty in getting on board but when he did he notified the Captain that there was a strike against British Commonwealth ships and that the "William G. Walkeley" would not be able to take on oil. The Captain radioed this information to Australia.

2. The CALTEX Company in Australia has been in touch with CALTEX, New York, which is of the opinion that the strike will last only a few days. CALTEX, New York, confirms that the strike is Union and not Government inspired.

3. National Development considers that even if the estimate of duration of the strike is inaccurate and assuming that the strike is against British Commonwealth ships and that labour would not enquire into the destination of oil loaded on to other ships it should be possible by juggling tankers to maintain oil supplied to Australia.

*Important: In your summary. Should you also mention
 Hong Kong send telegram.*

D.I. should see

with 12/11

Seen by D.L. 12/11

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister.	A/S G.R.	Central Br.	D.L. & P.I. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.	Admin. Branch.
Secretary.	A/S Admin.	Pacific Br.	U.N. Branch.	C. & P. Br.	Antarctic Div.
A/S U.N.	L. & T. Div.	Western Br.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> E.R. Branch.	C'wealth. Rels.	Melbourne Office.
			S.S.E.A.		Sydney Office.

A/S Div. I; A/S Div. IV;

FOLLOWING POST(S):

Report prepared by Keith Brennan
 (Keith Brennan)

ACTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.15479

BH/BH

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
1850

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

469. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For Casey from McBride.

Australian Force Contribution

My 462.

I have since discussed this subject with
Prime Minister and we are agreed that, having publicly
announced our attitude towards a contribution, we should
take no further initiative.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

(Cost £6.4.0.)

14th November, 1956.

39

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

BH.MMc

0.15424

Sent: 13th November 1956
1328

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

462. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For Casey from McBride.

1. You will have in New York the exact terms of the reference in the Prime Minister's speech of November 8th to the question of an Australian contribution to the United Nations force in Egypt.
2. You will note that we have given reasons why we do not yet know whether an Australian contribution will be needed. This, of course, provides a satisfactory explanation if, in truth, any Australian contribution would be refused entry by Egypt. In addition, we have said that Australia would be not unwilling to contribute to a military establishment which will facilitate the making of a permanent settlement in the Middle East.
3. We are not aware whether Walker made any statement to the General Assembly or has sent any communication to the Secretary-General about an Australian contribution of **forces**.
4. If he has not done so, I suggest you consider whether or not the terms of the Prime Minister's statement should be communicated officially to Hammarskjold.
5. I should be grateful for your comments.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.H.'s.

(COST £18.6.0)
13th November, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DW:VA

O. 15472

Sent: 13th November, 1956
1815

TO:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

271. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Stirling from Tange.

Suez Situation.

1. In view of the history of this matter in which France has had Australia beside her in all major votes, I would have expected that the French Government would be ready to give you frequent appreciations and advice of their policy intentions.

2. Would you please try to give us reports from direct French Government sources as distinct from press and other Embassy sources?

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

(Cost £4.3.11)
14th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

OA.MMc

0.15430/31/32/33/34/74

Sent: 13th November 1956
1630

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....465. ✓

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....975.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....191.

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2690.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.....268..

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....352.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

London pass to Paris. New York pass to Washington
and Ottawa.

For Casey from McBride.

SUEZ CANAL.

1. We are concerned at reports that Nasser, in negotiation with the Secretary-General about admission of United Nations forces, is stipulating not merely withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces but also:

- (a) that Egypt will not allow the clearance and repair of the Canal until all "foreign soldiers" have left Egypt;
- (b) the Suez Canal is to be operated by Egypt;
- (c) after the Anglo-French withdrawal, the United Nations force is to be moved from the Canal to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier.

At same time press reports Burns as saying that the International Force will not be responsible for clearing the Canal.

2. If, in fact, Nasser is allowed to maintain these or similar stipulations, the Suez Canal will be blocked indefinitely. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the regime which illegally nationalized the Canal should remain unchallenged after wantonly and methodically destroying it.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
2.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

0.15430/31/32/33/34/74

3. It appears to us that, as a first step, there should be communicated to all Governments and disseminated publicly the details of the damage done by the Egyptians which they could in no way justify as necessary on military grounds to support their resistance to Israeli, British or French forces.

4. In particular, we would think that urgent representations should be made in the capitals of the seven States advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, including the American resolution of November 2. These States are:-

Canada, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Norway, Iran and Brazil.

One operative part of that resolution urged that "upon the cease fire being effective steps shall be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation".

5. Please advise whether the Secretary-General and the Force Commander interpret the resolution as giving the United Nations Force authority either to perform or alternatively to provide protection for and facilitate the physical operations necessary to re-open the Canal and to occupy the Canal area and to remain in it for such time as is necessary to "secure" freedom of navigation. As to the location of the United Nations force ((c) above), please confirm that Secretary-General intends to insist upon Egypt's acceptance of the Assembly's interpretations that the Force is to cover the area "from the Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel".

6. If this is not the intention, the question at once arises whether there will be concerted action by the Powers entitled to enjoy freedom of navigation under the 1888 Convention to restore their rights.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

(COST £87.9.0)

14th November, 1956.

SECRET

SECRET
IMMEDIATE

189/11/1

13th November, 1956.

PAKISTAN - RELATIONS WITH COMMONWEALTH.

THE MINISTER:

THE SECRETARY:
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DIVISION IV: ✓

Mr. Lunn

With reference to the attached telegrams 311, 314, and 315 from Karachi, I beg to recall that when I was in Pakistan I had a talk with the present High Commissioner when we agreed that Iskander Mirza, then Defence Secretary, would eventually become Number One man of Pakistan and that he might model himself on the lines of Ataturk.

2. Iskander Mirza has in recent weeks, according to the telegrams to which I have access, played a valuable pro-Commonwealth and anti-Communist part first at the meeting of the Baghdad Powers in Teheran and then in Karachi in keeping much of the Middle East pro-British and anti-Communist.

3. In a previous submission, I have already dealt with the manner in which he scotched his Prime Minister's proposal to try to use the present crises to consolidate the latter's personal position by talking about Pakistan going out of the Commonwealth. Instead of immediately returning to Pakistan to defeat this proposal, Iskander Mirza used his influence in the wider sphere of Teheran to keep the Baghdad Powers from actively ^{supporting} Egypt. On his return to Pakistan, Iskander Mirza saw to it that Pakistan would not attend the meeting of the sponsors of the Afro-Asian Conference at Delhi on 12th November. (The sponsors are India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia.) Our High Commissioner who, as usual, has been playing a most significant part in keeping Pakistan on the right lines so far as the Commonwealth is concerned, has once again suggested that a brief telegram of appreciation should be sent to the Pakistan Government, in regard to its efforts (which are largely in fact those of the President) against the forces of autocracy.

4. Working as a rough draft, I would suggest that the following telegram be sent from Mr. Menzies to Mr. Suhrawardy:

"From Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister of Pakistan:

The Australian Government and I have followed closely the path which Pakistan has pursued during the last few weeks. As a fellow member of the Commonwealth with Pakistan, the Australian Government has been struck by the strength of the Pakistan Government's opposition to the forces of militant autocracy wherever they have shown themselves. If these forces succeed the world will be deprived of its most cherished possession - freedom. May I add in particular how greatly we admired Pakistan's recent initiative in raising the matter of the brutal onslaught on Hungary at the General Assembly. I conclude with the sentiment, with which I am sure you will agree, that if the subtle forces of Communist militant autocracy are not to succeed in any part of the world active immediate steps must be taken without delay. This threat to freedom is very real and calls for action by liberty-loving nations. - Menzies.

J. Oldham
(J. Oldham)

Adviser on Commonwealth Relations.

JEO:HMS.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. ⁰
6.15598/97400/401

GJW/BH

Sent: 13th November, 1956.
1220

TO:

Australian Embassy,
RCNN...395

Pass to Berlin.

Australian Embassy,
THE HAGUE...181.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS....266

Australian Legation,
ROME....381

SECRET.

We wish you to send us progressive assessments based on any information locally available to you of Soviet intentions in the Middle East and Europe. The latter heading should include the situation inside the satellite countries especially Poland and East Germany and developments in Soviet Policy towards them. We also desire to receive any reports available to you locally regarding the present balance of power inside Russia itself including the role of the Army.

2 Please take suitable opportunities to explore these subjects with the Foreign Ministry of the Government to which you are accredited with appropriate diplomatic colleagues and with reliable commentators. Summary of your reports should be sent by cablegram.

(Cost £40.6.10)

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

13th November, 1956.

SEC a/SS UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P

SECRET

33

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

AS

I.15475

Dated: 12th November, 1956
1836

FROM:

Rec'd: 13th November, 1956
0920

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3105. UNCLASSIFIED.

From External.

Cutler, Cook, Fogg and Walker arrived this morning. All well. Request you inform the families of the first three and inform the Department of Trade about Walker.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
A/MIN&DEPT TRADE (MR. MCLINTOCK)
P.M'S

13th November, 1956

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	S&SEA	E. AF&ME	AF&ME	INF
C&P	ADMIN@	PERS	TRAV@				

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

DBB:AS

I.15467

Dated: 12th November, 1956
1818

FROM:

. Rec'd: 13th November, 1956
0830

Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.

540. RESTRICTED.

Addressed Djakarta 38 repeated Canberra 540.

My telegram 539, 37 to Djakarta.

Later reports clarify that the Egyptian invitation was to T.W.A., Swissair, K.L.M. and Air India only.

Harry.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M'S

13th November, 1956
(Teletype to EA Melbourne
for Civil Aviation.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	ER	PAC&AM	S&SEA	SEA	E.AF&ME
E	AF&ME	INF	C&P				

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

12th November, 1956.

THE ASIAN MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES:

THE MINISTER:
THE SECRETARY:
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DIVISION I:
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DIVISION IV: ✓

The President of Pakistan having effectively scotched his Prime Minister's proposal to leave the Commonwealth (Iskander Mirza called it "blackmail" to Suhrawardy) and Nehru having in an otherwise unsatisfactory speech to the All India Congress Committee "firmly" opposed a motion (Telegram No. 315 from Delhi of 10th November), it is suggested that our High Commissioner at Colombo be advised of these facts in order that he might pass them on to authoritative circles in Ceylon.

2. Telegram No. 218 from Colombo of 9th November speaks of "Further anti-British demonstrations organised by L.S.S.P. and C.C.P." on 8th, and United High Commission still under heavy police guard. Continued press attacks on United Kingdom, France and Israel now accompanied by criticism of Russia. The "Times" is particularly forthright and condemns the Afro-Asian group for abstention in the United Nations. Lake House Group still direct main attacks against the United Kingdom, giving credit for forcing the cease fire".

3. In a conversation which I had with some mutual friends of the former High Commissioner for Ceylon (Mr. Martensz) who have just arrived back in Canberra and who were in the last United Kingdom ships to get through the Canal, they stressed the anti-United Kingdom feeling in Bombay and the xenophobia in Colombo. The short visit of the Duke of Edinburgh had, however, strengthened the position of the United Kingdom. (The Communist Opposition leader, however, now says there is little to choose between Kotelawala and Bandaranaike.)

4. I have arranged with some other friends in Melbourne to entertain privately Bandaranaike's cousin and his wife, the former, being a judge at the Olympic Games. Perhaps other members of the Department, who have relatives or friends in Melbourne, could arrange for the private entertainment of Asian judges and competitors to the games, especially if they come from border-line countries like India, Ceylon or Indonesia?

5. It is submitted that by such means the Olympic Games might prove a useful vehicle of gaining popularity for the Commonwealth as a whole at this juncture, but, of course, considerable tact will have to be used. Private visits to farms, etc., should interest a number of competitors and judges from the border-line countries more than public functions.

J. Oldham
(J. Oldham)

Adviser on Commonwealth Relations.

M. J. J.

Mr. Bellingham JEO:IBS.

has been 13/11

30

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MP:HP

I.15442

FROM:

Dated: 12th November, 1956,
1332

Rec'd: 12th November, 1956,
1800

Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.

RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Addressed to Djakarta 37, repeated to Canberra 539.

Radio Malaya today monitored All India Radio that the Egyptian Government has informed Branch Managers of Air Lines they can resume services through Cairo when ready to do so. This may help in securing the restoration of facilities for Qantas Empire Airways in Djakarta.

2. Qantas here understand Cairo International Airport damaged by bombing. Perhaps the Canadians in Cairo could report on this in consultation with B.O.A.C. Manager Bingham.

....Harry.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " Civil Aviation.
P.M.'s.

T/T. to E.A. Melb.
(for C.A.)

13th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA SEA E,AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P
G

Mr. Landale

*File
Mr Brennan
is dealing with this
was 13/11*

*Assume Mr Brennan is dealing with
this: My rec'd & from was
that our stated airlines was
being allowed to fly through Cairo:*

*Replying para 2, we are not
convinced that our Qantas (Singapore)*

RESTRICTED *regards but our Qantas
(Singapore) conveyed through
Cairo routes*

13/11

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:AS

0,15360

Sent: 12th November, 1956
1745

TO:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

190. SECRET.

Your telegram 213, paragraph 2.

First report that Australians in Egypt had to register with police, was received ten days ago. Cutler then obtained denial from Foreign Ministry. A second report (Cairo radio) was received a few days ago. This suggested Egyptians may have reversed decision. Grateful if Canadian Embassy, Cairo, could report briefly on this position and, if possible, indicate generally how Australians are faring. Did any come out with Cutler?

2. We have had specific enquiries about:-

- (1) Melloy, of Civil Aviation Department, who is in Cairo as a technical expert with I.C.A.O.
- (2) Miss Mary O'Donohue, who was engaged by Greek Ambassador to decorate Embassy.

3. Grateful if specific information could be given on these two persons.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT TRADE (C)
(MR. MCLINTOCK)
P.M'S

13th November, 1956
(Cost £11/18/4)

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME AF&ME DL INF
C&P@ ADMIN PERS

SECRET

28

RESTRICTED

→ 175/11/20

12th November, 1956.

Diplomatic Relations in the Middle-East

THE SECRETARY
MR. KEVIN

The following is an analysis of the rupture of diplomatic relations etc., in the Middle-East as a result of the Anglo/French intervention in Egypt.

(a) Egypt has broken off diplomatic relations with:

United Kingdom	(1st November)
France	(1st November)
Australia	(6th November)

(b) Syria has broken off diplomatic relations with:

United Kingdom
France

(c) Saudi Arabia has broken off diplomatic relations with:

confirmed United Kingdom (about 6th November.
No precise information but would appear to be the case)
France (unconfirmed, thought to be 6th November)

(d) Jordan has broken off diplomatic relations with:

France (1st November)

(e) Iraq has broken off diplomatic relations with:

France (ABC report on 18th November)

2. Other incidents connected with the crisis :-

(a) Soviet Union has recalled its Ambassador from Israel as a mark of displeasure, but has not broken off diplomatic relations.

(b) Lebanon has withdrawn its team from the Olympic Games as a mark of displeasure with Australia (ABC report)

3. We propose to seek confirmation of the position as regards

(a) Saudi Arabia/United Kingdom and France

(b) Iraq/France.

27

(W.G.A. Landale)
E.A. & M.E.

INN;MB
Middle East Section

RESTRICTED

File

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 15376/7/8/9/80/1/2/3/4/5.

FEL:OA.

Sent: 12th November, 1956.
2200

TO:

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO. 321.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA. 221.

Australian Legation,
SAIGON. 155.

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON. 229.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI. 286.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI. 366.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO 247.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA. 529.

Australian Legation,
RIO DE JANEIRO. 24.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK. 456.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Middle East.

No doubt you will be able to obtain from United Kingdom Mission copies of their Foreign Office guidance material. You should use appropriate extracts in your own discussions. Full text of Prime Minister's statement of 8th November has been sent to you.

Cost : £52.13.6.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

13th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
C&F

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SW.MMc

1.15377

Dated: 10th November 1956
1625
Rec'd: 11th November 1956
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
K A R A C H I.

311. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For the Acting Minister.

Reference the part of Menzies' statement of 8th November stating some Asian friends having had little to say on Hungary. Strongly feel that immediate public follow-up desirable referring to the Pakistan Prime Minister's initiative in sponsoring General Assembly resolution and writing to Bulganin vide my telegram 303. This would strengthen the Prime Minister's hand if, as appears likely, he goes on 12th November to Delhi for the Colombo Premiers' Conference. Have had strong hints from a high quarter on this and hope it will be possible before the Delhi meeting.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

11th November, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HP:HP

O.15306
Sent: 10th November, 1956.
1210

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2674. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For External.

Middle East.

Your 3061 paragraph 4.

We should appreciate immediate cabled summary of principal points in current J.I.C. papers on Russian threat and fuller comments by bag.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £4.

12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

SECRET

24

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM. I.15317

FROM:

Dated: 9th November, 1956.
1551

Rec'd: 10th November, 1956.
0915

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

213. SECRET. EMERGENCY.

Following message received this morning by the Department of External Affairs.

(Begins)

Your telegram C89 was only received late this afternoon after the evening papers announced Canada had accepted to be the protecting power. As a result the Foreign Ministry here were in touch with me before I had time to approach them. They have been very co-operative. I was able to visit the Australian Legation without delay and hand to the Minister the message contained in your telegram C.90. You can inform Canberra that Cutler and his staff of three are well and should like this word passed to their families. They will be leaving Cairo tomorrow night 9th November with the staff of the British and French Embassies by special train en route Libya. I hope to be able to let you have tomorrow details of onward journey. We were thankful that the Swiss Legation with all their experience and with the addition of 14 new officers to their staff are kind enough to assist us with their advice in this unfamiliar job.

(Ends).

2. Earlier the Department had advised me of the message reporting that the Australian Legation in Cairo had obtained confirmation from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry that the registration requirement applying to British and French Nationals positively does not apply to Australian Nationals.

3. Will comment in due course on the matters raised in your 189 but you should know that there are no political considerations motivating Canadian reluctance to assume long term responsibility. Paragraph 4 of my 211 together with paragraph 4 of my 212 shall have made this quite clear to you.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " " Trade(Canb.)(Mr. McLintock)
P.M.'s.

10th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME AF&ME INF C&P ADMIN
PERS FIN TRAV EXCOMMS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

AS

I.15282

Dated: 9th November, 1956

1305

FROM:

Rec'd: 10th November, 1956

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3068. CONFIDENTIAL. EMERGENCY.

From External.

Have just been informed by the Foreign Office that Cutler, Cook, Fogg and Walker are being evacuated from Cairo tonight with the British and French Embassy Party. They will proceed by train to Libya whence a special air lift has been arranged to bring them on to Paris and London, arriving here in groups probably Sunday and Monday.

2. The Foreign Office have asked whether these arrangements are satisfactory. They say it would be difficult to make any special provision for our people. After consultation with McCarthy I have told the Foreign Office that though we had no indication of your, or Cutler's wishes, we feel bound to concur.

A/MIN&DEPT EA

A/MIN&DEPT TRADE (C) (MR. MCLINTOCK)

10th November, 1956

C

SEC
PERS

A/Ss
TRAV

UN

PAC&AM

S&SEA

E. AF&ME

INF

C&P@

ADMIN

CONFIDENTIAL

22

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DLB:AS

PRESS.

0.15186

Sent: 9th November, 1956
1030

TO:

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.

348. UNCLASSIFIED.

Following should be added at end of Prime Minister's statement:-

"We have just received messages that this problem is recognized in the speeches made in support of the Afro-Asian resolution. Dr. Walker has reported to us that several nations have said that, in supporting this resolution, they interpret it as meaning that they support a withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces not immediately and so as to leave a vacuum but 'as soon as practicable', having regard to the fact that it will take some time for the International Force to be established and reach the area. Some use phrases such as 'as soon as possible'.

Declarations along these lines have been made, we are told, by Canada, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran and also, be it noted, by the United States.

We have been told that the substance of Mr. Cabot Lodge's statement to the Assembly was first that the United States believed that the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces should be phased with the introduction of the International force and secondly that these operations should be carried out as soon as possible."

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

9th November, 1956
(Cost £1/15/8)

SEC	A/Ss	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.AF&ME
E	AF&ME	INFO	DL	C&P	MT			

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

0.15183/4/5.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

1030.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....450.
PLEASE PASS TO:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....185.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....950.

PRESS: UNCLASSIFIED. URGENT.

Following should be added at end of Prime Minister's statement.

"We have just received messages that this problem is recognised in the speeches made in support of the Afro-Asian resolution. Dr. Walker has reported to us that several nations have said that in supporting this resolution they interpret it as meaning that they support a withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces not immediately and so as to leave a vacuum but "as soon as practicable having regard to the fact that it will take some time for the International Force to be established and reach the area. Some used phrases such as "as soon as possible".

Declarations along these lines have been made, we are told, by Canada, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, and also, be it noted, by the United States.

We have been told that the substance of Mr. Cabot Lodge's statement to the Assembly was first that the United States believed that the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces should be phased with the introduction of the International force and secondly that these operations should be carried out as soon as possible.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £15/16/8)

9th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT AM&SP.
G.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

175/11/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.Record of Conversation with the INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER (MR. MENON)on 9th November, 1956Officers Present THE SECRETARYMAIN SUBJECT(S):MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

1. Menon came to pay his first call. We discussed the Middle East situation without seeking to debate the previous differences between the Indian and Australian position on what had happened in recent days, but it was impossible to avoid touching on these differences.

2. Menon at one point said that the United Kingdom explanation for their intervention as being designed to prevent the blockage of the Suez Canal did not hold water. The Canal was in fact blocked, and it was obvious that it would be blocked. I said I saw no reason why the United Kingdom could foresee so vindictive an act by Egypt as the blockage of transport through the Canal of the commerce of half the world - an act which appeared to have no military value at all. Menon referred to the strong public reactions in India and throughout Asia, saying that he thought, in the circumstances, the Indian Government had been restrained. I said I hoped that those popular opinions would be encouraged to recognize that the prime problem was not Anglo-French colonialism, but -

(a) the need for a permanent settlement of the situation which led to this crisis; and

(b) the inability of the United Nations to do anything to deal with the Israeli invasion.

3. I said it was surely clear that had the U.K. and France not intervened, full-scale war between Israel and Egypt would have been going on at this moment, and the conflict would have spread elsewhere. Surely, there were lessons to learn from this. We had now reached the constructive stage of trying to build for the future and we wanted to build a permanent settlement and it seemed logical that those countries whose attitudes have purported to be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter would be anxious to build a system of enforcement of the settlement reached by negotiation. I asked whether India had any views about the use of the Security Council as against the General Assembly - a choice which we were at present ourselves exploring.

4. Menon was not able to tell me what Delhi's views were.

/5. He asked

DISTRIBUTION:

✓ 1/9 Minister.
✓ Secretary.
✓ 2/9 A/S UN. (1) +
E Asia

(1/1) + Info. *W*
A/S ~~Sec.~~
A/S Admin.
L. & T. Div.

Central Br.
Pacific Br.
Western Br.

D.L. & P.I. Br.
✓ U.N. Branch.
E.R. Branch.
✓ Exp. Arch.

E. & T.A. Br.
C. & P. Br.
C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch.
Antarctic Div.
Melbourne Office.
Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):ACTION:

2960/55.

Report prepared by.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Record of Conversation with the Indian High Commissioner
on 9th November, 1956

2.

5. He asked me whether there was not a need to revive the direct inter-governmental consultation between India and Australia which seemed to have lapsed. I said that we would welcome a continuance of the consultations which already took place frequently in Delhi between our High Commissioner and the Indian Ministry and would be glad to facilitate these consultations in Canberra. I said I was impressed by the desirability of discussion even on subjects where we knew that the Indian and Australian positions would differ in the United Nations, because there was otherwise a risk of misunderstandings of motives and the reasons which caused differences.

.....

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

SECRET

File No.....

Date 9th November, 1956

SUBJECT

ISRAEL-EGYPT

FOR THE SECRETARY.....

*Scully: I shall pass in draft
telegram
11/11/56*

*whether there does
not know whether
withdrawal will be
immediate or only
after our force arrives*

unknown

*Egypt still says
cooper with UN force
dependent on UK-French
withdrawal (which is
divisive)*

I did not ask

*I would rather
not comment by
phone*

If Walker or McIntyre are on the phone to you these are the main questions upon which we need progressive information:-

(i) Exact Israel intentions regarding withdrawal.

(The A.B.C. today quotes an Israeli spokesman as saying that Israel will inform United States and United Nations today that Israeli forces are prepared to withdraw from Egyptian territory and co-operate with United Nations force.)

(ii) Egyptian position regarding cease fire.

(Egyptians were firing yesterday. A Cyprus communique has accused Egypt of breach of the cease fire. At the United Nations yesterday Egypt declared that fighting continued and recalled earlier announcements that "while aggression continues" Egypt will go on fighting.)

(iii) Any sign of change in Egypt's consent to United Nations forces entering their territory.

(The A.B.C. states that Egypt yesterday agreed to accept the United Nations proposals for a United Nations force. In the United Nations the Secretary-General announced that Egypt agreed to the principle that Burns and ten observers should proceed to Cairo at once.)

(iv) Period for which international force will remain in position.

(Syria has claimed that force must be temporary and should not remain indefinitely or necessarily until final political settlement. United Kingdom has said United Nations force should remain pending general settlement and Israeli withdrawal. Our own view is that there should be no Anglo-French withdrawal until an effective international force has gone in, and that the international force will remain until there has been a genuine settlement of outstanding problems.

(v) British position regarding Anglo-French withdrawal.

(The United Kingdom position, as stated yesterday by Mr. Head, is that Anglo-

/ French

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

French forces will not withdraw until the United Nations force is in control. In the General Assembly (on Nov. 4th) Dixon said that the United Kingdom could not accept immediate withdrawal since if United Nations forces did not arrive, the separation now achieved might be destroyed. United Nations forces would arrive too late to avoid new conflagration threatening Suez. Pakistan, Turkey and Iran were among the countries which think that the Anglo-French forces should not withdraw until the United Nations forces arrive.)

(vi) Progress towards constituting the international force and period within which it will be effective in the area.

(vii) What are the -

- (a) powers,
- (b) area of operations of

the United Nations force.

(The Secretary-General's report helps to some extent, but in the General Assembly on 7th November Jordan interpreted that report to mean that the operations of the force would not extend beyond the present area of hostilities. Syria has complained that it lacks military character.)

W.K.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

SECRET

46

*Had not ask
(mainly talked
himself)*

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

OA:SH

I. 15236

Dated: 8th November, 1956
1756

FROM:

Rec'd: 9th November, 1956
1045

Australian High Commission,
O T T A W A

212. RESTRICTED - IMMEDIATE

Your 181.

No replies received up to now from the Canadian Embassy, Cairo (paragraph 1 my 211).

2. Formal expression of our appreciation (paragraph 3 your 181) conveyed to the Canadian Government 8th November. Substance of your 181 discussed with officials, who appeared a little surprised that the question of transfer of protecting duties would not be examined for "a few weeks" (your paragraph 2). They may well raise the desirability of an earlier decision with us in a day or two. Departmental legal advisor commented that the logical moment for such a decision might arise immediately after the completion of initial tasks described in the message to Cutler.

3. Regarding any public statement on the matter, you will presumably inform me of your intentions regarding the text of any announcements before it is made. The Canadians appear to prefer no announcement at this stage until long term arrangements have been finalised. They would certainly insist at present on wording which would clearly indicate that Canada was acting for Australia until a permanent arrangement had been considered and agreed upon. I would suggest that some such addition be made to your miscellaneous 74 in case the terms of it are seen by Canadian representatives or by other Governments.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 above should not be read as implying any change in the position described in paragraph 4 in my 211.

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

9th November, 1956

SEC A/SS UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P ADMIN

RESTRICTED

15

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON (please pass to NEW YORK)

Repeated: LONDON, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL - IMMEDIATE

EGYPT - ISRAEL

Part of our policy as given by the Prime Minister in Parliament yesterday is that it is essential to achieve as soon as possible a real settlement of the Arab-Israel and Suez Canal problems. It is also essential to our mind that the United Kingdom and the United States should make joint efforts to achieve this settlement.

2. Two alternative methods for seeking such a settlement have been proposed in the United Nations. The Assembly has before it two draft resolutions introduced by the United States which propose the establishment of small committees of the Assembly. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and France have proposed an early meeting of the Security Council at the Ministerial level. India has expressed its preference for using the Assembly to secure the settlement.

3. Please ascertain urgently from the Secretary-General whether any progress has been made towards reconciling United Kingdom and French on ^{the} one hand and United States views on the other on this aspect.

4. Our thinking is that the United Kingdom and
APR/bgg /French proposal....

9/11/56.

Mr. Billington
WMS 9/11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

French proposal will probably give rise to suspicions that their motive is to regain control over the settlement of these problems through the veto; unless their proposal is therefore endorsed by the United States, it may be better not to pursue it further. Furthermore, resort to the Security Council for this purpose will give the U.S.S.R. also control over the nature of the settlement. We also feel that in any event the great majority of the Members of the Assembly are not now likely to be willing to pass back to the Security Council the responsibility for working out the settlement.

5. We would not want you at this stage to indicate these doubts about the United Kingdom - French proposal to the State Department but merely to impress upon them the need for United Kingdom and United States agreement on this point and to request information on any progress towards this agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK
REPEATED CROTONATE LONDON (For External)
" AUSTEMBA WASHINGTON

S E C R E T

SECRET

Please continue to keep us informed of developments in the following matters. As regards some of them definitive information may be slow in emerging ~~and the essential thing, of course, is to get the United Nations forces quickly into position without bothering unduly about obtaining a perfect pattern beforehand.~~ Nevertheless, your progressive reports ^{in form of attitude} as they become available on the points mentioned will be of considerable value to us:

- (a) Exact Israeli intentions regarding withdrawal from Egyptian territory (including islands in the Gulf of Aqaba);
- (b) Egyptian intentions regarding the cease fire;
- (c) any sign of change in Egypt's consent to United Nations forces entering Egyptian territory;
- (d) any further elucidation of powers, area of operation, and objectives of the United Nations force;
- (e) progress made towards constituting the United Nations force;
- (f) period for which the United Nations force will remain in Egypt;
- (g) British and French attitude towards withdrawal of Anglo-French forces;
- (h) Soviet attitude to developments.

signed by the Secretary

Wang

9th Nov. 1956

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.....

Date 9th November, 1956.

SUBJECT

French Attitude towards Israeli Action in Egypt.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

Throughout France has maintained the line that it could not support any finding which condemned Israel. This was particularly evident at the time of the Soviet resolution of 30th October which noted Israel's violation of the Armistice Agreement and called upon Israel and Egypt to cease fire and withdraw behind their frontiers.

2. In the course of the debate on this resolution France said Israel had always been surrounded by vigilant enemies who had refused to seek a peaceful settlement or to accept Israel's existence. Egypt was proclaiming expansionist ambitions and "its plan of generalised aggression" was openly interfering in French internal affairs. France could not therefore reach a finding condemning Israel.

3. In speaking to Walker privately after this resolution the French delegate said that they "were already at war with Egypt since several weeks," presumably having in mind Egypt's interference in North Africa and particularly the "Athos" incident.

4. The French appear to have fairly solid parliamentary backing for this policy. Votes obtained have been National Assembly 380 - 191 (three-quarters of which were Communist) and in the Senate 289-19.

5. We have no evidence to support the allegation that the Israeli attacks were staged in collusion with the French, apart from unconfirmed reports that at the time of the attack French naval units were operating off the Northern Coast of Sinai. Press comment was to the effect that these units were engaged in screening operations for the Israelis.

W. M. G. A. Zindler

ERAME

Middle East Section.

Mr. Pilkington

For the file

Nov 9/11

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

restricted

File No.

Date 9th November, 1956.

SUBJECT

FOR MR. KEVIN.

all

** Received yesterday
at 3.30 p.m. (N.Y. time)
6.20 p.m. 7th)*

Egyptian Position as regards Cease-Fire.

On 4th November Egypt announced acceptance of the cease-fire "on condition that it would not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continue their aggression".

Walker has just reported* that in the General Assembly Egypt has said that as long as aggression continues against Egypt on her own territory and in defiance of the Assembly resolutions Egypt shall go on fighting. Egypt reiterated her demand for the removal of Anglo-French forces and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Have the Egyptians consented to the United Nations Force.

The Secretary General announced in the General Assembly yesterday evening that Egypt has agreed in principle that Burns and ten observers may proceed to Cairo at once. We have also just learnt (10.15 a.m.) from the A.B.C. that General Burns after his visit to Cairo has announced that Egypt has accepted the proposal for the ~~Cease-Fire Force~~ *United Nations*.

Israeli Position concerning the Withdrawal from Sinai.

On 7th November Ben Gurion declared that Israel was determined to hold Egyptian territory captured by Israeli forces and that Israel would not allow any foreign forces to enter the area.

This was followed by warnings from Eisenhower and Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General said that Israel would face United Nations action if she failed to withdraw her forces and refused to accept the stationing there of the International Force.

The A.B.C. this morning (7.45 a.m.) said that according to a message just received from Washington a spokesman from the Israeli Embassy had said that Israel will inform the United States and the United Nations today that Israeli troops ~~are~~ *were* prepared to withdraw from Egyptian territory and co-operation with the United Nations Police Force.

According to a United Press report from the United Nations just received (10.15 a.m.) by the A.B.C. Israel has officially announced that she will withdraw her forces from Egypt and co-operate with the United Nations Force.

United Kingdom intention regarding withdrawal.

Yesterday evening the United Kingdom Delegation was instructed to vote for the resolution setting up an Advisory Committee, to take final steps to establish the United Nations Force, with "a pretty tight reservation".

In speaking on the resolution Pearson-Dixon said that the United Kingdom could not accept the immediate withdrawal of Anglo-French forces since, if the United Nations Force did not arrive, the separation achieved by the Anglo-French forces might be destroyed and the United Nations Force might arrive too late to avoid a new conflagration again threatening the Canal. The United Nations Force should be established as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would be prepared to discuss details of the transfer of responsibility.

W 222 9/11

Middle East Section.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 15222.

DBB:CA.

Sent: 9th November, 1956.
1615

TO:

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

523.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PRIORITY.

We are informed through Caltex sources that Indonesians have refused to load "British or Commonwealth" tankers. The vessel "M.G. Walkley" loading for Australia is said to be affected. We have no information on locality.

2. Glad if you would make enquiries and report on what is taking place.

Cost : £6.18.0.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. N.D.
MIN & DEPT. DEF.
F.M'S.

12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA EAF&ME E INF DL MT C&P

Mandate

*Should be upon Statute
to check independence of
Harry's various reports. In fact
the decision was in favour
of Dr
12/11/56*

*Seen by D & the Brennan 12/11/56
No recommendation accepted 12/11/56*

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM⁶Sent: 9th November 1956
1900

TO:

Australian High Commission,
O T T A W A.189. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Your telegram 212. Owing to public anxiety about the position of Australians in Egypt we felt bound to release a press statement on 8th November stating that at the request of the Australian Government, Canada had agreed to act as protecting power in respect of Australian interests in Egypt. The Canadian High Commission was informed of the substance of the announcement, which was issued against the background of the Canadian Cabinet decision on 7th November reported in your telegram 208. (Your telegram 211, paragraph 4 also refers). In framing the statement we also had in mind the desirability of avoiding any reference to phasing which might have been open to misinterpretation.

2. The task of looking after our interests is not likely to prove particularly onerous nor, we hope, will it have to endure for long. Approximately thirty Australians remain in Egypt (although some of these may already have left). We are not at war with Egypt and the type of responsibility arising from that circumstance does not occur. Our trade interests under present circumstances are insubstantial. Our official property interests are as described in the message given you by Stuart for Cutler.

3. While we have said nothing publicly on the point we have kept in mind the possibility that the function of protecting power might have to be transferred from Canada (our telegram 181). Hence we suggested review in the light of the situation a few weeks hence. This appeared to cover the immediate problem. On our estimate the initial tasks were not likely to be completed before that time.

4. We are somewhat puzzled by the Canadian position which may reflect some reluctance to act for us based on political considerations. If this is so please advise us at once. Or does it mean that they simply want us to decide immediately whether we want them to act for us in the longer term? If this is so please tell them that this is what we would prefer.

5. We have today discussed all this frankly with the Acting High Commissioner for Canada; you should nevertheless make your own approach to Canadian officials.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C) (MR. MACLINTOCH)
P.M.'s.

(COST £30.16.8)

12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.15230/31/32

Sent: 9th November 1956
1720

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....454

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission
LONDON (For External)...2657

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....956

SECRET.

New York pass to Washington.

Please continue to keep us informed of developments in the following matters. As regards some of them definitive information may be slow in emerging. Nevertheless, progressive reports of facts or attitude as they become available on the points mentioned will be of considerable value to us:

- (a) Exact Israeli intentions regarding withdrawal from Egyptian territory (including islands in the Gulf of Aqaba);
- (b) Egyptian intentions regarding the cease fire;
- (c) any sign of change in Egypt's consent to United Nations forces entering Egyptian territory;
- (d) any further elucidation of powers, area of operation, and objectives of the United Nations force;
- (e) progress made towards constituting the United Nations force;
- (f) period for which the United Nations force will remain in Egypt;
- (g) British and French attitude towards withdrawal of Anglo-French forces;
- (h) Soviet attitude to developments.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

(COST £33.3.8)

12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR
E.AF&ME E AF&ME

PAC&AM AM&SP

S&SEA SA SEA
INF DL C&P MT

SECRET

7

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

BGH:ABK.

O.15251.

Sent: 9th November, 1956.
1740.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON... (FOR EXTERNAL).

2662. RESTRICTED.

For External.

Acting Minister has approved approach to appropriate authorities for the accreditation to C-in -C Anglo-French forces of the following press correspondents: H.G. Kippax ("Sydney Morning Herald" group), Lyall Turnbull ("Herald-Sun" group Melbourne) and Ronald Monson ("Consolidated Press"). Understand last named now been accredited, telegram 3023 from Foxcroft.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT.
A.N.I.B.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £6/13/4)

12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF@ DL C&P
MT ADMIN PERS.

RESTRICTED

6

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.15224/5/6/7/8

BH

Sent : 9th November, 1956.
1640

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...955

Pass to:
Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK...453.

Repeated:
Australian High Commission,
LONDON. 2656

Pass to:
Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...187

Repeated:
Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON...349.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE.

Egypt-Israel.

Two major aspects of our policy as announced by Prime Minister are that it is essential;

1. to achieve as soon as possible a real settlement of the Arab-Israel and Suez Canal problems;

2. that the United Kingdom and the United States should make joint efforts to achieve this settlement.

2. Two alternative methods have been proposed. The Assembly has before it two draft United States resolutions proposing the establishment of small committees of the Assembly. The United Kingdom and France have proposed an early meeting of the Security Council at the Ministerial level. India has expressed its preference for using the Assembly to secure the settlement.

3. Reference to Security Council would represent a decision to admit full Soviet participation in and control over the settlement. If Soviet frustrated a settlement there would on the face of it be difficulty for United Kingdom and France to bypass a Soviet Veto and refer question to Assembly. On other hand is it contemplated that in event of failure of Council the subject could be got off agenda and initiated in Assembly? In any case is it not now likely that majority in Assembly will be unwilling to pass back to the Security Council the responsibility for working out the settlement.?

4. (For London) Please discuss paragraph 3 with United

CONFIDENTIAL

5

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0:15224/5/6/7/8

Kingdom authorities and repeat their views to us and New York.
You will be aware of yesterday's message from Prime Minister
to Eden.

(For Washington) Please ascertain United States thinking
and emphasize our hope of common United States - United Kingdom
approach.

(Cost £64.15.10)

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

12th November, 1956.

SEC	A/SS	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	SEA	EEAF&ME
E	AF&ME		INF	DL	C&P	MT.			

G.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

PRESS

C.15245

BH

Sent: 9th November, 1956.
1630

TO:

ASIAN POSTS
AND TEL AVIV.

UNCLASSIFIED.

For Guidance.

Egypt-Israel General Assembly, 7th November.

Australia (and the United Kingdom) abstained on (rather than voted against) the Afro-Asian resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of forces because Canada the United States, and three of the sponsors (Pakistan Iran and Turkey) stated that "immediate withdrawal" should be interpreted in regard to Anglo-French forces as meaning as soon as practicable with regard to the introduction of the International force.

2. Australia (and the United Kingdom) voted for resolution establishing of the United Nations force and determining its scope and functions. Australia had resolution amended to inject urgency into the request to Burns to proceed with the organisation of the force. Australia pointed out however, that resolution was not clear on duration of the force. The negotiation of an enduring Israel-Arab settlement would be protracted. Would the force remain long enough to secure the borders while the settlement was obtained?

3. Extracts from Prime Minister's statement to Parliament 7th November telegraphed separately.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

9th November, 1956.

SEC A/CS UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

DB:SH

PRESS

O. 15182

Sent: 9th November, 1956
1038

TO:

Australian High Commission,

L O N D O N. (Please pass European Posts)2650. UNCLASSIFIEDPRIORITY.

Following should be added at the end of Prime Minister's statement.

"We have just received messages that this problem is recognized in the speeches made in support of the Afro-Asian resolution. Dr. Walker has reported to us that several nations have said that in supporting this resolution they interpret it as meaning that they support a withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces not immediately and so as to leave a vacuum but "as soon as practicable having regard to the fact that it will take some time for the International Force to be established and reach the area. Some used phrases such as "as soon as possible".

Declarations along these lines have been made, we are told, by Canada, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, and also, be it noted, by the United States.

We have been told that the substance of Mr. Cabot Lodge's statement to the Assembly was first that the United States believed that the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces should be phased with the introduction of the International force and secondly that these operations should be carried out as soon as possible.

External Affairs
P.M.'s.

9th November, 1956

(COST £5.18.9)

SEC	A/SS	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EAF&ME	AF&ME
INF	DL	C&P	MT						

G

2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

0.15237/8/9/40
Sent: 8th November, 1956.
1630

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.....2659. (Please pass to European
Posts).

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....350.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....188.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....957.

UNCLASSIFIED.

For Guidance.

Egypt-Israel General Assembly 7th November.

Australia (and United Kingdom) abstained instead of voting against Afro-Asian resolution because of declarations (see addendum to Prime Minister's statement telegraphed separately) concerning interpretation of "immediate withdrawal".

2. Australia (and the United Kingdom) voted for resolution on the establishment of the United Nations force. Australia had resolution amended to inject urgency into the request to Burns to proceed with the organisation of the force. Australia pointed out however that resolution was not clear on duration of the force. The negotiation of an enduring Israel-Arab settlement would be protracted. Would the force remain long enough to secure the borders while the settlement was obtained?

3. Prime Minister's statement to Parliament 7th November (extracts to some posts) telegraphed separately.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

9th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G